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T H O U G H T S
ON THE
LETTER of EDMUND BURKE, Esq;
TO THE
SHERIFFS of BRISTOL,
ON THE
AFFAIRS of AMERICA.

Bentley (W)
BY THE EARL OF ABINGDON.

THE SEVENTH EDITION.

"Praise where you *can*, but censure where you *may*."

O X F O R D,

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T H O U G H T S

BY J. D. COLEMAN

LETTER OF EDWARD BURNES

COLLECTIVE

SHERIFFS OF BRISTOL

ON THE

A. D. 1832



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DEDICATION

TO THE
COLLECTIVE-BODYOF THE
PEOPLE of ENGLAND.

THAT I should dedicate the following Thoughts to you needs no Comment. The Thoughts themselves are explanatory of the Reason. They were designed for the public Good, and whatever means the public Good, belongs, in common Right, to you: but that I should dedicate these Thoughts to you at this Period of their Publication, and not at first, calls for Explanation.

I have said that these Thoughts were designed for the public Good: but to design is not to effect. From right Intentions right Measures do not of Course proceed. To obtain the public Good was necessary, and this was my Object; but this too is not of certain Consequence.

Infallibility is not the Characteristic of human Science: For although Wisdom and Folly, like Rest and Motion, are correlative Terms, Fools commit Errors, and the wisest Men do err. Still however Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong, are in their Natures

fixed and immutable: but these being the Ends of Knowledge, and Wisdom the Means to those Ends, the Means applied are not always adequate to the End pursued.

Of this Doctrine the Application to Myself was unavoidable. The public Good was my Object: But whether I had made Use of the proper Means to that End, or no, was not for me to determine. So far indeed as my Intentions went, of their Rectitude I was conscious: but how far I had succeeded in Ability rested upon the Judgment of others.

To the Judgment of others I appealed, and I called upon the Public, if I was wrong, to set me right: I declared that "Truth being my only Object herein, I should as readily look for it in others as seek it in myself;" and I have waited impatiently for the Event: But notwithstanding five Editions of these Thoughts have been had, and much Time has since elapsed, to this very Hour, not the Colour of Objection, nor the Shadow of Argument have been opposed to them.

These then are the Circumstances under which this Dedication now makes its Appearance to you. What Diffidence had before with-held, acquired Confidence hath since produced; and as, on the one Hand, if Truth be with me, my Reward will be in its Use to You; so, on the other, if Error, my Consolation is, that I have been ever ready to retract it.

But having said, that not the Colour of Objection,

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Objection, nor the Shadow of Argument have been opposed to these Thoughts; I feel myself obliged to offer a few Words in Answer to one Writer, who has been pleased to honour me with his public Correspondence. This Writer is a Mr. Cartwright, and who, in a Letter addressed to me*, has, supposing me wrong in a Position that I have laid down, called upon me, with great Propriety, for my Justification. I rejoice to meet such Inquiries. They are the Avenues to Truth. And I am no less pleased with the Inquirer. He has written like a Gentleman, and what is more than this, like an honest Man: For, unlike those *anonymous* Writers, whose Fears are lest the Infamy of their Names should increase the Infamy of their Writings, he has affixed his Name to what he has written. It is therefore Matter of Concern to me to find myself mistaken by this Writer: But my Hopes are, that to remove his Mistake will be equally satisfactory to him, as to me.

Mr. Cartwright has made me to say, "that the Colonists have not a Right to Freedom in Trade;"† and this is the Ground upon which my Error is built: but if I deny the Charge, and prove the contrary Assertion on my Part, my Error falls to the Ground.

When it is said, "that the Colonists have

* Vid. A Letter to the Earl of Abington discussing a Position relative to a fundamental Right of the Constitution, &c. by John Cartwright. Printed for J. Almon, Piccadilly.

† Vid. Mr. Cartwright's Letter, p. 4.

"not a Right to Freedom in Trade," and the
 Page is referred to whence the Quotation is
 taken; one necessarily supposes to find the
 Words quoted in the Page referred to: But
 this is not so. There is not only no such
 Terms to be there found, nor the Meaning of
 such Terms, but the very Reverse of both.
 To take the Matter fairly, I will give the
 Words as they are from the Pages referred to,
 (viz. p. 48, and 49, of the Thoughts). "It may
 "be further asked, What! Are the Americans
 "to enjoy all the Rights appertaining to this
 "Government, and not contribute to its Sup-
 "port? I answer, by no Means; it is not
 "fitting that they should. The fundamental
 "Rights of the English Constitution I have
 "shown to be, *the Security of Life, Liberty, and*
 "*Property, and Freedom in Trade*; and to these
 "Rights all British Subjects *within the Realm*,
 "are without Exception entitled: But it is
 "not so with British Subjects *out of the Realm*,
 "for of them something more has been re-
 "quired, and of them something more has
 "been received. They (I mean the Colonists)
 "surrendered, from the first, one of the fun-
 "damental Rights of the Constitution; to
 "wit, *Freedom in Trade*. This they gave up,
 "and this they put into the monopolizing
 "Hands of their Brethren, as the Gift of Con-
 "tribution for the Price of Protection." ^{supl}
 Where then is it here said, "That the Co-
 "lonists have no Right to *Freedom in Trade*?"

There

There are no such Expressions. Where is the Meaning? I find no such Ideas. I have said that they gave up this Right, that they surrendered this Right, that they put this Right into the monopolizing Hands of their Brethren, as the Gift of Contribution for the Price of Protection: But to do all this they must have been entitled to this Right, for no one can surrender that to another to which he is not entitled himself; and to be entitled to this Right is the very Reverse of the Assertion, "that the Colonists have no Right to Freedom in Trade." "Aye," says Mr. Cartwright, "but this is a Right which could not be parted with. Freedom in Trade is a fundamental Right of the Constitution, and the fundamental Rights of the Constitution are unalienable." Admitted: but the Manner in which this Right was given up, was no Alienation of it. It was held in a State of Reversion. *For cessat Ratio, cessat et ipsa Lex.* It was a Thing given for a Thing to be received in Exchange. *A Quid pro Quo.* Right for Power, Contribution for Protection; and if Protection ceased, (or was withdrawn, as has been the Case) Contribution ceased likewise; and the Right reverted (as it has done) to its native Source. Besides; This was a Point of speculative Disquisition upon which I did not enter. I spoke to a Matter of Fact. A Fact of public Notoriety, and incontestible. A Fact which

Mr. Cartwright himself admits; namely, that this Country did monopolize the Trade of America to the Year 1764.*

Nay, more: I spoke from the Offers and Wishes of the Colonists themselves through their Congress, that this *mutual Compact* might continue; (*vide* p. 54. of the *Thoughts*;) and beyond this I did not look. It was not for me to dispute the Powers, nor define the Rights of Congress. I was satisfied with both in their Hands, and I had had too many Proofs of their consummate Wisdom upon these Topics, not to say of them as Hamlet did of his Father's Ghost; "I'll take the Ghost's Word for a thousand Pounds"†

So that although I had been *speculatively* wrong, so far as the Authority of the Congress went, I was *practically* right, and as it further appears that I did not say, nor mean to say, "That the Colonists had no Right to Freedom in Trade," nor yet had a Wish to deprive them of *that*, or of any other *natural or political* Right whatsoever to which they were entitled; so I had here (satisfactorily too I should hope) have taken Leave of Mr. Cartwright, if there had not been one Point more remaining, whose Merits I could wish a little to discuss; not only because they do not seem to be thoroughly understood, but because,

* *Vid.* Letter, p. 10.

† Mr. Cartwright says, "He does not mean to take the Congress at their Word, because," says he, "their Offer exceeded what they could possibly have had legal Powers to fulfil." *Vid.* Letter, p. 32.

upon their due Solution, the most important constitutional Doctrine hangs.

The Point is this. Mr. Cartwright objects to my calling the Americans, *British* Subjects; and says that they are *American* Subjects: But, as if conscious of an Impropriety, he converts them, by a Note immediately after, into *British American* Subjects.* His Argument is, "Their Allegiance to the King did not make them *British* Subjects: For were that so, then would the Hanoverians be *British* Subjects: But the Truth is, the People of Hanover are his Hanoverian Subjects, the People of Great Britain his *British* Subjects, the People of Ireland his *Irish* Subjects; and so, in like Manner, the People of America were his *American* Subjects." And then he subjoins the following Note in Explanation of himself. "I do not mean to insinuate that Great Britain's Connections with British America and with Hanover were of the same Nature, because I know they agreed only in the sole Circumstance of the respective Countries having the same Sovereign."

Now although Mr. Cartwright is a little right herein, in my Opinion he is a great deal wrong; and where his Error is, I will take the Liberty to suggest. It is true, that the Allegiance of the Colonists to the King did not make them *British* Subjects: for then, as it is said, the Hanoverians would be *British* Subjects. It is also true, that the People of Ha-

* Vid. Letter, p. 5.

noyer are *his* Hanoverian Subjects, the People of Great Britain *his* British Subjects, the People of Ireland *his* Irish Subjects, and that the People of America were *his* American Subjects; But it is *as true*, that the People of Great Britain and the People of Ireland *are*, and that the People of America were *British* Subjects likewise, which the People of Hanover are not; and the Reason of this is, that as *Members of the British Empire* their Allegiance is annexed to the Crown of England, which constitutes them all *British* subjects equally and alike; Whereas the Allegiance of the People of Hanover is not to the Crown of England, but to the King of England; thereby making them Subjects to the King, but not *British* Subjects. And hence arises the Ground of Mistake upon which Mr. Cartwright seems to have trodden.

The great, the important Line of Distinction, which the Constitution has drawn between the King of England and the Monarchy of England, or, in more common Phrase, between the King of England, and the Crown of England, is here totally unnoticed; although upon this Difference not only the understanding of this Point rests, but much other Matter of the last Consequence depends.

That the King of England is not the same, in all Respects, with the Crown of England, or that, in other Words, the King of England and the Monarchy of England are separable, and not inseparable, is a Proposition not to be contested.

not on

But

But if it were, there needs no better Examples for its Proof, than those that are before us. To say That the People of Hanover are the King's Hanoverian Subjects, and that the People of America were his American Subjects, is admitted by Mr. Cartwright; and it is added by me, that the People of America were also *British* Subjects: which (as Mr. Cartwright likewise admits) the People of Hanover are not: But let us try this State of these Examples in the Position of a Case.

Before that bigotted Tyrant James II. had his Crown taken from his Head, and was driven out of this Kingdom, as one unfit to wear that Crown, the People of America were his American Subjects; and if we suppose that he was also Elector of Hanover, it will follow that the People of Hanover were his Hanoverian Subjects: But mark the Difference in the Sequel.

When James II. was driven out of the Kingdom, did the People of America continue his Subjects? No. When James II. was driven out of the Kingdom, did the People of Hanover continue his Subjects? Yes. Why? The Reason is plain. The People of America, being Members of the *British* Empire, owed Allegiance to the Monarchy of the State; and through that Monarchy to the Monarch: But in the Instant that the Monarch ceased to reign, although Allegiance continued to the Monarchy, it ceased to the Monarch. The Facts are true in all their Parts. Upon the Expul-

sion

* : Crown to the King
tion of James II. the People of America were no longer *his* Subjects, but they were still Subjects; for they owed Allegiance to the Monarchy: which Monarchy continued to exist, though without a Monarch* (or otherwise an Appeal must have been made to you as the Collective Body of the People to form another Constitution); and when the Monarchy was filled in the Person of our glorious Deliverer William III, Allegiance vested in him; and the People of America, before Subjects to the Monarchy, now became Subjects to the King. But it was not so with the People of Hanover: For they, *not being Members of the British Empire*, owed no Allegiance to the Crown or Monarchy, but their Allegiance was *personal* to the King, as Elector of Hanover: which Personality James II. carried away with him, and the People of Hanover did not continue Subjects to the King, in the Person of William III.†

From these Circumstances then, the following Corollaries result: That the Allegiance of Subjects is due to the Crown, and through the

In the famous Conference between the Lords and Commons at the Convention, Serjeant Maynard said, "that the Constitution notwithstanding the Vacancy, was the *same*"; that the Laws that were the Foundations and Rules of that Constitution were the *same*; but if there was in any particular Instance a Breach of that Constitution, that would be an Abdication, and an Abdication would infer a Vacancy," &c. See Echard's Hist. of Eng. B. 3, ch. 5, p. 144. Fol. Edit.

† It must be noted, that what is here said of James II. is upon the supposed Fact (which is as conclusive as if real) that he was both King of England and Elector of Hanover. In the Person of George I. the Fact existed, and continues so to do.

Crown;

Crown, to the King wearing that Crown: * That every Member of the Empire owes Allegiance to the Crown, and of course is both a British Subject, and a Subject to the King: But every Subject to the King is not a Member of the Empire (as in the Case of Hanover), and therefore, not owing Allegiance to the Crown, is not a British Subject: That this Allegiance to the Crown arises out of the Constitution, for it was the Constitution that created the Monarchy, and the Monarchy the King, not the King the Monarchy: That when the King ceases to be King, the Crown retains its Allegiance, and the King does not; for it is the Crown that conveys Allegiance to the King! When James II. was a *Vagabond* in France, the Crown of England gave Allegiance to William III; and of this Sort Precedents in our History are multitudinous, but here superfluous. † And now there being another Species of Allegiance, which, the Constitution

* This Doctrine whilst it destroys the Jesuitical Distinction of a King *de Jure*, and a King *de Facto*, is incontestably proved by the Authorities that Sir William Blackstone quotes, though in Opposition to his own Opinion. Serjeant Hawkins says, "that a King out of Possession is so far from having any Right to our Allegiance by Virtue of any other Title which he may set up against the King *in Being*, that we are bound by the Duty of our Allegiance to resist him." Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, v. 4, p. 77, and Hawk. Pl. Cr. B. 1, p. 36. See also Hale's Pl. Cr. B. 1, p. 60.

† The Spencers in the Reign of Edward II. maintained, "That Homage and Legiance is due to the King, rather in Relation to the Crown, than absolutely to his Person; because no Legiance is due to him before the Crown be vested upon him; that if the King do not govern according to Law, the Lieges in such Case are bound by their Oath to the Crown to remove him either by Law or Rigour." See Nat. Bac. Disc. part 2, p. 52.

knowing

knowing nothing at all of, I will here just mention in Ridicule and Contempt, and because it is owing to this Innovation, that the Crown of England has lost more than one Half of its Empire. This new-fangled Doctrine is, that Allegiance is due to the Legislature, or to the Parliament, or as the Archbishop of York calls it, by Way of giving the Ton of the Times in a *clandestine Publication** of his, (if I may so speak) "*Allegiance to the State*;" thereby making of every Member of the State a petty King, or petty Tyrant; and taking, as a Member of the State himself, of course Allegiance to himself. But, as I have observed before, Allegiance is due to the Monarchy, and to no other Part of the State; and the Monarchy admits but of one King at a Time, and the Aristocracy and the Democracy of none.

But I have said, that upon the due Solution of the Merits of this Point, the most important constitutional Doctrine hangs; and I will concisely explain myself. The Doctrine, I allude to, is that of the *Attributes* ascribed to the King: Attributes which however strictly just in Institution, by no Means warrant the Inferences that are drawn from them.†

The Case, in a Word, is this. When the

* This Publication was a Sermon which was preached, and printed, and handed about: But not advertized in the public Prints, nor sold.

† These Inferences are, that "the King can do no wrong" that "the King never dies," that "the King is always a Minor," &c.

Constitution of England was formed, a Combination of the three Forms of Government (viz. Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy) for the Purpose of one, being, as is evident therefrom, the Object of Settlement; it was not only necessary that the Rights appertaining to each Form should remain, but that these Rights should be clearly ascertained, in order to produce, by their separate Counteractions, the great Designation of their Union. To the Monarchy then was given *Sovereignty*, *Perfection*, and *Perpetuity* as Attributes, in the *Abstract*, essential to its Existence: For without *Sovereignty*, Power had no Source of Derivation, without *Perfection* Error, which was to be avoided, was imputable; without *Perpetuity* what was meant to last was subject to Annihilation; and therefore such were the constitutional Attributes of the Monarchy: but because these Attributes were so predicated of the Monarchy, does it therefore necessarily follow that they are the existing Qualities of the Monarch? An Example will afford the best Proof, and one Example will suffice for all the Rest.

From the abstract Attribute of Perfection in the *Monarchy*, it is inferred, "that the *King* can do no wrong;" and, in Illustration of this Doctrine, Sir William Blackstone lays it down,

"In a Constitution like ours, the Safety of the Whole depends on the Balance of the Parts; and the Balance of the Parts on their mutual Independency on one another." Vide *Boling. Rem. Hist. of Eng. O. S. Ed. p. 30.*

that

that "the *King* is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: He can never mean to do an improper Thing: In him is no Folly or Weakness."* But let us see how this Westminster-Hall Inference, (for it is called a *legal Maxim*) and its Comment agree with the Constitution, with Nature, with Reason, with Common Sense, with Experience, with Fact, with Precedent, and with Sir William Blackstone himself; and whether, by the Application of these Rules of Evidence thereto, it will not be found; that (from the Want of Attention, as I have taken Notice of before, to that important Line of Distinction which the Constitution has drawn between the *King* of England, and the *Crown* of England) what was attributed to the *Monarchy* has not been given to the *Monarch*, what meant for the *Kingship* conveyed to the *King*, what designed for the *Thing* transferred to the *Person*, what intended for *Theory* applied to *Practice*; and so in Consequence that whilst the Premises (of the *Perfection* of the *Monarchy*) be true, the Conclusion (that the *King* can do no wrong) be not false. †

* Vid. Black. Comm. v. 1. p. 246. This Comment upon the Text that "the King can do no wrong," might have passed well enough in the Reign of James I.; and no doubt would have been very acceptable to that *learned Idiot*: But it is now a Century and a Half since that Reign, and "Mankind being," according to Doctor Priestly, "in a progressive State of Improvement," are of Course a Century and a Half wiser. Vid. Priestly on Government, p. 2.

† "How easily does the Worship of the *Divinity* degenerate into "a Worship of the *Idol*?" Vid. Hume's Essays, p. 46.

And first in Reference to the Constitution: To which if this Matter be applied (meaning what it expresses, and if it do not it is unworthy of Notice) it is subversive of a Principle in the Constitution, upon which the Preservation of the Constitution depends; I mean the Principle of *Resistance*: A Principle which, whilst no Man will now venture to gainsay, Sir William Blackstone himself admits, "is justifiable to the Person of the Prince when the Being of the State is endangered, and the public Voice proclaims such Resistance necessary;" and thus, by such Admission, both disproves the Maxim, and oversets his own Comment thereupon: For to say that "the King can do no wrong," and that "he is incapable even of thinking wrong," and then to admit that "Resistance to his Person is justifiable," are such jarring Contradictions in themselves, that until reconciled, the Necessity of Argument is suspended.*

With Respect then, in the next Place, to the Agreement of this Maxim and its Comment with Nature, with Reason, and with Common Sense, I should have thought myself sufficiently justified in appealing to every Man's own Reflection for Decision, if I had not been made to understand that Nature, Reason, and Common Sense had had nothing to do with either. Sir William Blackstone says, "That though a philosophical Mind will con-

* Vid. Blackstone's Comm. v. 1. p. 251.

"sider the royal Person merely as one Man
 "appointed by mutual Consent to preside
 "over others, and will pay him that Reve-
 "rence and Duty which the Principles of So-
 "ciety demand, yet the Mass of Mankind will
 "be apt to grow insolent and refractory if
 "taught to consider their Prince as a Man of
 "no greater Perfection than themselves; and
 "therefore the Law ascribes to the King, in
 "his high political Character, certain Attri-
 "butes of a great and transcendant Nature,
 "by which the People are led to consider him
 "in the Light of a *superior Being*, and to pay
 "him that awful Respect which may enable
 "him with greater Ease to carry on the Bu-
 "siness of Government." So that, in order
 to govern with greater Ease, (which by the
 bye is mere Assertion without any Proof) it
 is necessary to *deceive* the Mass of Mankind,
 by making them believe, not only what a phi-
 losophical Mind cannot believe, but what it is
 impossible for any Mind to believe; and there-
 fore in the Investigation of this Subject, accord-
 ing to Sir William, neither Nature, Reason,
 nor Common Sense can have any Concern.

But however desirous I might be to yield
 up my Senses, to the Authority of so great a
 Man; I am from the same Authority, with-
 held from doing so: For if I could believe
 that the King was a *superior Being*, I should
 have no Hesitation to believe a Doctrine, which
 Sir William himself explodes; and explodes
 because

because repugnant “*to common Reason*.” I mean the Doctrine of “*the Divinity of regal Sway*,” which James I, and the Rest of his Race, thought fit to assume to themselves. I say I should not hesitate at this, because the one necessarily follows from the other. If James I. was a *superior Being*, his Government was *de jure divino*; and if it be necessary to impose a Belief on the Mass of Mankind in the former Instance, why should it not be equally necessary in the latter? The Cases do not seem to me to differ, though Sir William’s Sentiments do upon them; and therefore being thus left at my Option, I must own I cannot countenance Politics of such a Complexion. They may be the Politics of *Machiavel*, but, I am sure, they are not the Politics of *John Bull*. *Sum Davus non Oedipus*, says honest John; and “Honesty is the best Policy” with him.* It is the only Policy of our Government, and if this Knowledge were not as old as the Government itself, a modern Proof would afford the fullest Conviction. Contrast the Administration of that *virtuous* Statesman, the late Earl of Chatham, with that of the present *notorious* Minister, whoever he be; † and the Demonstration of

* “*Hæc Romana esse*,” says Livy, “*Non versutiarum Punicarum, neque Calliditatis Græcæ, apud quos fallere Hostem gloriosus, deo quam Virtute.*”

† Lord North has repeatedly declared in the House of Commons “that he never looked upon himself in the Light of Minister, that he was no more than the Servant of the Public, whose Councils it was his Business to execute and not to direct;” and to this Declaration his Lordship has, in the same Manner, added this prudent Resolution, “that (without Responsibility, and although the Councils

Euclid will follow. The *former*, by knowing that "Honesty *was* the *best* Policy," and by making that the Rule of his Administration, brought this Country to a Pitch of Glory, Grandeur, and Power, unknown to any other State antient or modern: The *latter*, by believing that "Honesty *was* the *worst* Policy," and by making that the Rule of his Ministry, has reduced this once proud Empire to the contemptible Level of the Minister himself.

It remains to examine in how much this Maxim and its Comment agree with Experience, with Fact, with Precedent, and with Sir William Blackstone himself. And here it is Matter of most curious Speculation, to observe a Maxim laid down, and which is intended for a Rule of Government, not only without a single Case in support of it, but with a String of Cases that may be carried back to *Egbert* the first Monarch of England, in direct Opposition to the Doctrine. Who is the Man, that reading the *past* History of which he is to execute be fatal to the Interests of the Nation) "he will not resign, but will continue to hold the Office of Prime Minister," and of Course to enjoy the Honours and Emoluments that are to be derived from it. How different the Earl of Chatham! The Earl of Chatham *resigned* his Office, because he would not be answerable for Measures that he did not direct; Lord North *holds* his Office, because he neither directs the Measures nor is answerable for them. But it is in this Instance alone, that any Comparison between these two Characters is intended: for Lord Chatham was Minister in Fact as well as in Office, and as such the People looked up to him; whilst Lord North openly confesses his own mere Ostensibility, and the People look down on him as one, whose sole Occupation is, by the mere Dint of *Joke* from the Treasury Bench, to get their Money into the Treasury. And in this it must be owned, *no* *Servant of the Public* ever *outjoked* his Lordship.

this

this Country, will shew us any King that has done no wrong? Who is the Reader that will not find, that all the Wrongs and Injuries which the free Constitution of this Country has hitherto suffered, have been solely derived from the arbitrary Measures of our Kings? And yet the Mass of Mankind are to look upon the King, as a superior Being; and the Maxim that "the King can do no wrong," is to remain as an Article of Belief. But without pushing this Inquiry any further, let us see what Encouragement Sir William Blackstone himself has given us for our Credulity. After stating the Maxim, and presenting us with a most lively Picture, "of our sovereign Lord thus *all perfect and immortal*," what does he make this All-perfection and Immortality in the End to come to? * His Words are these: "For when King Charles's deluded Brother attempted to *enslave* the Nation," (*no Wrong this, to be sure*) "he found it was beyond his Power: the People both COULD, and did resist him: and in Consequence of such Resistance, obliged him to quit his Enterprize and his Throne together." †

The Sum of all is this: That the Crown of England and the King of England are distinguishable, and not synonymous Terms: That Allegiance is due to the Crown, and through the Crown to the King: That the Attributes of the Crown are Sovereignty, Perfection,

* Vide Blackstone's Comm. v. 1. p. 250. † Id. v. 4. p. 433.

tion, and Perpetuity; but that it does not therefore follow, "that the King can do no wrong." It is indeed to be admitted, that in high Respect for the Crown, high Respect is also due to the Wearer of that Crown; that is, to the King: But the Crown is to be preferred to the King, for the first Veneration is due to the Constitution. It is likewise *to be supposed*, that the King *will* do no wrong; and as to prevent this, a Privy Council is appointed by the Constitution to assist the King in the Execution of the Government, so if any Wrong be done, "these Men," as Montesquieu expresses it, "may be examined and punished".*

But if any future King shall think to screen these evil Counsellors, from the just Vengeance of the People, by becoming *his own Minister*; and, in so doing, shall take for his Sanction, "*the Attribute of Perfection*," shall trust to the Deception of his being "*a superior Being*," and cloak himself under the Maxim, that "*the*

* Except the Parliament, which is the great Council of the Nation, the Judges, and the Peers, who, being the hereditary Counsellors of the Crown, have not only a Right, but are bound in *Foro Conscientiæ* to advise the King for the public Good; the Constitution knows of no other Council than the *Privy Council*. Any other Council, like Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, Lauderdale, and as the Initial Letters of these Names express, is a C A B A L, and as such should be suppressed. Nat. Bacon, speaking of the Loss of Power in the grand Council of Lords, says, "The Sense of State once contracted into a *Privy Council*, is soon re-contracted into a *Cabinet Council*, and last of all into a *Favourite* or two; which many Times brings Damage to the Public, and both *Themselves* and *Kings* into extreme *Precipices*; partly for Want of Maturity, but principally through the Providence of God over-ruling irregular Courses to the Hurt of such as walk in them." *Pol. Disc.* part 2. pag. 201.

"*King can do no wrong*;" I say, in such a Case, let the Appeal already made to the Constitution, to Nature, to Reason, to Common Sense, to Experience, to Fact, to Precedent, and to Sir William Blackstone himself suffice, and preclude the Necessity of any further Remarks from me.*

Having thus explained the Reason of this Dedication to you, and having removed the only seeming Obstacles that have been thrown in my Way, with such Observations and Remarks upon them, as may be found perhaps not altogether impertinent; I now come to say a Word or two more in Addition to the Thoughts themselves, as tending not only to their Elucidation, but as serving, more directly, to point out the Source of our present Political Distractions, in order to their Remedy and Redress.

In the Course of the following Thoughts, the principal Object of Consideration has been the Doctrine of "the Omnipotency of Parliament:" But as the Importance of this Doctrine rises, in Proportion to the Attention that is given to it, so a Renewal of the Subject here,

* For Experience, Fact, and Precedent, see the Reigns of King John, Henry III. Edward II. Richard II. Charles I. and James II. See also *Mirror of Justices*, where it is said, "that this grand Assembly (meaning the now Parliament or then Wittenagemotte) is "to confer the Government of God's People, how they may be kept "from Sin, live in Quiet, and have Right done them, according to "the Customs and Laws; and more especially of *Wrong done by "the King, Queen, or their Children*:" To which Nat. Bacon adds this Note, "At this Time *the King might do wrong*, &c. and "so say Bracton and Fleta of *Kings in their Time*." Disc. part 1. pag. 37. Lond. 1739.

and to which alone I mean to confine myself, will not, I trust, be thought a Work of Supererogation in me; nor yet, leading as it does to a proposed Plan of Reformation, will it prove without its Use to you.

The Doctrine itself is, as I have just stated it to be, that of "the Omnipotency of Parliament;" and it is under this Head that I now mean to consider it: But it having made its Appearance to the World under other Topics of Argument differing in Expression, according to its different Assertors, though agreeing in Sentiment; it may not be amiss that each be brought in Conjunction with the other, that all in one collected View may be seen. By one then, it has been called "the Supremacy of Parliament:" by another, "the Right of Parliament to *unlimited* Power in and over the "whole British Empire:" By a third, "a Right "to bind by Act of Parliament *in all Cases* "*whatsoever*;" and so says a modern Statute of itself: By a fourth, it is said, "that the "Legislative Authority of King, Lords, and "Commons is as *despotic* over all Britons, let "them live wherever they please, as the "Grand Turk is over his own Subjects." And again, "Absolute Despotism must lodge somewhere, and nothing can be more unlimited "in Power than an Act of Parliament:."* And lastly, as if to concenter all possible Powers

* See Political Essays printed for W. Strahan, and T. Cadell in the Strand, 1762. pag. 39.

into one, the Phrazeology adopted is, "the Omnipotence of Parliament." And which I mention again, last as well as first, because the Weight of Authority whence this Position is derived has, I am led to think, not only established this Doctrine in Theory, by the implicit Faith of others therein, but has proved too the unhappy Foundation of its Practice.*

Such I say then is the Doctrine, and these the Terms of Language in which it has been conceived and expressed: But I may now perhaps be told, that if such Weight be due, as I have admitted, to the Authority upon which this Doctrine seems to rest; it is, at least, a Mark of Presumption in me, under any Circumstances, to controvert, or in any Shape, to raise Objections thereto. And of this Reproof, so far as it goes, there is no one who more sensibly feels the Impression than myself. But my Justification being grounded on a Maxim of long Influence over my Conduct, that to Precedents not founded on Right, and to Authority, however great, not supported by Reason, no *Deference* is due; † this will lead me to the Application of this Maxim to the present Case, and of Course to an Examination of the Subject more particularly and in Detail.

* Mr. Addison says, "Most of our Fellow-subjects are guided either by the Prejudice of Education, or a *Deference* to the Judgment of those who, perhaps, in their own Hearts, disapprove the Opinions which they industriously spread among the Multitude."

† This Maxim is, to those who adopt it, the Exception to Mr. Addison's Rule.

The

The Authority alluded to, I am already anticipated in saying, is that of Sir William Blackstone; for to whom can such Weight be due if not to the learned Author of the Commentaries on the Laws of England! But to this Authority it is now necessary, from these Commentaries, to add the following Quotation; that the one may support the other, and that both may stand the Test of Inquiry. "The Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament," says Sir Edward Coke, "is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for Causes or Persons, within any Bounds.* And of this high Court" (of Justice, I think Sir Edward calls it) he adds, "it may be truly said, *Si Antiquitatem spectes, est vetustissima; si Dignitatem, est honoratissima; si Jurisdictionem, est capacissima.* It hath sovereign and uncontrollable Authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of Laws, concerning Matters of all possible Denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the Place where that absolute despotic Power, which must in all

* This Quotation from Sir Edward Coke is stated by Judge Hales in the following Manner: "Of the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament *for making of Laws in proceeding by Bill*, it is so transcendent and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for Causes or Persons within any Bounds." The Words *for making of Laws in proceeding by Bill* are omitted by Sir William Blackstone: The Insertion of which is, *quoad hoc*, a plain Limitation of the Power of Parliament; whereas its Omission is inasmuch an Enlargement of that Power. See Hales of the Original Institution of Parl. p. 46.

" Governments reside somewhere, is entrusted
 " by the Constitution of these Kingdoms.
 " All Mischiefs and Grievances, Operations
 " and Remedies, that transcend the ordinary
 " Course of Laws, are within the Reach of
 " this extraordinary Tribunal. It can regu-
 " late or new model the Succession to the
 " Crown, as was done in the Reign of Henry
 " VIII. and William III. It can alter the
 " established Religion of the Land, as was
 " done in a Variety of Instances, in the
 " Reigns of Henry VIII. and his three Chil-
 " dren. It can change and create afresh even
 " the Constitution of the Kingdom, and of
 " Parliaments themselves; as was done by
 " the Act of Union, and the several Statutes
 " for triennial and septennial Elections. It
 " can, in short, do every Thing that is not
 " naturally impossible; and therefore some
 " have not scrupled to call its Power, by a
 " Figure rather too bold, *the Omnipotence of Par-*
 " *liament.* True it is, that what Parliament
 " doth no Authority upon Earth can undo." *

This is the Quotation. But what is there
 in this Quotation that is decisive of the Doc-
 trine intended to be laid down therein? I
 will examine its several Parts. And, *First*, it
 consists of an Appeal to the Authority of Sir
 Edward Coke: *Secondly*, it rests on Precedents:
 and, *Thirdly*, it contains, without Argument

* Vide Blackstone's Comm. vol. i. pag. 161. for what further is
 said upon this Subject.

or Reasoning, without Principles or Maxims, the bare Assertion and Opinion of Sir William himself. "True it is," says Sir William, "that what Parliament doth, no Authority upon Earth can undo."

Of the *first* then, the Appeal to Sir Edward Coke is but an Appeal from one Authority to another; and as such is to be regarded only: But here the Question is, does the Authority of Sir Edward Coke give Sanction to this Appeal? Or, in other Words, does it furnish such Premises as warrant the Conclusions that Sir William has drawn from it? I think not; and I reason thus. That the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament, in the Exercise of those Rights which the Constitution hath established, is *transcendent* and *absolute*, is not to be disputed; but to be *transcendent* and *absolute* is not to be *despotic*, as Sir William hath inferred: for in Despotism the very Idea of Rights is excluded. And that this was the Meaning of Sir Edward Coke must be presumed, or Sir Edward will be found to have contradicted himself; for he hath said too, (and if his Authority is to be taken in one Instance, it must be received in another) "That the Common and Statute Laws of England are, in the Mass and Bulk of them *unalterable*."* So that if the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament was *despotic*, the Mass and Body of the Laws of England

* 2 Inst. pag. 187. Bracton. W.

could

could not be *unalterable*; for the Power of Despotism is *unlimited*: but the Mass and Body of the Laws of England are, according to Sir Edward, *unalterable*; and therefore, according likewise to Sir Edward, the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament cannot be *despotic*: for each Assertion contradicts the other, and “*Dua contradictoria non possunt simul esse vera.*”

But to illustrate this Matter by Example. An Act of Parliament passes, declaratory of the Right of the Subject to Trial by Jury; and declares, that, Whereas the Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench hath assumed to himself the Power of determining by his Decision Matters cognizable only to Juries, to the Suppression of Trial by Jury, and to the Introduction of the Tyranny of the Civil Law in Exclusion of the Liberty upheld by the Common Law of the Land;* Be it therefore enacted, and it is hereby enacted and declared, That Trial by Jury is, and ever hath been, an original and fundamental Right of the Constitution established *per Legem Terræ*, unalterable and irrevocable but by a Conven-

* “About the Year 1666 the Lord Chief Justice Kelyng was questioned in Parliament for over-awing and putting a Restraint upon Juries; and the House came to several Resolutions upon his Case, and ordered him to be prosecuted: But by Reason of the House being prorogued, and he himself not long after dying in Discontent, we do not find there were any further Proceedings made therein.” *Triumphs of Justice*, fol. Lond. 1681. p. 29, 36.

Cardinal Wolsey too by his endeavouring to introduce the *Imperial Laws*, and by an exorbitant Use of his Legatine Power, lost all and died in Ignominy and Disgrace. 4 Inst. 89. 3 Inst. 208.

tion of the People (as at the Revolution)* intending an Alteration therein, and agreeing thereto, &c. &c.

In this Act then it is plain, that the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament is *transcendent* and *absolute*, but not *despotic*; for nothing derogatory to the Constitution is enacted therein: but on the contrary, whilst the Act is founded upon, and *grows out of the Constitution*,† over which the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament is by Institution placed for Protection, it shews demonstratively what that “supreme Legislative Authority of Great Britain,” so much talked of, and yet so little understood, is; and which, when considered in this Light, is certainly so far “not to be confined, either for Causes or Persons, within any Bounds,” that from the very Nature of Society, as well as by Compact, the whole Force of the Empire is bound to support it.

But let the Weights be now placed in the opposite Scale, and suppose an Act of Parliament to pass to the following Effect; That whereas it hath been found by our trusty and well-beloved Chief Justice of the Court of King’s-Bench that Trials by Jury, although an

* “The Settlement at the Revolution was made by a Convention of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and a *full and free* Representative of the *whole Body* of the People.” See Dissertation on Part. pag. 129.

† Junius says, “Be assured that the *Laws*, which protect us in our Civil Rights, *grow out of the Constitution*, and that they must fall or flourish with it. See Junius’s Letters, Dedic. p. 3.

original and fundamental Right of the People established by the Constitution, and supported by the Law of the Land, are become inconvenient and of Hindrance to the present Object of Government, and that the *Decretals* of Judges in the Stead thereof will be better suited to the End proposed; Be it therefore Enacted, and it is hereby Enacted, &c. &c. Now by this Act the Power and Jurisdiction of Parliament is not only *transcendent* and *absolute*, but it is *despotic*. It is to assume a Power to which it is not by Right entitled. It is Usurpation. It is to take away that, which, by Institution, it was designed to protect. It is to destroy, and not to preserve a Right. And therefore such an Act of Parliament is not only *ipso facto* illegal and void, but the whole united Force of the Community is bound to oppose it; to demand its Repeal; and to pursue the Framers thereof to the same condign Punishment, that the great Hampden did Charles the First, for his illegal and unconstitutional Proceedings.

So much then for the Appeal to the Authority of Sir Edward Coke. And now, secondly, for the Precedents quoted; of which enough having been said, “as importing no Authority but upholding Error,” in the Thoughts themselves, I shall here content myself with a short Question or two only in Remark upon them.

If the Alteration from triennial to septennial
Elec-

Elections be produced by Sir William as a Precedent to determine the Omnipotence, or Right of Parliament, "to change and create afresh the Constitution;" may not this same Omnipotence "change and create afresh the Constitution" by another Act of Parliament, and declare the House of Commons independent of the People, and *perpetual*? And will Sir William venture to say that Parliament hath a Right to do this? I must answer, Most certainly: Or, otherwise, Omnipotence is no longer omnipotent. But Sir William hath already said so: For he hath affirmed "that what Parliament doth no Authority upon Earth can undo," and so of Course if this be done, it cannot be undone; though in Consequence thereof, *Actum est de Republicâ*. But it may be objected, that this is an *unreasonable* Supposition; and perhaps it is: And yet even this is no Argument with Sir William: For he tell us in another Place, "That if Parliament will positively enact a Thing to be done which is *unreasonable*, I know of no Power that can controul it."* And therefore saith the Omnipotence of Parliament, through the Breath of Sir William; I will enact what is *unreasonable*, and you the Collective-Body of the People of England shall receive it as *reasonable*. I will make the King *absolute*, and the House of Commons *perpetual* to register his Edicts, and you shall

* See Blackstone's Comm. v. i. p. 91.

submit to both. I will substitute Slavery for Liberty, and the Exchange shall be approved. In short, I will be *arbitrary*: For am I not “that absolute *despotic* Power which must in “all Governments reside somewhere?”

Such is then, and such must be, the Language of “the Omnipotency of Parliament;” and yet to what Purpose, or how in the Nature of Things, or in Common Sense, an *arbitrary Power* can, by any possible Construction, be said to exist in a *free State*, as ours is, founded upon Rights *natural* and *political*, and supported by a Constitution,* Sir William has no where, that I know of, explained in Argument. And therefore I proceed *thirdly* to the Consideration of the bare Assertions and Opinion of Sir William, as stated in the Quotation from his Commentaries; and which being Matter of Authority only in him, I shall take the Liberty to answer by the Authorities of others in Opposition thereto.

And first I should have begun with the Authority of Mr. Locke, but Sir William having set him down, in one Place, as a mere Theorist, in another as a visionary Republican, and in a third, together with Milton and Sidney,

* “It was this Depravity of the Few, (which is oftner the “greater, because born no better than other Men, they are educated worse) which obliged Men first to subject Government to “*Constitution*, that they might preserve *social*, when they gave up *natural* Liberty, and not be oppressed by *arbitrary Will*.” See Dissert. on Parties, Octavo Edition, pag. 144.

in the Company of Watt Tyler and Jack Cade. † I shall in Respect to Sir William, pay no Attention whatever to this Authority; though Sir William has not himself forbore to do so, with Expressions of much Satisfaction, when it answered his Purpose: * But I shall have recourse to the Authority not of a visionary Republican, but of a rank Tory; as for that Reason the most unimpeachable that can nowadays be produced: I mean the Lord Bolingbroke, from whose Works the following Quotation is taken. † “ Thus the Col-

† It is upon the Principles of this said Jack Cade, who was an Irishman, that his Countrymen in Ireland are now acting. And it were much to be wished, if these Principles of his be what Rapin relates of them, that the Irish would be so good as to spare poor old England a few of Jack's Descendants; as the Breed of the Lockers, the Miltons, and the Sydneys are almost entirely extinct here. Rapin says, “ The King having Notice of the Approach of the Rebels, sent to know the Reason of their appearing thus in Arms. Cade answered for all, that they had no *ill Design upon the King's Person*. That their Intention was to petition the Parliament, that *evil Ministers* might be *punished*, and the People rendered more happy than of late Years. A few Days after, they presented to the Parliament two Petitions, setting forth the Grievances of the Nation. Among other Things they prayed that the Duke of Somerset might be punished as being the principal Author of the *Loss* of Normandy. (AMERICA.) That the King's Council might be filled with the *Princes of the Blood*, and other prudent and judicious Persons, and not with *vicious and profligate Men*, of ill Principles, and Manners, and incapable of managing the Affairs of the State.” See Rapin's Hist. of Eng. vol. i. p. 574. Fol. Edit. It is to be presumed that no one will dare to deny the Constitutionality, as well as Legality of these Principles, their Appositeness to the present Times, and the Necessity of their being adopted for the Salvation of the Country. †

* See Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. i. pages 161, 213, 243, 252, and vol. iv. pag. 427, for the above References.

† Although Lord Bolingbroke was in his Habits of Life, and in Practice, both a Tory and a Jacobite; he was in Speculation, from the early Impressions that had been made on his Mind (for he was

lective

" legislative-Body of the People of Great-Britain
 " delegate, but do not give up; trust, but do
 " not alienate their *Right*, and their *Power*;
 " and cannot be undone by having Beggary,
 " or Slavery brought upon them, unless they
 " co-operate to their own undoing, and in
 " one Word betray themselves. We cannot
 " therefore subscribe to those two Sayings of
 " my Lord Bacon, which are quoted to this Ef-
 " fect: That England can never be undone,
 " unless by Parliaments; and that there is
 " nothing which a Parliament cannot do."
 " Great-Britain, according to our present Con-
 " stitution, cannot be undone even by Parlia-
 " ments; for there is something, which a Par-
 " liament cannot do. *A Parliament cannot annul*
 " *the Constitution*; (Sir William says the Par-
 " liament may alter and create afresh the
 " Constitution;") and whilst that is preserved,
 " though our Condition may be bad, it cannot
 " be irretrievably so. The Legislative is a *su-*
 " *preme*, and may be called in one Sense an
 " *absolute*, but in none an *arbitrary Power*. If
 " you therefore put so extravagant a Case as
 by Connexion as well as Education a Whig) not only one of the
 wisest Statesmen and ablest Politicians that ever lived, but he was
 the best informed, and most comprehensive Writer on the English
 Constitution of any that ever wrote on that Subject: Inasmuch so,
 that his Political Works are now the very School of English Politics,
 and the Prophecies of the present Times; and yet such has been
 the wretched Use made of them, that those very Principles and
 Measures of Government which, if not avoided, he shewed to De-
 monstration, would prove the certain Ruin and Destruction of the
 Constitution, those very Principles and Measures the *confidential*
 Servants of his present Majesty have implicitly adopted, and with
 unremitting Perseverance pursued.

“to suppose the two Houses of Parliament
 “concurring to make at once a formal Cession
 “of their own Rights and Privileges, and of
 “those of the whole Nation to the Crown, and
 “ask who hath the Right and Means to resist
 “the supreme Legislative Power; I answer the
 “whole Nation hath the Right, and a People,
 “who deserve to enjoy Liberty, will find the
 “Means. An Attempt of this Kind would
 “break the *Bargain* between the King and the
 “Nation, between the *Representative* and Collec-
 “tive Body of the People, and would dissolve
 “the Constitution.”* Such is the Doctrine
 of Lord Bolingbroke.

The next Authority is that of the Reverend
 Doctor Hurd, now Bishop of Litchfield and
 Coventry; and who, in one of his Dialogues,
 makes Sir J. Maynard to say; “I willingly
 “omit, as superfluous, what in a worse cause
 “might have been thought of no small Weight,
 “the express Testimony of our ablest Lawyers
 “to the *Freedom* of the Constitution. I do
 “not mean only the *Cokes* and *Seldens* of our
 “Time (though in Point of Authority what
 “Names can be greater than theirs?) But
 “those of older, and therefore more reverend
 “Estimation; such as *Glanvil*, *Bracton*, the
 “Author of *Fleta*, *Thornton*, and *Fortescue*: Men
 “the most esteemed and learned in their seve-
 “ral Ages; who constantly and uniformly speak
 “of the *English* as a *mixed* and *limited* Form

* See Dissert. on Part. pag. 270.

“ of Government, and even go so far as to
 “ seek its Origin, where indeed the Origin of
 “ all Governments must be sought, in the
 “ Free-Will and Consent of the People.” His
 Lordship afterwards says in a Note, as from
 himself, “ By the *free Constitution of the English*
 “ Monarchy, every Advocate of Liberty, that
 “ understands himself, I suppose means, *that*
 “ *limited Plan of Policy*, by which the supreme
 “ Legislative Power (including in this general
 “ Term the Power of levying Money) is lodged,
 “ not in the Prince singly, but jointly in the
 “ Prince and People; whether the popular
 “ Part of the Constitution be denominated
 “ the King’s or Kingdom’s great Council, as
 “ it was in the proper feudal Times; or lastly,
 “ the two Houses of Parliament, as the Style
 “ has now been for several Ages.” *

A third Authority is that of Junius, † who

* See Moral and Political Dial. vol. ii. p. 222, and p. 327. It is impossible to speak of this Author, without the greatest Reverence and Respect; without Gratulation to this Country, that, as Preceptor to the Heir apparent of the Crown, he is now obliterating from the Prince’s Mind, those slavish and monkish Doctrines, that have been heretofore impressed upon it; nor without the most earnest Request to him from all good Men, from every Friend to Liberty, which is the Friendship of Humanity, that he would now come forth, and by his Knowledge and Situation, both of which set him far above his Fellows, wrest from the profane Hands of those that Constitution, which by them is now about to be offered up in Sacrifice upon the Altars of Ignorance and Tyranny. His Lordship has said, “ that a right good *Constitutional History of England* would be the noblest Service that any Man duly qualified for the Execution of such a Work could render to his Country.” His Lordship has proved himself to be qualified, the Service is only wanting.

† I am extremely concerned to be obliged to call this admirable Writer by a fictitious Name; But at the same Time, if he be alive, and has not prevented, in Times such as these are, my feeble Es-

says,

says, "The Power of King, Lords, and Com-
 mons is not an arbitrary Power. They are
 the Trustees, not the Owners of the Estate.
 The Fee-simple is in us. They cannot alie-
 nate, they cannot waste. When we say
 that the Legislature is supreme, we mean
 that it is the highest Power known to the
 Constitution; — that it is the highest in
 Comparison with the other subordinate
 Powers established by the Laws. In this
 Sense the Word Supreme is relative not
 absolute. The Power of the Legislature
 is limited, not only by the general Rules
 of natural Justice, and the Welfare of the
 Community, but by the *Forms and Principles*
 of our particular Constitution. If this
 Doctrine be not true, we must admit that
 King, Lords, and Commons have no Rule
 to direct their Resolutions, but merely their
 own Will and Pleasure. They might unite
 the legislative and executive Power in the
 same Hands, and dissolve the Constitution.
 But I am persuaded that you will not leave
 it to the Choice of seven hundred Persons
 notoriously corrupted by the Crown, whe-
 ther seven Millions of their equals shall be
 Freemen or Slaves. And again: "There
 cannot be a Doctrine more fatal to the
 Liberty and Property we are contending for
 than that, which confounds the Idea of a
 for in the public Service, by the Exercise of his superior Talents,
 Junius deserves every Curse and Calamity "that human Flesh is
 Heir to."
 supreme

"supreme and an arbitrary Legislature. I need
 "not point out to you, the fatal Purposes to
 "which it has been, and may be applied. If
 "we are sincere in the Political Creed we pro-
 "fess, there are many Things, which we
 "ought to affirm, cannot be done by King,
 "Lords, and Commons."*

A fourth Authority is that of the great
 Earl of Chatham, who, in one of those many
 unparalleled Speeches of his in the House of
 Lords, said, "Resistance to your Acts was
 "necessary as it was just; and your vain Decla-
 "rations of the Omnipotence of Parliament, and
 "your imperious Doctrines of the Necessity of
 "Submission, will be found equally impotent
 "to convince or enslave your Fellow-subjects
 "in America; who feel that Tyranny whether
 "ambitioned by an individual Part of the Legis-
 "lature, or the Bodies who compose it, it is equally
 "intolerable to British Subjects. The Means
 "of enforcing this Thralldom are found to be
 "as ridiculous and weak in Practice, as they are
 "unjust in Principle.†

* See Junius's Letters, vol. 1. Ded. p. 4. and vol. ii. p. 353.

† See *Genuine Abstracts* from two Speeches of the late Earl of Chatham, and his Reply to the Earl of Suffolk, pag. 5. Printed for J. Dodsley, Pall-Mall. It was from these Principles that this great Constitutionalist, on the Occasion of a Bill being brought into Parliament for declaring the *Independency* of America, said, with Exclamation, in the House of Lords; "Let me see that Act of Parliament that can disinherit the Prince of Wales of his Hereditary Dominions in America?" Meaning to say, that no Act of Parliament could of Right, concede *Independency* to America. The Crown may treat with America on Terms of *Independency*, and the Parliament may counsel the Crown to do this; the Crown may negotiate a Treaty of *Independency* with America, and the Parliament

And now I have done with Authorities: For to add would be but to take away, from the Force of those already quoted; and which concluding the Considerations meant to be given to the Quotation taken from the Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone, let us for a Moment turn our Eyes towards the Constitutional History of this Country, and see whether this Doctrine of "the Omnipotency of Parliament" has any Foundation therein; and whether by these Means we shall not be able to trace out the Origin, as well as find the Reason and Occasion of it.

I believe there is no one, who has in any Degree attended to this History, but will readily grant the following *Postulate*, namely; that the Constitution of England is of a *mixed* may ratify or reject it: But for an Act of Parliament, in the first Instance, to absolve the Subjects of the Crown of their Allegiance, and dispossess it of its Territories, is, at least, a Doubt with me. Holland was declared independent, but it was by *Treaty* on a Truce for twelve Years; and not by any *Renunciation* on the Part of Spain. And indeed I am the more confirmed in this Opinion, when I consider that the Proposition, made by the Americans themselves, was (as if aware of the Objection) in the Alternative; "Grant us," say they, "our Independency, or, withdraw your Troops;" and on this latter Alternative was Lord Chatham's proposed Accommodation with America to take Place. It must be remembered too, "that it is the immutable Principle of every State to conserve an *eternal Right* over all those Countries which have ever appertained to it by a legitimate Title, unless their Alienation has been made by just Means, and conformable to universal Laws;" that the Independency of America by Act of Parliament, being the Case of revolted Subjects, is not being "made conformable to this Principle;" that the Title of King of France which the King of England assumes, without the Possession of the Kingdom, is founded upon this *immutable Principle*; and that for the same Reason, his Majesty must now place in his Crown, the *Feather* of King of America, in the Room of the inestimable Jewel itself, which, by the wicked Hands of his Ministers, has been torn from it.

Nature,

Nature, consisting, in *Matter*, of certain fundamental Laws or Rights *natural* and *reserved*; the *natural* unalienable by their very Nature, the *reserved* unalienable by the Compact that established them; and, in *Form*, of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; or, in other Words, of King, Lords, and Commons: And that *Liberty* is hence the *Genius* and *permeating Principle* thereof, though not always perceivable in the Administration of its Government.* I say, I am to presume that these are Facts which none will deny; and therefore as they will follow me, without Argument, in the Course I mean to take, the Object of my present purpose is only to mark, in the concise Manner I can, the several Periods in which the Administration of this Government has been under Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Democratical Influence: till at length it has fallen under the joint, united, Tyranny of all, as the last unsuccessful Manoeuvre to quench that heavenly Flame of Liberty, which lives, I trust in God, never to expire in this Constitution.

If we look back to the Times of the Saxons, whence we must date the Origin of our Constitution (for although there were many *British* Rights or Customs engrafted upon it; and

* Sir John Fortescue calls it "a political mixt Government" in Contradistinction to "a Regal Government." And Doctor Hurd says, "no consistent Account can be given of the English Government, but on the Supposition of a *legal limited Constitution*." See Fort. de Lau. Leg. Ang. c. 35. p. 127. and Hurd's Dial. v. ii. p. 126.

which

which do still remain, and although the Britons themselves were free; * yet the Form of the Constitution is certainly of Gothic Institution, and was brought by the Saxons over into England,) we shall find that the Constitution was, as I have stated it to be, of a mixed Nature; and its Principle that of Liberty. † We shall find that it consisted of a King, Thanes or Lords, and Commons under the different Descriptions of Frilingi, Custodes Pagani, Ceorles, Villains, &c. to whom separate Rights and Privileges belonged; and that it was of Course composed of a Monarchy, an Aristocracy, and a Democracy: But as the Lands of England were then *allodial*, and as Lands were the only Property, for Commerce was unknown; and as these Lands were almost

* Nat. Bacon says, "The Government of the People of this Nation in their Original, was Democratical, mixt with an Aristocracy, "if any Credit be to be given to that little Light of History that is left unto us from those antient Times." See Hist. and Pol. Dis. parts i. p. 138.

† It is curious to remark, (because perhaps not observed before,) that the Constitution and Form of Government established by our wise Forefathers in America, were precisely, in Principle, the Constitution and Form of Government of the Saxon Heptarchy. At the Heptarchy "the Kingdom was cantoned out into certain Provincial Establishments, not under one common Dispensation of Laws, though under the same sovereign Power." For so says Sir William Blackstone himself. See his Commentaries, vol. iv. p. 403. And just so was it, in Institution, with America. America "was cantoned out into certain Provincial Establishments, not under one common Dispensation of Laws, though under the same sovereign Power." And therefore whilst these Governments were strictly Constitutional, deriving their Source from the Origin of our own Government; the modern Attempts of Alteration in them have been as tyrannical in Design, as the Arguments of an *Imperium in Imperio*, or *Status in Status*, as made Use of and applied to them, have been false and futile both in Fact and Experience.

entirely

entirely in the Hands of the Lords, and the King was not, as he afterwards became, Lord of the Soil; the *Aristocracy* was uppermost and prevalent in the Administration of the Government. The Power of the King was merely military; * the executive Power was in the Lords, and the civil or legislative in the *commune Concilium Regni*, or in the Lords and Freemen of the Land. † And thus, under the Influence of the *Aristocracy*, did the Saxon Government continue; till the Invasion of William the Norman: When by the vast Accession of Property which fell to the Crown from the Slaughter that was made among the Lords at the Battle of Hastings, by the Investiture of his Norman Followers with the Lands of these Lords, under certain Services in Alteration of the before established Feudal System, (and which, by the bye, being grievous and burthensome not even these Followers could afterwards endure) and by the Accession of the Weight of his own Norman Dominions to this acquired Property; the Saxon *Aristocracy* was subdued, and the Standard of the Norman *Monarchy* erected in its Stead: Still however, without any Alteration in the Form, or with-

* The Title of King was originally among the Saxons that of *Dux* or *Leader*; that of *Rex*, a *regendo*, or King, being the Device of Priests afterwards to found their impious and selfish Doctrine upon of governing *de Jure divino*.

† What the Connexion was between the Lords and the lower Orders of People is known from Glanvil, who says, "*Mutua debet esse Domini et fidelitatis Connexio, ita quod quantum debet Domino ex Homagio, tantum illi debet Dominus ex Dominio, præter solam Reverentiam.*" Vid. L. ix. c. 4.

out

out destroying that Liberty which was the vital Principle of the Constitution.

Here then we see, the first Rule of Kingly Power in this Government; and the Occasion of it: But we shall find that it was not of long Duration: For as Power, not rightfully obtained, knows no Limits; so, in the very Act of its own Extension, it becomes limited. And therefore the *Monarchy*, which now, in full Career, had the Reigns of Government in its Hands, was, by Reason of those oppressive Whips and Spurs which it was wont to make Use of in its Course, stopped short in the Reign of King John, by the returning Power of the *Aristocracy*, aided and assisted by the *Democracy*, in bringing back the Constitution to its *Saxon* Principles; and by establishing it upon that Basis of *Magna Charta*, on which it has ever since stood; and from which, I must hope, it will never be removed.*

From this Time then to the Reign of Henry VII. is the third Period that occurs to our Observation. And here although the *Aristocracy* had reassumed its Power in the State, by getting rid, through the Means of *Magna Charta*,

* My Intention being merely to mark the Periods in which the Forms of the Constitution, or the separate Powers of King, Lords, and Commons had chiefly prevailed in the State; it will not be expected that any other historical Facts should be related, than what alone has Reference to this Occasion. And for the same Reason I shall omit to mention the Attempts of the Clergy, in this Period, to add a *fourth* Estate to the Constitution, by the Creation of themselves into Lords *spiritual* for *temporal* Purposes; looking upon this Occurrence as a political Madness, or Disease in the Constitution, which Time has since well-nigh rid the Government of.

of many of those hard feudal Services which William had introduced into the System of Government, to the almost Annihilation of the antient Privileges and original Rights of the People; yet, by the bloody civil Wars that were carried on between the Houses of York and Lancaster, by the Necessity that the Barons had been under of alienating their Lands, as the Price of their Folly, in Support of the holy War; by the Increase of Trade, which, from the Encouragement it met with in the Reign of Edward I, had produced another Species of Property in the Kingdom, and by other less considerable Circumstances; the *Democracy* was daily growing in Strength and Power: The lesser Barons were separated from the greater, and became the Representatives of the landed Interest; Boroughs were incorporated, and Burgesses were returned to Parliament as the Representatives of the Commercial Interest: * But still the Power of the *Aristocracy* remained till the Reign of Henry VII, when by the Policy of this Prince, and by the Prerogative now erected and vested by the *Democracy* in the Crown, as the Means of giving greater Liberty to the People (and not of taking that Liberty away as it was afterwards applied) the *Monarchy* again became, with increased Exertions of Influence, the directing Power of the State; and continued so. Those whom the Saxons called *Thanes*, were by the Normans afterwards styled *Barons*, of which there were two Sorts, the greater and the lesser.

to be to the Reign of Charles I: which forms the fourth Period of our Inquiry. But yet so far were these Exertions, from quenching that heavenly Flame of Liberty which existed in the Constitution, that they only served to add Fuel to Fire; till at length the Flame burst out into a Rage of Dominion, on the Part of the *Democracy*, greater than any that had been ever known before. Happy Rage of Dominion! Happy in Spite of its Excesses! For whatever be the Means, *Salus Populi suprema Lex est*; and if this be the End, the Means are justified by the End.

And now the *Democracy* ruled, even without a Competitor; though not, as some have conceived, by the Overthrow of the Constitution; For Liberty was not to be extinguished, and although there was no Monarch, and notwithstanding the House of Lords was voted useless, the *Monarchy* remained, and the *Aristocracy* still subsisted. As well might it be said, that when Charles I. thought fit to rule twelve Years without any *Parliament*, that the *Aristocracy* and the *Democracy* were then destroyed; that Liberty was lost, and the Constitution annihilated: But the Fact was not so, in either Case. The Administration of the Government was, in both Cases, altered by Usurpation; in the one Case for twelve Years, in the other, continuing till the Restoration of Charles II, which now marks the fifth Period in the Sequel of our History: And when the
Constitution

Constitution, like a Spring that had been held, by Force in an unnatural Direction, returned, by its own elastic Power to its original Form; but in which it did not long remain: For the Monarchy was now again to be exalted, and indeed actually was so, to the very same Height that had but just before brought its Monarch's Head to the Block: But it was exalted, that its Depression might be the more certain and compleat; for in the very next Reign James II. was deposed, and the Crown of England placed on the Head of William III. which finishes the sixth Period of my intended Investigation, and brings me to the Æra of the glorious Revolution. An Æra of which the Design was, as Lord Bolingbroke tells us, "not only to save us from the Attempts on our Religion and Liberty, made by King James, but to save us from all other Attempts, which *had been made, or might be made* of the same Tendency; to renew and strengthen our Constitution." An Æra, when, as Sir William Blackstone says, "the Prerogative of the King was limited by Bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should exceed them without the Consent of the People:" *When*, the Power of the Lords became that of their being *pro Tempore* the actual Representatives of the Nation at large,* of

Upon the Abdication of James II. there being no House of Commons in Existence, the Lords became the actual Representatives of the People; and took upon themselves the Administration of the Government, till the Meeting of the Convention, and the Appointment of the Prince of Orange to succeed them in Power.

being

being in future the Mediators between the King and the People, and of rendering Justice to both, by opposing as well the Encroachments of the Crown upon the Liberties of the Subject, as the Encroachments of the Subject upon the just Prerogative of the Crown: * *When*, the Rights of the People were asserted, maintained, acknowledged, and defined: And in short, *when*, each Form of the Constitution was so attempered with the other, as to make Liberty, which had hitherto been, though in vain, the Object of their separate Attempts to destroy, the now Object of their united Endeavours to preserve: Of all which Particulars collectively taken, the good Effects have come so personally home to every Individual, as well as to the Community in all its great Extent, that it is unnecessary for me even to allude to them. All I will say is, that from this happy *Æra*, Great-Britain began to rise in Empire, in Wealth, in Power, in Credit, in Greatness of every Description, in Commerce, the Source of all the rest, and the Guardian of Liberty; and that it continued so to do, far above all other States that the Annals of either *antient*, *middle*, or *modern* History can boast, to the *Æra* of the Reign

* There cannot be a greater Solecism in Politics, than that of
 "a Nobility, under monarchical Government, who suffer the Liberty
 "of the Commons to be taken away. In Aristocracies, the Nobility
 "get whatever the Commons lose, but in Monarchies, the Crown
 "alone is Gainer; and the *certain* Consequence of their helping to
 "enslave the Commons must be that of being enslaved themselves at
 "last." See Diss. on Part. p. 228.

of George III. which closing the last Period of my historical Journey, whilst it opens a new System of Politics to our View, and, in consequence, our sad Reverse of State, I shall beg Leave to look back for a Moment upon the Ground over which I have just trodden, as leading to that, upon which I am now about to stand.

In the historic Course I have taken, my Design has been to shew, as I proposed to do, the several Periods of our History, in which the different Forms of the Constitution have had the upper Hand, or influencing Power, in the State. I have shewn that, from the Time of the Saxons to the Norman Invasion, the *Aristocracy* was the prevailing Power; that, from the Norman Invasion to the Reign of King John, the *Monarchy* took the Lead, and arbitrarily prevailed in the Government; that, from the Reign of King John to that of Henry VII, the *Aristocracy* again assumed its Power; that, from the Reign of Henry VII, to that of Charles I, the *Monarchy*, assisted by the *Democracy*, recovered its Influence, and again arbitrarily exerted it; that, from the Reign of Charles I, to the Restoration of Charles II, the *Democracy* became alone the ruling Power in the State; that, from the Reign of Charles II, to the Accession of William III, the *Monarchy* recovered its Power, and renewed its arbitrary Measures; and that, from the Revolution to the Era of George III, the Administration of the Government rested on the settled "*limited*

"Policy" of the Constitution, whilst Liberty being "*the informing Principle*," (as Doctor Hurd calls it) Glory and Grandeur followed.*

I say then that this being my Design, the Inference to be drawn therefrom is this; that if the *separate* Exertions of the *different* Forms of the Constitution were, as, in the *several* Periods mentioned, they are stated to have been; the *Combination* of these Forms, upon the Principles laid down by Sir William Blackstone and others (of "*the Omnipotence of Parliament*," of an *arbitrary* and *despotic* Power in King, Lords, and Commons to act by the mere Direction of their own Will, subject to no Limitations from the fundamental Laws

* "*The History of Sparta*," says one, "contains very little else, than the Struggles of *one Part* of the Constitution against *the other*; for sometimes the *Kings* laid very deep Designs for introducing arbitrary Power; sometimes the *Nobility* practised against their *Kings*, and either brought them to violent Ends, or forced them into Banishment; and, at last, the *Ephori*, under Colour of promoting Liberty weakened the Foundations of the State to such a Degree, that it sunk into Anarchy, and never recovered its former Lustre. The Romans, who copied that Constitution in theirs, met with the same Fate." It does not appear in either History, that there ever was an Union of *all the Forms* of the Constitution to obtain that arbitrary Power, for which *each* had separately contended. This Machiavelian Experiment was reserved for the Annals of the English History in the 18th Century. But it appears from the History of Rome "that these Struggles made Way for the perpetual Dictatorship, and that at last all Parties agreed to repose the Power of the Commonwealth in a single Person, when the Constitution was too weak to sustain it according to the Antient Forms." Sad Exchange! and yet however sad, the vesting of the Powers of a Dictator in the Crown has been the Language of late in a British House of Commons, to the British Nation; and which makes one of two ministerial Objects in View: Either that the People of England shall submit to "*the Omnipotence of Parliament*," or, that they shall be so burdened, galled, and oppressed by their Parliaments, as to induce them to do what Rome did, and what Sweden and Denmark have since done, "*repose the Power of the Commonwealth in a single Person*." May their Views to come, like their *past* Measures be crowned with the same Success!

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of the Constitution, but *unlimited* "to alter
 "and create afresh even the Constitution it-
 "self") must derive its Origin from the Date
 of these Principles; and as the Date of these
 Principles is derived from the *Æra* of the present
 Reign, * so the Conclusion, upon the whole, is
 this; that, to that *arbitrary Power*, against the
 Introduction of which, *separately*, we have been
 contending from the Saxon *Æra* to the *Æra* of
 George III, *conjunctively*, we must now submit;
 though attended, in this Form, by a State of
 Slavery, tenfold more oppressive, than any
 other Form could possibly inflict. †

So far then have I endeavoured to trace the
 Origin of this Doctrine. And now the next
 Subject of Consideration is the Reason and Oc-
 casion of it. It has been observed by my Lord
 Bolingbroke, "that absolute Power was the
 "Object of Kings from the Norman Conquest
 "to the Revolution;" and so it certainly was:
 For although the Aristocracy and the Demo-

* It is said, that the Subjugation of America, upon the Idea of an
 Arbitrary Power in Parliament, was planned in the Cabinet of the
 Princess Dowager of Wales; before the Death of George II: but
 whether this be true or not, is not for me to determine: One Thing
 however is true; the Plan of the Subjugation of America commenced,
 with the Power of the Earl of Bute, in the Reign of George III.

† The Duke of Buckingham in his most excellent Comedy of
 the Rehearsal, has a Part therein so very *à propos* to the present
 Purpose, that however ridiculous it may appear, the Comparison
 is worthy of Mention. The Duke makes Bayes to introduce upon
 the Stage the *Sun*, the *Moon*, and the *Earth*, who all *separately*
 perform their several Parts; but Bayes not content with this, makes
 the *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Earth*, to dance the Hay all together. "Now
 "the *Sun*, now the *Moon*, now the *Earth*, now all together, says
 "Bayes, *Sun*, *Moon*, and *Earth* dance the Hay." And just so
 hath it been in our Farce of State. Now the *Monarchy*, now the
Aristocracy, now the *Democracy*, now altogether, says Lord North,
King, *Lords*, and *Commons* dance the Hay; to the Tune of "Charley
 "over the Water."

cracy had, at different Times, assumed the Administration of the Government, yet whenever this happened, it always proceeded from the more arbitrary Designs of the Monarchy. And therefore the Limitation of the Monarchy, at the Revolution, became the *only* Object of Contemplation and Settlement. The other Powers of the State were so circumstanced, as to occasion no Apprehensions, individually from them, of any further Attempts towards arbitrary Power; and as to the Doctrine, of an arbitrary Power being vested in the *Legislature* to take away the Rights of the People, no such Idea was entertained or existed: But on the contrary, Parliaments were looked upon as the Protectors of the Liberties of the People, and were adored by the *Whigs* as the great Bulwarks of the Constitution; though, for the same Reason, hated by the *Tories*. * Thus then was the Monarchy the only Power, which it was necessary at this Time to guard against; and this being effectually done, as has been shewn, the Constitution and Government were not

* It may be asked then, what is the Meaning that *Tories* are now the Friends of Parliament, and *Whigs* the Opposers of them? The Reason is plain. The *inverse* use of Parliaments hath made them so: when Parliaments were limited to the Use of the Constitution, they belonged to the *Whigs*; when unlimited, to the Abuse of it, they became the Property of the *Tories*: for *Tories* follow arbitrary Power, as *Crows* do *Carrion*, wherever it is to be met with; and are driven in search of it, by the same blind impulse, that drives a *Newfoundland Dog* into the Water, after a Stone that he cannot reach. It follows therefore that by *Whig* and *Tory* is meant this: A *Whig* is the Friend of Liberty, and the Enemy of arbitrary Power. A *Tory* is the Friend of arbitrary Power, and the Enemy of Liberty. And such is the Definition, and specific Difference, of these Parties at this Day; though, from the *Whigs*, not perceiving in Time, the Politics of the *Tories* respecting Parliaments, and from their well-grounded Attachment to the Constitution of Parliaments, many of the best, and most respectable Characters, of this Party, became, by
only

only then considered as ascertained, and settled; but actually continued so to be, as I have said before, to the *Æra* of the present Reign; though not without the Introduction of a Principle, as must be admitted, which, however necessary the Circumstances of the Times might have rendered it, and although adopted at first without any View to arbitrary Power, as will appear hereafter, yet, has since proved the fruitful Means of our present public Evils: For this Principle, being that of Corruption, became at length to be an acknowledged Principle in the Government; upon which a System was to be erected, and by which the Administration of the Government was to be conducted. But as even this *arch Seducer*, this *wicked Serpent*, was found insufficient of itself to violate the *Chastity of Liberty*; and now every other Experiment having failed, one other Trial was left: *Force* must be used, a *Rape* was to be committed, and that *Wolf in Sheep's Cloathing*, that *clown footed Beast*, the Offspring of Corruption, called "*the Omnipotence of Parliament*," was generated, and became the Heir apparent to the forfeited Estate, and lost Patrimony of Prerogative.

the Policy of the Court, hampered by that damnable Heresy of State, the now *Tory* Doctrine of "*the Omnipotence of Parliament*."

It may here be asked too, how can "*the Omnipotence of Parliament*" increase the Power of the Crown? The Answer is, in Fact, by the Means of Corruption; but, by logical Proof, it stand thus:

P R O O F.

One of the Emperors of Rome having said that his little Boy of five Years old governed Rome, and being asked, how that could be, he proved it in this Way:

I govern Rome, said he;

My Wife governs me;

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But

But now I shall be told, that, notwithstanding what has been alleged, this Doctrine is, in Principle, the Doctrine of all Governments; that it is so of our Government; that it is cloathed in the Forms of the Constitution; and that it has many Acts of Parliament for its Support. To which I reply; that to say that this Doctrine is, in Principle, the Doctrine of all *absolute* Governments, is to say, what is absolutely true: for it is of such Governments the very Principle itself. But to say that this Doctrine is, in Principle, the Doctrine of a *limited* Government, of a *free* Government, and so in Consequence of our Government; I think, I may presume to assert, that, so far as Argument founded on Fact will go, the contrary has been already proved. And now I do not feel myself at all averse from the Examination of this Doctrine, upon the abstract Ground of the Principles of Government in general; or of our Constitution in particular. But, in good Truth, until the Problem be solved, how in the Nature of Things, and in Common Sense, an *arbitrary* Power, under any possible Mode, can be said to exist in a *free* Government; all Process of Ratiocination is mere *Verba, et præterita nihil*; and the *Dilemma* of the Problem itself must stand in the Stead of Reasoning.

My little Boy governs my Wife;

Ergo, my little Boy governs Rome.

APPLICATION.

The Parliament governs the Kingdom;

The Treasury governs the Parliament;

The Crown governs the Treasury;

Ergo; the Crown governs the Kingdom.

INFERENCE.

That the Law is the Will of the Prince, declared in Parliament.

However,

However, as it would seem that the Theory of this Doctrine has its Dependence principally on the Authority of Sir William Blackstone, I shall hope for his Pardon, if for the Sake of Truth, (and I am sure, from the personal Obligation as well as real Esteem I sincerely have both to and for Sir William, it can proceed from no other Motive) I should suggest, and shall endeavour, by a few cursory Observations, to support the Suggestion, that the Error of this Doctrine seems to have arisen, in Inference, from an Error in the Manner in which he has, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, laid down and treated the Principles of our Constitution.

These Commentaries, in their Dedication to the Queen, announce themselves to be, "A View of the Laws and Constitution of England;" and, of the *Laws*, they are truly so, in every Sense. They have for their Recommendation, Arrangement and System, the most natural and beautiful Diction, with the most comprehensive and best chosen Collection of Materials: so that as a *juridical* History, they may be considered as correct and perfect. But as a *Constitutional* History, the View is somewhat different. Here they are imperfect, and, as I have just suggested, erroneous. Of the *Law* itself, whilst the most accurate Definition is given, and the most elaborate Reasonings had upon all its Parts, not a Word, of this Kind, is said of the *Constitution*. No Definition, not even a summary Explanation of it; nay, although the Term *Constitution* is to be read almost in every Page, great as the Word is, it

has not a Place assigned, nor is it to be found, in the *Index*. So far then are the Commentaries imperfect, and in what follows, I think, they are erroneous.

The Principles of the Constitution are so embodied, and confounded with those of the Law, that the *Rights of the People* are made not to arise out of the *Constitution*, but to depend on the *Law*. The Laws assert our common Rights, says Lord Bolingbroke, "but they do not give them to us."* Between *civil* and *political* Law, no Distinction whatever is made; when lo! upon this Distinction depends the very Difference between the Law, and the Constitution. *Political* and *civil* Laws, says Baron Montesquieu, "Should be relative to the Nature and Principle of the actual, or intended Government; whether they form it, as in the Case of *political* Laws, or whether they support it, as may be said of *civil* Institutions." Again: "Considered as Members of a Society that must be properly supported, they have Laws relative to the *Governours* and the *Governed*; and this we call *politic Law*. They have also another Sort of Laws relating to the mutual Communication of Citizens; by which is understood the *civil Law*." Baron Montesquieu next makes an Apology, for not having separated the *political* from the *civil* Laws: "For," says he, "I do not pretend to treat of Laws, but of their Spirit;" which, *conversely*, is the very Reason that this Distinction should have been made in the Commentaries on the Laws of England. † Another great Authority,

* See Diff. on Part. p. 89.

† See Spir. of Laws, v. 1. ch. 3.

in Support of my Opinion, is that of Baron Bielfeld. This Author says, " Considered as living in a Society that must be maintained, there must be Laws in the Relation there is between the Government and those that are governed; and these make the political or public Law: There are still others in the Relation that all the Citizens have among themselves, and these make the civil Law." He says too, in another Place, " In the most extensive Sense the public or political Law comprehends the reciprocal Duties between the Governors and the governed; that is, from Sovereigns towards their Subjects, and from Subjects towards their Sovereigns, and towards the State of which they are Members. Each State, each Nation, has therefore its public Law; the Study of which becomes the more extensive, and the more difficult in Proportion as the Form of Government is more complicate. The public Law, or Constitution of England, for Example, which determines the Rights and Prerogatives of the King, the Parliament, and the People, forms a very extensive Science." *

Now from the Want of this Distinction between the *political* and the *civil* Law, or rather from the total Silence of the Commentaries upon the Subject of the former, those pre-

* See Elements of Erudition, vol. i. p. 89, and 103. This Science, in order to its Attainment, is very judiciously treated of in the third Volume of these Elements, under the Head of *Statistics*; and to which the Reader is not only referred in particular, but the Elements themselves in general, as well as the *Political Institutes* of Baron Bielfeld, are worthy the Perusal of every Lover of Learning and Science.

determined,

determined, or *precedent* * Relations, that exist between the *Governors* and *governed* of this Kingdom, are made to be the Offspring of the *civil* or *municipal* Law; to be the mere Effects of Legislation, and the Acts of the Legislature itself only: So that, from such Premises, the Conclusion, of an *arbitrary* Right in the Legislature, is just and natural; and “the Omnipotence of Parliament” follows as of direct and certain Consequence: For that Power that gave, must have a Power to *take away*; and if the Legislature *created* the Constitution, the Legislature must of Course have a Right “to *change and create it afresh*.” But how erroneous this Doctrine is, a bare Attention to the Nature of the *political* Law alone, without any other Aid, sufficiently proves.

The Commentaries say, “Now the Rights that are *commanded* to be observed by the *municipal* Law are of two Sorts;” and then they proceed to convert *Rights* into *Duties*, in order to bring them under the *Command* of the *municipal* Law;† and which otherwise could not be done from the very Definition of this Law: for the Definition is, *Lex est Sanctio sancta, jubens honesta, et prohibens contraria*; which can, by no Means, apply to the *Rights* of the People, though it may to their *Duties*. As for Example: The Trial by Jury is a *Right* of the People: But how is this Right of the

* Sir Francis Bacon says, “that *Monarchies* do not subsist, like “other Governments, by a *precedent* Law; and that Submission to “them is grounded upon Nature;” which proves, according to him, that other Governments do subsist by a *precedent* Law, and that Submission to them is *not* grounded upon Nature. See Case of the *Post-nati*. vol. 4. pag. 185.

† See Blackstone’s Comm. v. 1. p. 123.

People to be subjected to this *municipal* Law according to its Definition? It cannot be. Trial by Jury is an *absolute reserved* Right, and not a *relative* or *social* Duty. It is *neque honestum, neque contrarium*. Besides, there is no Connexion between this Species of Law, and this Species of Right. This Species of Law, that is the *municipal* or *civil* Law, has to do with *private Rights*. This Species of Right is subordinate to that Species of Law, which has to do with *public Rights*; namely, the *political* Law. And herein consists both the Error of the Commentaries, and its Solution. The Error is, in making *political* and *civil* Rights *synonymous*, and without Distinction.* The Solution is, that *political* Law has to do with *public Rights*, *civil* Law with *private Rights*: That *private Rights* are the Objects of Legislation: That *public Rights* are the Basis and Foundation of *private Rights*, the fundamental, unalienable, and unalterable Laws of the Land, originating in Compact; and, whilst the Constitution lasts, holding by the same Tenure: That they are the Grounds of the Constitution, and the Occasion of its Form of Government; the Creators of Legislators, Legislatures, and of Legislation; and these being of Course the Creatures of these Creators, the Creatures may not have a Right of Omnipotency over their Creators: But on the contrary, "the Omnipotency of Parliament," *quoad* these *public Rights*, must become "the *Subserviency* of Parliament,"

* *Political*, or *civil* Liberty, say the Commentaries, is no other "than natural Liberty so far restrained, &c.;" so that *political* Liberty is *civil* Liberty, and *civil* Liberty *political* Liberty, with out Distinction or Difference.

which

which is the very Reverse of what the Commentaries intended to prove: and, in being so, shews, as if the Constitution had been made for the Commentaries, and not the Commentaries for the Constitution: As if they had been written *pro Re nata*: Or as if they had been submitted to the Pruning-Knife of the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, that they might bear the Fruits of his Politics, and bring forth the Evils that have arisen from them.

I would now seek to excuse myself, for having presumed to trespass on that Ground, to which the Vinerean Professor of Law might be said to have an *exclusive* Right: But as my Views were to save, and not to destroy, to his Justice, I am content to think, will be to pardon, and not to condemn.

Another Argument that has been alluded to is that, of this Doctrine being clothed in the Forms of the Constitution; but the Argument itself is the very Objection to the Doctrine: for of all Tyranny, that Tyranny is the worst, which has the *Formalities* of Law for its Support. Every other Tyranny is the Effect of misguided and ungoverned Passions: this is the Result of Deliberation, and even Reason is prostituted to its Purposes. The former may find Motives for its Excuse: the latter is out of the Reach of Absolution. Lawless Tyranny is confessedly lawless. Legal Tyranny adds Treachery to Tyranny: for it acts in Disguise, and deceives with the Appearance of Truth. But this Argument applies to the superior Baseness of this Tyranny only. The Absurdity of it is almost

almost too preposterous to mention. Tyranny cloathed in the Forms of the Constitution! How irreconcilable the Terms with the Ideas! And how little able to stand the Test of Examination! Every Body knows how, and in what Manner, one Part of the Constitution receives its Form; I mean the House of Commons: that it has no original Jurisdiction or Power of its own: that it is elective, and for a stated Term only: * that its Members are the Deputies of the People, appointed to do their Business in Parliament; and for so doing, received, no farther back than the Reign of Henry VIII. the *Wages* of their Constituents. And yet no sooner are forty of these Members (for forty constitute a House) assembled in the holy Chapel of St. Stephen, than a *Right* originates in them, in Conjunction with the King and the Lords, to make Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water of those very *Electors*, of whom they are themselves the *Elected* only.† Such is the Absur-

* The Election of an House of Commons was formerly for one Year, afterwards for three Years, since for seven. What is next to be the Case, rests on "the Omnipotence of Parliament."

† In Proof of the former subordinate State of Parliament to the People, and so of course, in Contradiction to its present assumed State of Omnipotency, Judge Hales says; "It is the Law and Custom of Parliament, that where any new Device is moved on the King's Behalf in Parliament for his Aid, or the like, the Commons may answer, that this is a *new Device*, and they dare not agree without Conference with their Countries; whereby it appeareth such Conference is warrantable by the Law and Custom of Parliament;" and for his Authority, cites Rot. Parl. 13 Ed. III. N. 58, to which I have referred: But this Doctrine not tallying with these Times, this Citation is not now to be found in the modern Editions of our Rolls. If, when the Taxation of America without Representation was proposed, the Commons had said "this is a *new Device*, and we dare not agree without Conference with our Countries," America had still been Part of the British Empire, and Great Britain not the degraded Kingdom it now is.

See Hales of Parlm. p. 13.

dity

dity of this Doctrine, and yet such the Doctrine is. Had it been said, that the Legislature might assume such a *Power* to itself, but that it could not possibly have a *Right* to such a *Power*; that it might exert and maintain such a *Power* by Force, but that such a *Power* was *Usurpation* and *Tyranny*; such a Doctrine as this would have been intelligible, and it would not have been denied: but, on the contrary, it would have been admitted; as, upon this Principle, I mean very readily to admit (as a Matter of Fact) the last Argument made use of, that this Doctrine has many Acts of Parliament for its Support; and to this End will take the Liberty of citing some of these Acts myself.

The first is the Statute of the 21st of R. II. c. 16, whereby the whole legislative Power of the Parliament was delegated and lodged in this King, with twelve Lords and six Commoners, or any six of the Lords, and any three of the Commoners.

A second is the Statute of the 11 of Hen. VII. c. 3. whereby Authority was given by the Justices of the Peace (without any Trial by a Jury) by their Directions to hear, and determine all Offences against any penal Statute then in Force.*

* Upon this Act Dr. Hurd has the following Remarks: "The Oppressions," says he, "of Empson and Dudley, had been founded in a Stretch of Power, usurped and justified on the Principles of the Civil Law, by which these Miscreants had been enabled to violate a fundamental part of our Constitution, the Way of Trial by Juries. The Effect on the People was dreadful. Accordingly, in the Entrance of the next Reign, though the Authority, by which they had acted, had even been Parliamentary, these Creatures of Tyranny were indicted for High Treason, were condemned and executed, for having been instrumental in subverting *Legem Terra*; and the extorted Statute, under which

A third

A third is the Statute of the 31st Hen. VIII. c. 8. which delegated to the King Power to make Laws by his Proclamations, with the Advice of his Council, of equal Authority, and Force, with Acts of Parliament. *

There are, besides, some other Statutes, particularly in the Reign of R. II. to the same Effect; but as they are less exceptionable, it is unnecessary to mention them. These may be said to be Cases in Point, and as such I produce them. But will Sir William Blackstone, or any other Advocate for "the Omnipotence of Parliament," say; that these Statutes were made upon an *actual acknowledged Right* subsisting in the Legislature, of making and enacting such Laws? Or rather will they not say, what was then said, and what has ever since been said, on every Hand; that "these Statutes were notorious Breaches and Violations of the original Constitution: that the fundamental Rights and Powers of the two Estates of the Lords and Commons were given up and deserted: that the Wildness of them was apparent; that the Fate of their Makers was precipitate and fearful: and that may it always be so, with such *Infringers* and such *Infractions*." And will any one say that this was not the Light in which these Laws were and are considered, nor the Manner in which, *ex debito iustitie*, they ought to be looked upon "they had hoped to shelter themselves, was, with a just Indignation repealed." See Mor. and Polit. Dial. vol. 2. pag. 211.

* Of this Statute, Doctor Hurd says; "This terrible Act is 31 Hen. VIII. ch. 8. It was repealed in 1 Edw. VI. ch. 12. See Mor. and Pol. Dial. v. ii, p. 267." What will the Doctor say of the Popish Canada Act? Hereafter I trust we shall know.

and treated? Sir William Blackstone, I am sure, will not say this. And then, all Controversy is at an End between him and me; and he and I are agreed. But yet again, if he does not say this; what becomes of his "Omnipotence of Parliament?" For if the Parliament be of *Right* omnipotent, the *Power* exerted by these Laws is indisputable; and the Objections made to them are treasonable, and deserving the highest Punishment.

But now two important *Questions* arising, to which *Answers*, as important, may be expected; I will state the former, and will endeavour to give the latter. The one Question is; What *present* Mischief hath this Doctrine done? The other, Where is its *future* Danger?

To the first Question, I answer; it hath "divided a House against itself," it has severed *America from Great-Britain*. This is the Mischief it has done. These are the *Primitiae* of "the Omnipotence of Parliament," of that Doctrine, which from *Heaven* took its Name; but from *Hell* received its Principles; A Doctrine, which "in the Hour of Insolence" dared to say; "I will tax America without Representation; I will take the Money out of the Pockets of three Millions of People without their Consent, and of *Right* will bind them in all Cases whatsoever; I will reduce them to unconditional Submission, and I will bring them at the Feet of Parliament." Blasphemous Tyranny! Fatal Mischief! But this is not all.

It has produced a Congress (from the fifteen
Synod

Synods into which Scotland* is ecclesiastically divided) at Edinburgh, debating upon the Subject of Religion, "raising," to use the Words of Mr. Burke, "the same Question on the Competence of Legislature to make any Alteration in that System," † and defying that Omnipotence of Parliament, which had but just before said, in the high toned Language of Milton, to America;

— "Fool, not to think how vain

"Against th' Omnipotent to rise in Arms!"

Paradise Lost, book vi. ver. 135, 136.

but which, to Scotland, was as ready to cry out, with the same Author;

"Son! thou in whom my Glory I behold

"In full Resplendence, Heir of all my Might,

"Nearly it now concerns us to be sure

"Of our Omnipotence!" Par. Lost, b. v. ver. 719, &c.

This too hath this Doctrine done. "And

"yet more fatal Tidings still await our Ears."

It hath raised a gallant Army of forty-two thousand Men in Ireland, who, wisely foreseeing that "the Omnipotency of Parliament," from its very Definition, could not be confined to America, were prepared even with *Omnipo-*

* The mention of Scotland reminds me to say, that Sir William Blackstone having produced the Act of Union as a Proof of "the Omnipotency of Parliament," "the Omnipotency of Parliament" might be proved by a Repeal of the *fundamental* Articles of the Union. But this was not the Sense of the Reign in which the Act of Union passed. For upon the Question in the House of Lords, whether the Peers of Scotland should sit by *Election* or by *Descent*, the Debate turned entirely upon this Distinction; "which of the Articles of the Union were *fundamental*, and not alterable;" and which were otherwise. See Tind. Cont. of Rap. vol. 2. p. 238.

† See Mr. Burke's Answer, to the Letter of Mr. Pat. Bowic, one of the Members of this Congress, in the Edinburgh Magazine for March, 1779.

tency to contend. But Tyranny is ever cowardly. And now our "Palinurus nodding at the Helm," to avoid *Scylla*, runs upon *Charybdis*; * and gives the *thousandth* Mark, and *damning* Proof of himself, that;

"Dum vitant Stulti Vitia in contraria currunt."

Hor. Sat. lib. i. v. 123.

This is the Mischief of this Doctrine, and this, with much more, it hath already done. I forbear to mention the Fears, the Apprehensions, the Distrusts, the Heart-burnings, the Dangers, the Losses, the Difficulties, and Distresses it hath brought down upon, and occasioned to, his Majesty's useful, faithful, and loyal Subjects in the West-Indies. I omit to take Notice of the Broils, the Heats, and the civil Dissentions it hath sown in this Country. For this were but to heap *Pelion* upon *Ossa*, whilst enough remains to crush the *infernal* Ministers of this Doctrine to Atoms, though their

* What is here said must be received, as not intending to express the least Disapprobation of those Advantages, which Ireland has received from this Country: On the contrary, there being still other Benefits to which Ireland is justly entitled, and without which those already granted will be rendered not so beneficial, I sincerely hope she may obtain them. But what is here said is meant to shew, how *dastardly* and *unprincipled* that Minister must be, who, because the Danger is at a Distance, spends forty Millions of English Treasure, and spills the Blood of thirty Thousand of his Majesty's Subjects, to obtain *that* in America, *which*, because the Danger is near, he yields up, and, with his own Hands, makes a Proffer of to Ireland. And can a stronger Picture of *Injustice*, flowing from that Source whence *Justice* should issue, be painted, than this Representation affords! But let it be a Lesson of Caution to the good People of Ireland, how they trust this *Weathercock* of a Minister: For Ireland *disarmed*, Courage returns; and with it "the Omnipotence of Parliament" returning, the Advice of Alexander Sforza, the Italian, to his Ally Lewis 11th of France, was, "Agree with your Enemies upon any Conditions, and then find the Opportunity to cut their Throats;" and to the *Age* of To-day may be *repealed* To-morrow.

Shoulders,

Shoulders, like those of Atlas, were made to support the Burden of the *Earth*.

And therefore I proceed to the second Question proposed, Where is its *future* Danger? And this too I will answer. The Danger is, that with this Doctrine so held to be the Doctrine of the Constitution, *a corrupted Majority of Parliament* may constitutionally make the King of a *limited* Monarchy, a *legal* Despot. † We are told, that “ what Parliament doth, no “ Authority upon Earth can undo.” This then being done, where is the Remedy? Sir William Blackstone tells us, “ the Remedy is “ to be sought, when the Evil comes. To “ prevent it would be an Act of Indecency to- “ wards Government.” “ For the Supposition “ of Law is, that neither the King, nor either “ House of Parliament (collectively taken) is “ *capable of doing wrong*.” * And if ever the Evil unfortunately arrives, “ the Prudence of “ the Times must provide new Remedies upon

† If our Princes, on Conviction, that it was not only a vain, but a desperate Undertaking, to wrestle with Parliaments, should find it expedient to compromise the Affair with them, and agree to *divide* the Commonwealth *between them*, would not Parliaments themselves become a Grievance? Would not our Representatives become our Masters? Would not their Constituents become their Slaves? Thus, if the governing *without* a Parliament was justly the Object of our Terror; if the governing *with* a Parliament was, *as justly*, the Object of our Wishes; the governing *by* a Parliament would be an infallible Method, not only to compass, but give a Sanction to our Ruin. With Regard to the first of these Governments, our Terrors have long slumbered: For while we *so freely give*, why should the Sovereign take? And with Regard to the last — *Hinc illæ Lacrymæ!* See Use and Abuse of Parliaments, v. 2. p. 714.

* I had imagined, and from Sir William Blackstone too, that this Attribute of Perfection belonged only to the *Person* of the King: But now I begin to feel a little Ray of Divinity about myself, and to think that, as a *Member of the Legislature*, I am as incapable of *doing wrong*, as the King. See Black. Comm. vol. i. p. 244.

"new Emergencies." And so I think myself: For the Evil is arrived, and therefore the Prudence of the Times must find *a new Remedy upon a new Emergency*. And which shews too, what I undertook to prove, that "the Omnipotency of Parliament," as a *constitutional Doctrine*, is "a new Emergency," originating in the Reign of George III. and requiring "a new Remedy." But what if no Remedy can be found? Why then, we shall be told that "what we cannot cure we must endure," and that we must take to ourselves, what has been called, "*the Comfort of the Inquisition*:" *We must bear the Evil with Patience.*†

But why seek a Remedy at all? For where is the Evil? Admit the Doctrine, and the Evil is none. It is the Doctrine of the Constitution. And how can the People complain of that Doctrine, which the People themselves thought fit, in their Constitution, to ordain?

But did I say that this Doctrine, *so held* to be the Doctrine of the Constitution, *may* make the King a legal Despot? I *will* say that it *has already* made the King a legal Despot, greater than any Despot in all Europe; I was about to say greater than in all the World: But as great as any in the World, I do assert and will maintain.

When the War with America was lighted up by this Country in that, the Pretence of it was to force Submission to the Parliamentary Rights of England. It was therefore *a War of*

† An innocent Italian being once condemned to the Inquisition, he said to his Father Confessor; "*Padre mio, che s'ha da fare?*" Father, what must I do? To which the Father answered; "*Eglio mio, bisogna aver Pazienza.*" Son, you must bear it patiently. And whence, this fatherly Advice is called, the *inquisitorial Comfort*, or *the Comfort of the Inquisition*.

Parliament, the Cause of it being a Parliamentary Cause. But what Proof did Parliament give of its being so? Or rather what Proof did Parliament not give to shew that this was nothing but a mere Pretence? I will tell you in a Word. They passed the Quebec-Act: Of which before I speak, I trust, "the Omnipotency itself of Parliament" will allow, that if there be any one Thing which Parliament cannot do, it is that of *divesting* itself of its own *legislative* Authority. And yet this very Quebec-Act, not only surrenders up the *legislative* Authority of Parliament, in and over all Canada, marked out, for this special Purpose, in Extent determinable only by the Lines and Circles of Astronomical Geography, into the Hands of the King; but places the *executive* and *judiciary* Powers there also. And if there be any Degree of *Despotism* greater and higher than that, where the *legislative*, the *executive*, and the *judiciary* Powers meet and unite in one and the same Person; I have failed in what I so boldly took upon myself to assert and maintain.

Where then is the Difference between this Act and those of the 21st of R. II. c. 16, and the 31st of Hen. VIII. ch. 8. (which last Doctor Hurd calls "*a terrible Act*") except in the paramount Nefariousness of the *former* over the *latter*? They all give up the *legislative* Authority of Parliament to the Crown: But the Act of R. II. has the Modesty, in so doing, to join some of the Lords, and some of the Commons, with the King; and the Act of Hen. VIII. superadds, "with the Advice of the Council:"

whereas the Quebec-Act, besides the *judiciary* Power, the *executive* being of Right in the Crown, vests an *exclusive* Right to the *legislative* Power there in the King alone; and is called a *constitutional Act*: whilst the others, when passed, and for ever after, till repealed, were held *notorious Violations* of the Constitution, and Acts of Tyranny. But this is not the only Act in which this Madness of Power has been exerted. There is not one of those many coercive Acts that have passed in the Administration of the present Minister respecting America, in which you do not find the very Roots, not only of our Constitution, but of every Government, *even of Humanity itself*, * torn from their native Embraces, and burnt up by the Blast of his unnatural Power. Not an Act out of which Articles of Impeachment, upon Articles of Impeachment, do not arise; † and for which if he does not suffer in this World (for his avowed Ostensibility will not protect him) Justice is but fled to the next, that his Punishment may be eternal hereafter. ‡

* See the Fishery-Bill, or *Starvation-Act* as it is called, *ναὶ ἔσονται*, where the *Innocent* are involved with the *Guilty*, and “the Sins of the Father visited upon the Children unto the third and fourth Generations.”

† Let it be remembered, that one of the Articles of Impeachment against the Earl of Clarendon was; “That he introduced an *arbitrary Government* in his Majesty’s foreign Plantations.”

See Clarendon’s Tracts, p. 25.

‡ It may be enquired how, under such Circumstances, has this Minister been able to find Support? To which the Answer is; by the following Means. In the first Place, by a Waste and Dissipation of the Public Money, exceeding the Bounds of all *Credit*; in every Sense of the Word. In the next, by the Adoption, and most ready Use, of a *favourite* Maxim in the Politics of Machiavel, namely, “to conceal every Appearance of *Cunning*, and to deceive under the Guise of *Candour* and *good Faith*.” But lastly, and principally, by becoming the adopted *God-father* of the *old Cocoa-Tree-Club*, of *living Fame*; and to whom, *God-father-like*, he pro-

I have

I have now done with what I had to offer in Addition to that *very, very* important Subject, “the Doctrine of the Omnipotence of Parliament;” and here ending my Endeavours to point out to you the Source of our present political Distractions, their proposed Remedy and Redress become the next Object of your Consideration. And as by the *former*, my Design has been to prove, that this Doctrine of “the Omnipotence of Parliament” has been not only the Source, but the *unconstitutional* Source of our present political Distractions; so, by the *latter*, the setting aside that Doctrine, is, in the very Act of its Removal, both the Cure of the Evil, and the Remedy proposed. But of this briefly in Detail.

I have observed, that a Principle at the Time of the Revolution was introduced, which afterwards became an acknowledged Principle in the mised and vowed three Things in their Name: *First*, that the Parliament should be omnipotent; whereby, although they, *in themselves*, would become the *Vassals* of the Crown; *of themselves*, they would be the *Tyrants* of the People: *Secondly*, that a Revenue should be procured from America, in order to ease them of the Burthen of the Land-Tax: And *thirdly*, that Trade should be destroyed: For Tories hate Trade, as Oil does Vinegar; they never mix, as witness, the four last Years of Queen Anne’s Reign; and for good Reason: Trade begets Wealth, Wealth procures Independence, Independence protects Liberty; and Tories, in their very Definition, are the Enemies of Liberty. It is however said, that there is now a great Misunderstanding between this *God-father* and his *God-children*; and which is likely to bring an *old House* about his Bars. The *God-children*, it seems, complain, that out of the *three* Things promised and vowed in their Name, God-father-like, only *one* has been performed; to wit, *the Destruction of Trade*. And now Experience hath taught them, that the Destruction of Trade was lowering the Price of their Lands, lessening the Value of their Rents, rendering unsaleable their Home Commodities and Manufactures, throwing the Poor and the unemployed upon their Hands to maintain, and, in short, making absolute Dupes of them. What a Pity, as the only Dupes, these Tories had not been the only Sufferers!

Government, upon which a System was to be erected; and by which the Administration of the Government was to be carried on: And that this Principle was, *Corruption*. But this will require some little further Explanation. And here I will say, that although Corruption, as a System, might take its Date from the Epoch of the Revolution; yet the Corruption of those Days, and from that Time to the Demise of George II, was as different in Aim, and View, to the present Object of Corruption, as any two Things can possibly be. The Corruption of the Reign of King William, I was almost about to say, was a *laudable* Corruption; and indeed as far as *wicked* Means can be justified by a *good* End, it was laudable: But that it was a *necessary* Corruption, and to the full as good in Essence, as the Persons for whose Use it was devised, no Friend to this Country will deny. An *unworthy* King had been driven out of the Kingdom, and if he had taken his *Unworthies* along with him, there had been no Need of Corruption; and Corruption had not existed: But instead of this, he left behind him such Tribes of Jacobites, Tories, and Priests, so numerous and powerful in Opposition to the then Settlement; that as to appease the wicked Loyalty of these Wretches, (and who had been otherwise in Rebellion to Liberty) a wicked Sacrifice to Mammon

* It is certain that Corruption was practised before the Time of the Revolution; and it is said, by Lord Bolingbroke, that "the Expedient of corrupting Parliaments began under the Administration of that boisterous, overbearing, dangerous Minister *Clifford*." But as "the necessary Supports of such Means were not yet acquired," to use the Words of the same noble Writer; so is it as certain, that Corruption was not, before the Revolution, reduced into a System; nor considered, as it is now, the ruling Principle of our Government.

was

was the only Expedient; so, to appease this Loyalty was of this Sacrifice the only View. And as this Necessity continued, of which the Rebellions of 15 and 45 are flagrant Proofs, to the Period of Demise mentioned; so again, farther than this Necessity gave Occasion to Corruption, Corruption had no Object. For will any one say, that arbitray Power was the Object of the Reign of William III? Was it of Queen Anne's Reign? * Was it the View of the Reign of George I? The Histories of those Times do not tell me so. Was it of George II? His Fame is still alive, and daily Comparisons serve but to make it live for ever. What then was the Object of Corruption? I have already said: to stop the Mouths of the discontented; to prevent Rebellions, which, however, it could not effect; to save, and not to murder the Constitution.

But let us turn our Eyes to the present Times: to the present Reign: to that Reign in which, no one Reason, that gave Occasion to Corruption in the former Reigns, exists. No Controversy about hereditary Right: no Pretender to the Crown, or next to none: no German Prince upon the Throne: but a Briton, as I am taught to say, though his Majesty was born in England. † And let us ask what is the Object of Corruption now?

* The Tories of this Reign, when in Power, made one desperate Push to bring back the Stuart Family; and to place the then Pretender on the Throne: but this was no more than the convulsive Agonies of their dying Tyranny, at that Time, in this Country: and as to arbitray Power, that was only in *Ordine ad*, in Case of Success, and not the View of the Reign itself.

† If his Majesty had been born in Wales, or in Scotland, or before the Conquest of the Anglo-Saxons, he had been born a Briton. But being born since the Conquest of the Anglo-Saxons, and in England, as this Country has ever since been called, it would seem as if his Majesty had been born an *Englishman*.

Look

Look to that “ absolute *despotic* Power which “ must in all Governments reside somewhere !” Look to *arbitrary* Power in a *free* State : Look to “ the Omnipotence of Parliament,” and see the Object *there* ; “ robed in Divinity, *majestically* “ sweet,” with the *Bawd* Corruption *pimping* for the Embrace. Such is Corruption’s Object now, and this the Difference in its Aim and View. Here too is the Evil, in its Means and End ; but where the Remedy is, is now the Subject of Inquiry.

Perceiving, as many zealous and worthy Patriots have done, the Ruin and Destruction which the Male-administration of our Government have been headlong driving this Country into, Remedies for Reformation have not been wanting in Proposal. A *Place and Pension Act* has been thought a fit Expedient, *short Parliaments* have been repeatedly called for, and a *more equal and adequate Representation of the People* required.*

* This Proposition of “ a more equal and adequate Representation “ of the People” is, as it would seem, founded upon the same Mistake of the Nature of Representation, that has led our puny Politicians of this Reign into that absurd Distinction, and still more absurd Reasoning concerning a *real* and *virtual* Representation in Parliament. The Mistake is, that *Persons* or the *People* are the *Objects* of Representation : Whereas the *Fact* is, that *Property* is the *Object* of Representation, and not *the People*. The Members for Counties are the Representatives of the *landed Interest*, and not the Representatives of the *Persons* by whom they are elected, but of the *landed Property* of those Persons, and through them of *all the landed Property* in the Kingdom. Just so the Members for Cities and Boroughs are the Representatives of the *monied* or *trading Interest* of the Kingdom at large, and not of the *Persons* of the Pot-wollopers or Chimney-sweepers who may perhaps be their Electors. If therefore on the one Hand the Representation of the landed Interest is inadequate, that Representation must be made good in Proportion to the Quantity of Land that is occupied, and not in Proportion to the Number of its Occupiers : So on the other Hand, if the Representation of the monied or trading Interest be inadequate, this Representation must be made good in Proportion to the increased Quantum in both, and not in Proportion to the increased Number of monied Men and Traders.

Each

Each excellent in itself, all useful, and proper. But viewing this Subject in the Light I have just thrown it, reflecting that what Corruption was, Corruption, now, is not; may it not be a Question, Whether these Remedies, looking as they seemingly do, to the Prevention of Corruption only, would, under these Circumstances, be found fully adequate to the Reformation wanted? Will they not be *Palliatives*, instead of *Specifics*? And although they may *mend*, is it sure that they will *cure* the Evil? For myself, I must confess, these are my Doubts; and I will state my Reasons for them.

I have said, that these Remedies look, seemingly, to the Prevention of Corruption only; and if Corruption was itself the Evil, the Prevention of Corruption was the Cure of the Evil: But Corruption is not itself the Evil; it is in order to the Evil. The Evil is arbitrary Power. Corruption is the Handmaid to arbitrary Power. It is, And thus it is that the whole Property of the Kingdom, and of Course its whole Interest, which must consist either of Land or Matters of Trade; being represented, the whole Kingdom is represented, though it may not be adequately so; the Members of Counties being the Representatives of all the Land of England, for the Interest of that Land, whilst the Members of Cities and Boroughs are the Representatives of all the Money and Trade of England to the same End. Hence it was that Lord Camden, in his great Wisdom, has said, "That there was not a Blade of Grass in all England that was not represented." And why? Because the Interest of that Land whence the Grass grows, and not the Owners of that Grass, was the Object of Representation. What are the Members of the two Universities the Representatives of? Not of the Students, for they are already represented either in the landed or trading Interest; but they are the Representatives of a supposed Property in *Literature*, and the Protectors of the Rights thereunto belonging. In the Reign of William the Norman, all the Lands of the Kingdom, which was the only Property, there being then no Commerce, were in the Possession of Seven Hundred People only; and therefore they, in their *collective* Capacities, not only composed the whole Legislature, but engrossed the whole civil Authority of the Kingdom into their Hands.

as I have said before, the *Bawd*, the *Procurefs*, or the *Pimp*, of arbitrary Power: But it is not arbitrary Power *itself*. It is the Means to an End; but not the End *itself*. Arbitrary Power is the End, Corruption the Means to that End. But it may be said, that to remove the Means is to take away the End; and if Corruption were the *only Means* to arrive at arbitrary Power, the Assertion had been true. But to the same End, there are many Means; and so is it in the present Case. As for Example. Let these Remedies do away Corruption *entirely*, suffer arbitrary Power to remain as a *constitutional* Doctrine, leave the Administration of the Government in the Hands of Tories; and arbitrary Power follows in Adoption *upon Principle*, as surely as the Means of Corruption would have procured it. Hence therefore it is plain, that to take away the Means, and to leave the End, is not to perform the Cure: For *Principle* will supply the Place of Corruption. Whereas to take away the End, which is arbitrary Power, not only the Means of Corruption are done away; but *all other Means* to that End must inevitably perish with it.

Of these Remedies then, these are my Ideas. My Objections are not to their Propriety, but to their Insufficiency. The one I have endeavoured to prove, the other I have acknowledged. If therefore I am mistaken, my Mistake is not wilful; and my Error pardonable. I will add too, that even the Insufficiency of these Remedies had not been suggested by me, without conceiving that some Plan of Reformation, more pointed to the Purpose, might be adopted; for any Remedy is better than none, and to find Fault, without attempting

attempting to mend, is to play that Part of a Critic, which I neither know, nor desire to learn.

It remains therefore, that the Plan of Reformation, to which I have alluded, be now submitted to your Censure or Adoption, as it may appear to merit the one, or deserve the other. And here, however great my Anxiety is for the Salvation of the Constitution of this Country, however willing to adopt any Measure whatever to this End, even that of Resistance itself; (I mean such Resistance as the Constitution admits) if the Proposition which I had to make was unsupported by any other Authority than that of my own, my *mental* Courage (for the Courage of the Heart is not to be parted with in Times such as these are) would fail me in the Attempt. But when I consider that what I have to offer is not only founded on the Authority, and established by a Precedent of the Constitution, but is supported by *Reasons*, so wise, so prudent, so unexceptionable, and so conclusive, *that are not my own*; Fear is converted into Fortitude, and Confidence supplies the Place of Doubt.

Standing therefore upon its own Basis, and in three Words, the Plan is this; *Settle your Constitution*. And Reformation succeeds,

“Velut Unda supervenit Undam.”

This is the Beginning, this the Middle, and this the End of Redress. And let your first Monitor be that of *Shame*. *Shame!* that in an enlightened Country, in a Country whose Government is subjected to a *Constitution*, and in a Country where, although the Term is in the Mouth of every Body, the *Constitution itself* (as if by the Designs of the wicked Few) is to be wrapped up in Clouds

Clouds of mysterious Darkness; so little known, that no two Persons can agree in their Ideas upon the Subject, always undefined, ever abused, and of late so perverted, shocking to relate! as to have it repeatedly declared even from the high Authority of the Throne itself, that Taxation without Representation, and of Course "the "Omnipotence of Parliament" is a *constitutional* Doctrine, to be maintained by the Blood and Treasure of England. A Declaration that annihilates the very Idea of a Constitution, and, whilst it converts *Government by Constitution* into *Government by Will*, lays the Axe at once to the Root of the Tree, and *Liberty* is no more. *

* In all other Reigns when any *novel* Measure of State was to be adopted, the Legality of such Measure was to be decided, by the Opinions of the Twelve Judges; and then the Judges were the Objects of Bribery and Corruption. When Charles I. levied Ship-money, he bribed the Judges to say, that he had a Right to do so. Why then was not the *novel* Measure of taxing America, in order to raise a Revenue for this Country, referred to the Judges of our Days? The Reason is obvious: *Those* were the Days of Prerogative: *These* are the Days of "the Omnipotence of Parliament;" and so Corruption hath changed its Ground. When Prerogative was opposed to Law, the Judges were the necessary Tools of Government. To misconstrue, misapply, and pervert the Law was almost *professional* amongst them; and this was the Channel through which Corruption passed. But now that "the stern Commands of Prerogative have yielded to the milder Voice of Influence," as Sir William Blackstone *well* expresses a very *bad* Idea, Prerogative is swallowed up in the Law, "the Omnipotence of Parliament" succeeds, and Corruption stains the Fountain Head. *Then* were the Judges dependent on the Crown: *Now* the Statute of the 1st of Geo. III. c. 23, hath set them free. And why? Not for the chaste and pure Motives that have been ascribed to that Statute, but for the Reason that Corruption hath changed its Ground: Not because Justice should be incorrupt, but because Legislation may be corrupt. And therefore as with the Judges no Temptation to Corruption is left, and with Government, through them, no Necessity for it; so the Fact is, that when any *novel* Measure is now to be adopted, in *Vulcan's Shop*, a dead Majority of *living* Cyclops are always ready, with the Hammers of Corruption in their Hands, to forge into any Form the *Thunderbolts* of *Jupiter* for *omnipotent* Use.

Here

Here then is your Remedy, take it, and for *Shame* make Use of it; for something *more* than *Shame* adopt it: For in a Matter of this national Magnitude, of this *first* Importance to Society, Ignorance is Criminality, and Want of Certainty, *Reproach*. *

But now the Question that arises is, in what Manner is this Remedy to be obtained? For although it may be desireable in *Speculation*, in *Practice* it may prove unattainable. But in this, as in the former Proposition, the Proof lying in the Proposition itself; the Proposition is, briefly this: Obtain it by an Act of your own Legislature: by an Act *for Uniformity in the State*, declaratory of the Constitution, and of those *fundamental* and *irrevocable* Laws upon which the Administration of the Government is built, and by which it is to be directed. And such, both in *Matter* and *Manner*, is the Plan of Reformation proposed. A Plan no less easy, plain, practicable, adequate to the End, and sure in Effect; than *constitutionally* supported by the *Authority*, the *Precedent*, and *Reasons*, which I have already alluded to: and to which it would be now necessary for me more particularly to advert, if the very Mention of *Uniformity in the State* did not, in the Instant, bring to every Mind the already obtained *Uniformity in the Church*. An Authority and Precedent, precisely in Point; and not only so, but who is he that, in approving the *latter*, does not see ten thousand stronger Reasons for adopting the

* If the *Collective* Body adopt this Remedy, and the *Legislative* Body refuse to execute it, a real Proof of "the Omnipotence of "Parliament" will be given.

former?

former? Shall it be said that the Church, as *established by the State*, is better worth preserving, than the State itself? Shall it be said that the Church is wiser than the State? † Or that Churchmen are more wary and provident even of their *temporal* Interest than Statesmen are? Shall *Thirty-nine* Articles, the *Entities* of metaphysical *Non-entity*, in some Respects, staggering the Faith even of the Faithful, and in others, surpassing all human Understanding; shall these be Fundamentals for Uniformity, for Faith and Practice in the State? And shall the *Rights, Liberties, and Privileges* of the State, the Offspring of Common Sense, founded on Matter of Fact, knowable, and essential to be known by all, be hid in Obscurity, and left in Uncertainty, nay even in the Jeopardy of Destruction by the very State to which they belong? To the *former*, Objections may be raised. Many may say, as many do; I do not desire to partake of the Rights of your Church. I do not understand them. I will not accept them. But to the *latter*, where can the Pretence of Objection lie? Will any Man say, I do not desire to be free. I do not wish to enjoy the Liberties of Englishmen. I do not choose to see them secured. I had rather be a Slave. And so he who objects to Uniformity in the State must say. But I am reasoning upon a Subject which I have already referred, for its Support, to the *Reasons* of another; and which rendering any Arguments that I can suggest. There was a Time when the Church was wiser than the State, for there was a Time when the Church could read, and the State could not; and this may easily account for Uniformity in one, and not in the other. But now that *both* can read the best *Privilegium Clericale* we can have, is the *Benefit* of their Example for Uniformity.

gest superfluous, and unnecessary, I have only to direct the Reader to "REASONS for Uniformity in the State," by Roger Acherley, Esq; being a Supplement to that most admirable Work of his, "*the Britannic Constitution.*" A Work, in the whole, full of Instruction for the present Moment. * And now, whilst I rest satisfied, that no Argument whatever, except that great Argument of State, the *Argumentum baculinum*, can, in Opposition to these *Reasons*, have any Weight, Force, or Effect; so in conclusion of the Subject,

* This excellent Author says, "The Design of this Supplement is, to unite the two contending Parties of *Whigs* and *Tories*, in the true Notion of the Constitution of the British Kingdom and Government, as the only expedient to pull up by the Roots all Seditions, Tumults, treasonable Conspiracies, Rebellions, and even Party Distinctions, except that one, viz. Of those who are for the British Constitution, and those who are against it, being a Distinction that ought to be perpetual: Which desired End can never be effected, without an Act for Uniformity, and for that Purpose to shew, &c."

Again: "The Insecurity or Infirmary of the Constitution in the State, ariseth from the Want of Uniformity in Mens Minds, and for Want of the People's knowing it, and from their Disputations and Questions about what are, and what are not the fundamental Parts of the Constitution."

He likewise says in his Dedication, "The People of antient Rome and Greece treated such Men as introduced good Laws, with uncommon Honour. It is therefore apprehended, that if Uniformity in the State were enacted in Great Britain, it would produce a national Stability meriting equal Honours; forasmuch as the fluctuating Opinions, about what are the fundamental Rights of the Crown, and what of the People, have often engaged the Governors and Governed in hostile Contentions, rendering the Nation weak by Divisions, which, in former Times, excited neighbouring Potentates to invade and wrest away those very Rights both Parties contended for; and in our Times, unquestionable Authority hath informed us, that the same Causes are engendering the same Effects." See Acherley's *Britannic Constitution*, with the Supplement thereto, Fol. Ann. Dom. 1727. From these Specimens the Reader may perceive the Tendency of this Work, and forejudge the Satisfaction he will have in the Perusal of it.

and that nothing may be omitted which may tend to give Effect to so important an Undertaking, I will take the Liberty just to State my Ideas, in Outline only, of the Frame of the Bill that may be necessary for the Adoption of Parliament, in order to the End proposed; leaving its Completion to that *united* Wisdom, which such a Proposition calls for, and must of Course require.

In the first Place then, this Bill, in order to an Act, may be entitled, an Act *declaratory of the Constitution, for settling the Constitution, and for obtaining Uniformity in the State.*

In the Preamble, the Reason and Occasion of this Act, will of Course be stated, its Propriety shewn by the several Acts already passed for Uniformity in the Church,* and its Efficacy and Effect deduced from the Efficacy and Effect of that Example. It will then proceed to state and declare,

Article 1, What the Prerogative of the Crown is; and if it be, according to Sir William Blackstone, so *certain* and *notorious* that it cannot be exceeded without the Consent of the People, in this no Difficulty can occur.

Art. 2, What the Privileges of the House of Lords are. †

* See 1 Eliz. xiii. and xiv. Char. II.

† For a Review, *at least*, of the Privileges of the House of Lords, there wants no stronger Reason than the late Exertion of them, in the Case of William Parker, Printer of the General Advertiser. An Exertion, to which it were to be wished that the House, for its own Sake, would turn its most serious Attention. A Man is complained of for publishing what is *supposed*, and not *proved* to be, a Libel. This Man is ordered to the Bar of the House. He, conscious of the Publication, and knowing that his coming to the Bar can only tend to *criminate* himself, does not appear. What then?

Art.

Art. 3, What the Privileges of the House of Commons are. § Of both which last, the *sober* Examination, and the *caudid* Reports of their own Committees of Privileges will of Course be received; intending, so far from taking away either from the *legal* Prerogative of the Crown, or the *just* Privileges of Parliament, that *both* may

An Usher of the Black Rod, no Constable, without Warrant, by mere Resolve of the House, is ordered to bring him by Force to the Bar. And what further? By mere Resolve again, he is committed, without Accusation, without Defence, without *Trial by Jury*, to close Imprisonment, until he shall give up the Rights of his Fellow-Subjects, by acknowledging this Power in the House; and thereby placing an unconstitutional Precedent upon the Journals, to be drawn into Use for the same unconstitutional Purpose at other Times. But admit this single Position only, that the Privileges of the House of Lords cannot *annul* the Constitution, nor *repeal* Acts of Parliament (and who is it that will maintain a contrary Doctrine?) and the Case of this Man is so gross a Violation of both, that Precedents in Support of it serve but to enhance the Violation. Can the King take away the Liberty of the Subject in this *summary*, and, of course, in this *arbitrary* Way? Every Body knows that this Power is not in the Prerogative of the Crown, even in Cases of High Treason. And if the *executive* Power is not entrusted with this Authority in any Case, shall the Privilege of Parliament claim it, and claim it too in the Case of a Libel? But it is necessary; for this is the Plea. But Necessity is the Tyrant's Plea. Besides, how can *Illegality* be necessary for Redress, when *Legality* has already provided the most ample Means? Let this Case, therefore, be among those many Arguments which now so forcibly cry out, "*Settle your Constitution.*"

§ For the Necessity of a Review of the Privileges of the House of Commons, look to the *Middlesex Election*, and see the *audacious* Use that has been made of them there. An Use that ought to make the Blood of every *Electer* in the Kingdom boil in his Heart, as in the Caldron of Macbeth's Witches, never to subside, till this wicked Precedent be torn from the Journals of that House; and, the Usurpation, like the *Royauté* of the French Parliament by Lewis XI, *mise hors de page*. But this Matter has been so fully, and so often set in its true Light, by that real Patriot, and Friend to his Country, Mr. Wilkes, whose Case it was; and has been painted in Colours so much stronger than any others, and which are so peculiarly his own, that to *refer*, and not to *explain*, is the intended Business only of this Note.

be extended in all Cases whatsoever, where the Good of the Community is the *direct* Object; and where they do not in any Respect whatsoever interfere with the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities of the People at large.

Art. 4, What the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, and Immunities of the People at large are; as well those *natural* Rights which are by their Nature *unalienable*, as those *reserved* Rights, which Compact, and immemorial Usage, and Custom, have interwoven with, and established in the Constitution; as the *fundamental* and *irrevocable* Laws of the Land, subsisting, and existing, between the *Governors* and the *Governed*. †

Art. 5, That these Rights of the Crown, of the House of Lords, of the House of Commons, and of the People, constitute the *material* Part of the Constitution; as the King, the Lords, and the Commons form the *formal* Part thereof, in order to the Execution of its Government, which is

† If such an Act as this had existed before the American War, Representation in order to Taxation, had, in this Schedule of the Rights of Englishmen, of course appeared. And what then? Why then neither the Corruption of the American War, nor the American War itself, had ever taken Place: For the End of the American War was to establish the *arbitrary* Power in Parliament of Taxation without Representation, and the Means to obtain that End was Corruption. But of what Use is a Bawd to obtain the Chastity of Cæsar's Wife, when the Chastity of Cæsar's Wife must not even be suspected! When, to speak without a Metaphor, Representation in order to Taxation was a fundamental Law of the Land, which Parliament cannot take away, nor repeal, nor yet dare to counteract? In this single Instance then is seen the Utility of the Act proposed. It cuts up arbitrary Power by the Roots, and Corruption rots with the Tree itself upon the Ground: For in this Case again, as well might Lord North now say, I will be the Archbishop of Canterbury without subscribing to the XXXIX Articles; as for him to have said, as he did, with all the Corruption of the Treasury about him, I will tax America without Representation.

founded

founded upon, and must *universally* be directed by, these *Rights*: That these Rights as *natural Rights* are *unalienable*, and as *political Rights* *fundamental* and *irrevocable*, whilst the Constitution lasts; and that the Constitution (*quoad* these Rights as well as its Form) cannot be altered in any Degree, but by and with the Approbation and Consent first had and obtained of the *whole Body* of the People called upon for this *special Purpose*, in their *collective*, in order to their *representative*, and not in their *elective* Capacities only.

Art. 6, That the *supreme legislative Authority*, (the Objects of which are the *Duties* and *civil Rights* of the People) is vested in the King, in the Lords, and in the Commons, and no where else; and that (*quoad* these Duties and Rights) as arising out of, and depending upon, the *natural* and *political* Rights of the Constitution, this Authority is "absolute and without Controul."

Art. 7, That for the Preservation of these Rights, and that they may be handed down to Posterity inviolate and inviolable, and in order effectually to carry into Execution the good Intentions of this Act; a *Test* must be adopted suitable to the Occasion: A *Test*, to which not only every Description of Person who may have the least Concern in, or Interference with the Offices or Functions of the State, but every *Teacher, Preacher, or other Professor* of every Species of Religion (all tolerated *universally*, and without *Limitation*

As Men have given up their natural Independence to live under *political Laws*, they have given up the natural Community of Goods to live under *civil Laws*. See Spirit of Laws, v. ii. p. 210.

as Religions) shall (by the Provision of fit Pains and Penalties) be forced to subscribe and conform. §

§ This Act being intended for Uniformity in the State, the Clergy, for Reasons alluded to in the Note of Page xlv, have not been in their *political* Rights distinguished from the Rest of the People at large; nor ought they, on any Account to be so. With Respect to their *civil* Rights or Duties, which are the Objects of Legislation, there no Doubt, so far as they extend to the Exemption of personal Services in certain Cases, of Course remain. But why the Body of the Clergy should, by the fundamental Laws of the Land, be separated and set a-part from the Rest of their Fellow-subjects, Common Sense cannot account for; and, it is conceived, no other Sense has any Thing to do with the fundamental Laws of Society. Why should not the Navy, the Army, the Body of Law, and Physic, have *exclusive* Rights in their *political* Capacities, as well as the Clergy? And for better Reasons, because these are made essentially serviceable to the State, by the *civil* Laws of the State; whereas the Clergy, in many Cases, are rendered unserviceable to the State, by the same Laws. If the Clergy enjoy the Security of *Life, Liberty, and Property*, equally, to the full, and in common with the Laity, the Clergy in their *political* Capacities can desire no more; but this is said of their *political* Capacities merely: for as to their *religious* Capacities, they ought not only to be distinguished from the Laity, but the Line to be drawn between the Church and the State should be so *dearly* plain, and *mathematically* true, that no Interference one with the other can possibly take Place; the proper Object of each being as different the one from the other, as Matters *spiritual* and Matters *temporal* can make them; as Body and Soul can be. The *Care* of the Church is the *Cure* of Souls. The *Care* of the State (though too often the Killing) is the Preservation of Bodies. These are their characteristic Differences, and the natural Reasons for their Separation: but there is a Reason of Policy too. Never had the Church the upper Hand in the State, that the most barbarous Government did not follow. Never did the Church interfere with the State, that Mischief did not ensue. At this very Time, the Interference of *some* of the Clergy, with the Quixotism of Ministers, to establish and maintain the *canon* and the *feudal* Law in America, has made the War in that Country another *Crusado*. Hence, therefore, no Objection arises to the Uniformity of the Church already obtained, but on the contrary inasmuch as it relates to the Religion of that Church, that Uniformity is fundamental and constitutional. The State, it is certain, has an undoubted Right to make Choice of a Religion; by which is meant, whoever approves and chuses to adopt that Religion, shall partake of those *Loaves and Fishes* of the State which are the Appropriations thereof: but this Establishment should go no farther than this, for beyond this it is to be intolerant.

Art.

Art. 8, That this Act is *enactive* of no new Rights, but *declaratory* only of the *original*, an-

and Intolerancy in a free State is, or ought to be, a Contradiction in Terms. Presuming this then to be the Case of the present established Religion, as, on the one Hand, no Objection arises to it, so, on the other, being the Institution perhaps the most analogous and consentaneous to the Constitution itself, it is insomuch the fittest for Adoption; for whilst it has as much of the Hierarchy, or old Leaven of Popery therein, as may be necessary for the Trappings of Majesty, and the Exercise of Faith, it has, it is to be hoped, at the same Time, as much of the Spirit of Protestantism in it, as to have Reason for its Guide, and Liberty for its Object; and so therefore obtains, as it were of Right, the Preference of the State.

It is for these Reasons too, as well as for many others not to be comprehended in a Note, that without the Adoption of the Test proposed for Uniformity in the State, the present Policy of the State, with respect to the Roman Catholic Religion, cannot cordially be approved; and that this does not proceed from the Spirit of Intolerancy, it is thought that if Captain Cook had been directed to bring Home with him a Priest of every Religion, that he could meet with in his intended Voyage round the World, to be tolerated as well as encouraged in this Country, it had been probably the best Object of his Mission: For as all Reasoning is comparing, so it being by comparing that Truth from Falsehood, Right from Wrong is distinguished, it had been found perhaps, upon Comparison, that the Religion of the Church of England was, of all other Religions, the best; and if it were not, the same Comparison might afford an Opportunity to make it better. Nor does this Objection arise from any Prejudice conceived against the Roman-Catholic Religion itself, as a Religion: for surely every Man, and more especially every Englishman, because a Freeman, has a Right inherent in himself, to worship God, and "to save his Soul alive," in whatever Manner he pleases. And so, if Transubstantiation be the Road of a Papist to Heaven, who is it to put him out of his Way? If he chuses to give himself an annual Flogging, by Way of Penance, for his Sins, as the Sect of Lacerating Friars do; who is to prevent him? If he chuses to fall down on his Knees in the Streets to worship an Image, what Harm is there done, except in daubing the Knees of his Breeches? Let the Roman Catholics therefore have their Religion, so far as it is to carry them to Heaven, in every Manner or Way, both in Faith and Practice: But let their Religion be confined to this, by every Lock, Bolt, Bar, or Iron, that human Wisdom can devise, or the State provide. Every body knows that to the Popish Religion is annexed a *System of Politics*, which being founded on the *absolute Dominion* of the Pope, both in Church and State, and that both are equally the

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tient, and *fundamental* Rights of the *Constitution* both in *Matter* and *Form*; that, *as such*, it shall be held, deemed, taken, and received; and that therefore, whilst it can be subject to no *Repeal*, or *Alteration* therein, any Attempts to this End shall be considered, *eo instanti*, in the Movers of them, as *High Treason* against the State, to be tried and punished, as Offences for High Treason are, and, if condemned, to be out of the Power of the Crown to pardon, &c. &c. &c. †

This, or something like this, may be the Basis, on which this noble Edifice is to be built. An Edifice which, as founded upon human Nature, will last, whilst human Nature exists. An Edifice so large and comprehensive, and so disposed in all

Subject of Faith in its Professors, this *Dominion* is so big with Danger to the State, that the Toleration of this Church can be only adjusted by the most *unequivocal* and *explicit* Subordination in its Professors to the State. Speaking of the Toleration of this Religion in England, even a Roman Catholic himself, Baron Montesquieu, has these Words: "If amongst the different Religions, there is one that has been attempted to be established by Methods of Slavery, it must *there* be odious; because as we judge of Things by the Appendages we join with them, it could never present itself to the Mind in Conjunction with the Idea of Liberty." [Spir. of Laws, vol. i. pag. 447.] Upon the whole then, let the Test proposed separate the *Politics* of the Roman Catholics from their *Religion*: Let the one be the Subject of *perfect* Toleration: let the other be the Object of the most *determined* Persecution: let their *Religion* lead them to Salvation, but let their *Politics* be led to Destruction: For where *Liberty* is to live, *Slavery* must not reside.

† The Drift of a late Publication, by Mr. Eden, in Address to the Earl of Carlisle, being evidently to *show* how this Country *may* and *ought* to GO ON in its present Measures of *Folly* and *Wickedness*; and the Drift of this Plan of Reformation, being as evidently to *prove* how it *may* and *ought* to GO BACK to its first Principles and better Times; two such Politicians being not likely to *meet*, either here or hereafter, the Test of their Politics must be the *Sense* of the Nation in its Measures of Adoption.

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its Parts, for the Comfort, Happiness, and Welfare of Society, that it may not only bring back our lost Brethren in America to live under its happy Roof, but may tend, in England's Fellowship, to assimilate all human Kind. Under our present Circumstances, the Habitation we are in, not affording even Shelter for its own Inhabitants; so far from inviting others to come among us, ourselves will be driven away to those better Regions, where the *Happiness* of Mankind, and not their *Misery*, is made the Object and End of Society. †

† Shall it be said, that every Government that has had the Shadow of Liberty only, in its Texture, shall have had, or still has, its *fundamental* Laws preserved, even with the *Holiness* of Care; and shall the *fundamental* Laws of that Country, where the *Substance* of Liberty is said to exist, be in a State of Doubt, nay even in Contempt, and Neglect? The Laws of *Moses* had the *Ten Commandments* for their Fundamentals. Were they ever doubted, were they ever contemned, were they ever neglected as Fundamentals? Were they ever repealed by any Authority whatever? Are they not still in Force, and are they not likely to continue so, unless repealed by "the Omnipotence of Parliament?" Greece had its XII Tables, and are we not told, that from these XII Tables, "as the Source" and Fountain of Right, issued all the Streams of public and private Law and Equity, by which the Commonwealth was regulated and governed?" See Mart. Philo. Lib. tit. Jur. p. 471. Had not Rome its XII Tables, borrowed from Greece, and of which Livy says, "In immenso aliarum super alias Acervatarum Legum Cumulo, fons omnis publici privatiq[ue] Juris?" Has not Germany its Golden Bull, and "which, even at this Day, they strengthen" and make Supplements to, by new Capitulations upon Occasion, "according as the Emperors abuse their Power, or that Tricks are devised, by Colour of the Letter, to elude the honest Intention of that fundamental Law and Constitution?" See Use and Abuse Parl. vol. 1. p. 29. Had not Sweden its Monarchy limited by the Laws of its Constitution, until *Gustavus Vasa* (whose Example we have been, in this Reign, bid to follow, "kill them, or they will kill us,") made the Kingdom absolute and hereditary in his own Family? Had not Denmark its Charter of Danish Liberty, but now indeed its *Lex Regia*? Had not Poland its *Pacta Conventa*, till of

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I have now done, what I had conceived it was my Duty to do; for to have possessed Sentiments such as these are, and not to have given public Utterance to them, would have been to have abandoned those *social Duties*, which, as a Member of Society, I am bound to maintain. For the Sentiments themselves therefore I have no Apology to make. They are the Result of *Common Sense*, (I mean that Sense which is *common* to us all, the Sense of distinguishing between Right and Wrong) and not the *Metaphysics* of Politics; nor the Wanderings of the Imagination into the airy Regions of Utopian Commonwealths. My Object has been the *Constitution* of England, my Arguments *Facts*, my Conclusions *their Consequences*. The Plan for Reformation proposed, *simple* and *plain*. The Means to effect it, *tranquil*, *easy*, *constitutional*, and *efficient*. I must therefore repeat, that for Senti-

late swallowed up by a three-headed Monster of arbitrary Power? Has not *Switzerland* its Treaty of Alliance between the Cantons of *Uri*, *Switz*, and *Underwalden*, for their mutual Defence, and Conservation of their Lives and Liberties, and which is still held sacred and fundamental? Has not *Holland* its Treaty of *Utrecht*? Have not the *Jews* their fundamental Articles even for their *dispersed Government*? And what has *poor Old England*, the Land of Liberty, as it is called? Talk of the Revolution, and the Bill of Rights, and you are guilty of High-Treason. Speak of *Magna Charta*, and, as a Proverb of Reproach, a *filthy Rhyme* is to be coupled with it. And shall these Motives have no Effect towards *Reformation*? Let the Guardian Angel of Liberty, let the Majesty of the People of England forbid it! The Object of the Settlement at the Revolution was the *Limitation* of the Power of the Crown. Let the Object of Settlement *now* be the *Limitation* of the Power of Parliament! Let it be said what Parliament CANNOT do! And then what it CAN do, will be still Power enough left for any *free Government* to possess. As it is, the Power of Parliament is said to be *unlimited*, and under such *Unlimitation* the Rights of the People have been taken away.

ments such as these are, I have no Apology to make. But in all other Respects great Candour is necessary, much Apology is due. Much Apology is due, for the Length of this Dedication; and the Apology is, that I have not had Time to make it shorter: For although the Subject-Matter has been long, and constantly the Employment of my Thoughts; the *Composing*, the *Writing*, the *Printing*, and the *Correcting*, from Page xxiii of this Dedication to the present Period of Writing, has been accomplished since the Recess of Parliament, within the Space of six Weeks. Had it been otherwise my Thoughts had been more concentrated, and in gathering the *Fruit*, I had rested to have culled the *Flowers* also. As it is, I have only to say, that Truth was my Object, that Truth is naked, and that the *Nakedness* of Truth is perhaps its first and fairest Ornament. This for myself. The Rest depends on you. Great is the Hour, weighty the Business, and important the Occasion. Let the following Quotation, therefore, from a very excellent Writer, as serving for your Use, be also my Conclusion upon the whole.

“As the People are the Fountain of Power and
 “ Authority, *the original Seat of Majesty*, the Authors
 “ of Laws, and the Creators of Officers to execute
 “ them; if they shall find the Power they have con-
 “ ferred abused by their *Trustees*, their Majesty vio-
 “ lated by *Tyranny* or by *Usurpation*, their *Authority*
 “ *prostituted to support Violence or screen Corruption*,
 “ the Laws grown pernicious through Accidents
 “ unforeseen or unavoidable, or rendered ineffectual
 “ through

" through the *Infidelity* and *Corruption* of the
 " *Executors* of them; then it is *their Right*, and
 " *what is their Right is their Duty*, to resume that
 " *delegated Power*, and *call their Trustees to Ac-*
 " *count*; to *resist* the *Usurpation*, and *extirpate*
 " the *Tyranny*; to *restore* their *sullied Majesty*,
 " and *prostituted Authority*; to *suspend*, *alter*, or
 " *abrogate* those *Laws*, and *punish* their *unfaithful*
 " and *corrupt Officers*. Nor is it the *Duty* only of
 " the *united Body*; but every *Member* of it ought,
 " according to his *respective Rank*, *Power*, and
 " *Weight* in the *Community*, to concur in ad-
 " *vancing* and *supporting these glorious Designs*." §

§ See Elem. of Mor. Philos. pag. 46.

THE END.

T H O U G H T S

ON THE

LETTER OF EDMUND BURKE, Esq.

HAVING seen Mr. Burke's late Publication on the affairs of America, I was led to read it with all that attention which every performance of his must necessarily deserve. I sympathise most cordially with him in those feelings of humanity, which mark, in language so expressive, the abhorrence of his nature to the effusion of human Blood. I agree with him in idea, that the War with America is "fruitless, hopeless, and unnatural"; and I will add, on the part of Great-Britain, *cruel and unjust*. I join hand in hand with him in all his propositions for Peace, and I look with longing eyes for the event. I participate with him in the happiness of those friendships and connexions, which are the subjects, so deservedly, of his panegyric. The name of Rockingham is a sacred deposit in my bosom. I have found him disinterested, I know him to be honest. Before I quit him therefore, I will first abandon human nature.

So

So far then are Mr. Burke and I agreed. I am sorry that we should disagree in any thing. But finding that we have differed, on a late occasion, in our Parliamentary Conduct; and that I cannot concur with him in opinion on a matter, as I think, of very great national importance: it is therefore not in the zeal of party, but in the spirit of patriotism, not to confute, but to be convinced, not to point out error, but to arrive at truth, that I now venture to submit my thoughts to the Public. I feel the weight of the undertaking, and I wish it in abler hands. I am not insensible to my own incapacity, and I know how much I stand in need of excuse: but as public good is my object, public candour, I-trust, will be my best apologist.

Mr. Burke commences his Letter with the mention of "the two last Acts which have been passed with regard to the Troubles in America." The first is, "for the Letter of Marque," the second, "for a partial suspension of the *Habeas Corpus*." Of the former, he says little, as not worthy of much notice. Of the latter, his distinctions are nice, his strictures many, his objections unanswerable; and yet, although so well apprised of the dangers and mischiefs of this Act, he says, "I have not debated against this Bill in its progress through the House, because it would have been vain to oppose, and impossible to correct it." But this is matter of inquiry. As I thought differently,

rently, I acted differently. Being in the country, this Bill was in its way through the House of Lords before I knew any thing of it. Upon my coming accidentally to town, and hearing of its malignity, I went down to the House, I opposed it, and entered my solemn Protest on the Journals against it. It is true, I stood single and alone in this business; but I do not therefore take shame to myself. Rectitude of intention will even sanctify error. But, says Mr. Burke, "During its progress through the House of Commons, it has been *amended*, so as to express more distinctly than at first it did, the avowed sentiments of those who framed it." Now if the Bill was *amended* in its progress through the House of Commons, Mr. Burke's reason "for not debating against the Bill" cannot be well founded; for his reason is, "that it would have been vain to oppose, and *impossible to correct* it:" but to *amend* a thing is to *correct* it; and therefore if the Bill was *amended*, it was *not impossible to correct* it.

The case was this. This Bill was brought into the House of Commons under the black coverture of designing malice. Some of the honourable Members of that house, seeing it in this dark disguise, endeavoured to unrobe it of its darkness. Their endeavours succeeded, and "it was *amended*, so as to express more distinctly than it at first did, the avowed sentiments of those who framed it." In this shape

shape it came to the House of Lords : bad
 enough in all conscience : but I use Mr. Burke's
 own words when I say, " there is a difference
 " between bad and the worst of all." I thought
 it bad, and therefore I put my negative upon
 it : had it been worse, *a fortiori*, I should
 have done the same. But here it would seem
 as if Mr. Burke and I were not agreed in our
 notions of *bad* and *worse* : for what he holds
bad, I esteem *worse*, and what he calls *worse*, I
 think *bad*. To explain myself. He considers a
partial Suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* a greater
 evil, than an *universal* suspension of it. I conceive
 the contrary : though if Mr. Burke's premises
 were right, I should approve his reasoning, and
 admit his consequences. He says " whenever
 " an Act is made for a cessation of law and
 " justice, the whole people should be universally
 " subjected to the same suspension of their
 " franchises." Be it so : but then the whole
 people should fall under the reason and occa-
 sion of the Act. If England was under the
 same predicament with America, that is to say,
 if Englishmen were looked upon to be Rebels,
 as the Americans are, in such a case, a *partial*
 suspension of the *Habeas Corpus* would be invi-
 dious, and consequently more unjust than a *ge-*
neral suspension of it ; for why should one Rebel
 be distinguished from another ? but English-
 men are not accounted Rebels, and the Ameri-
 cans are ; and therefore in the same degree that
 a *partial* suspension, on the one hand, *might* be
 just,

just, an *universal* suspension, on the other, *would* be unjust. Where the offence is local, the punishment too must be local. It would have been unjust if the lands in *America* had been forfeited to the Crown in the year 1745, because *Scotland was then in Rebellion*. I do not use these arguments in favour of the Bill. The principle was *bad* with respect to *America*: it was *worse* with regard to this country. And herein consisted the very malignity of the Bill: for whilst the *Habeas Corpus* was taken away from the *imputed guilty* Americans, the *innocent* English were at the same time deprived of its benefit; suspicion, without oath, being made the two-edged sword that was to cut both ways.

But, says Mr. Burke, "The alarm of such a proceeding," (that is of an universal suspension of the people's franchises) "would then be universal. It would operate as a sort of *call of the nation*." As to my part I have heard so many *calls of the nation* of late, without any answer being made to them; that I fear the *nation* has either lost its *bearing* or its *voice*: but supposing otherwise, of what avail can a *call of the nation* be against the supremacy of an act of parliament? And who shall dare to resist the authority of a statute that can alter the established religion of the land, nay even bind *in all cases whatsoever*? But more of this by and by.

Mr. Burke goes on to say, "As things *now* stand, every man in the West-Indies, everyone inhabitant of three unoffending Provinces on the Continent, every person coming from the East-Indies, every gentleman who has travelled for his health or education, every mariner who has navigated the seas, is, for no other offence, under a temporary proscription." But how did things stand *before the amendment* of the bill? Not only every man as described above, but *every individual* in this kingdom was under the same temporary proscription. The writing of a letter to, or receiving a letter from, America, in this country, though the contents were ever so harmless, was ground of suspicion sufficient to immure a man in the castle of Dumfries, or Pendennis, or wheresoever else persecution should think fit to send him*. We have been saved from this hell-governed proscription, Opposition removed it from us. It had been well to have done so from every subject of the realm: but it did what it could, and the liberty of many unoffending persons has been preserved thereby.

This being the state of the Bill, *amended*, as

It is said that the number of persons who died in different prisons during the despotic government of the Marquis de Pombal, late minister of Portugal, *without having been convicted of any crime*, is computed at 3070 persons; and those who were languishing in irons at the time of his disgrace amounted to 800. If this act had passed, as it was first framed, and if we may measure our punishments by those meted out to our brethren in America; what reason is there to suppose that our situation had not been the very counterpart of this?

Mr.

Mr. Burke himself confesses, one might have thought that, though *bad*, it was *better* than it had been; but the very reverse of this is the opinion of Mr. Burke: for in one place, he says, "the limiting qualification, instead of taking out the sting, does, in my humble opinion, sharpen and envenom it to a greater degree." And, in another, he adds, "that far from softening the features of such a principle, and thereby removing any part of the popular odium or natural terrors attending it, I should be sorry, that any thing framed in contradiction to the spirit of our constitution did not instantly produce in fact, the grossest of the evils, with which it was pregnant in its nature." So that *amendment*, by softening the features, and removing the popular odium, without producing the grossest of evils with which it was pregnant in its nature, has, if I may use such terms of contrariety, made the bill *worse*.

Such is the doctrine of Mr. Burke, and just it may be: but if it be, I can only say that he and I see objects through different mediums; and that if he thinks it right to do evil that good may come of it, I wish to do good, by averting the evil. The physician that stops the progress of a disease, may, at one time or another, hope for its cure; but he that leaves the disease to the efforts of nature alone, trusts to a cause that is very unsure in the effect.

Mr. Burke, however, in aid of his opinion says, that, "On the next unconstitutional Act, all the

“fashionable world will be ready to say—Your
 “prophecies are ridiculous, your fears are vain,
 “you see how little of the mischiefs which you
 “formerly foreboded are come to pass. Thus
 “by degrees that artful softening of all arbitrary
 “power, the alledged infrequency or narrow ex-
 “tent of its operation, will be received as a sort
 “of aphorism: and Mr. Hume will not be sin-
 “gular in telling us, that the felicity of man-
 “kind is no more disturbed by it, than by earth-
 “quakes, or thunder, or the other more unusual
 “accidents of nature.” Now as to the fashion-
 able world, living as they do under the tyranny
 of that greatest of all tyrants, *Fashion*, upon such
 an occasion, I should hardly look up to them as
 a fit court of appeal. And as to Mr. Hume, let
 those remember who adopt his aphorisms—that
 that great philanthropist and friend of liberty,
 Doctor Franklin, has not, in the depths of his
 wisdom, thought, “alledged infrequency or
 “narrow extent of operation,” any argument to
 prevent the protection of mankind even “against
 “the more unusual accidents of nature;” and let
 them in the remembring of this, regret, that
 his Politicks, like his Philosophy, have not been
 the subjects of our experiment. Happy, thrice
 happy, had it been for this country, if, instead
 of besetting this able man with foulmouthed
 language, and indecent mockery, (indecent
 doubly so, because of the venerable council be-
 fore whom he stood) his advice, like his *con-*
ductors, had been made use of to draw the
 forked lightning from that portentous cloud,
 which,

which, with overspreading ruin, has now burst upon our heads.

Another argument made use of by Mr. Burke for not debating against the Bill, is this. "It is," says he, "some time since I have been clearly convinced, that in the present state of things, all opposition to any measures proposed by ministers, where the name of America appears, is vain and frivolous." I think so too: but then, it does not therefore follow that opposition is to be laid aside. The question, how far a member of either house can give over his attendance in Parliament, because he is out-voted, is a nice question; and worthy the examination of those who have leisure and abilities for the purpose. My own private opinion is, that no member, *individually*, can do this, consistently with his duty. *Collectively* he may: as the precedent of secession, during the administration of Sir Robert Walpole, shews; and as reason proves: for it is not to be presumed that a combination to this end can be obtained, without a sufficient foundation for it; and therefore when it does take place, it is intended, as Mr. Burke elsewhere says, "as a sort of call of the nation." But even here, I must not think it justifiable, unless supported on the following grounds. In the first place, the secession must be general; that is to say, it must not consist of this or that party only in opposition, but must include the whole Minority against the measures that have

provoked secession. In the next place, it must be a secession not *sub silentio*, but proclaimed either by Remonstrance on the Journals, or public Address to the People; and when both these circumstances attend the act, then secession is not only justifiable, but is the most faithful pledge of duty that can be given. I have therefore exceedingly to lament that a secession, such as this is, has not been carried into execution; and not only on account of the proof that would have been given thereby to the nation of the sincerity of opposition, but because I do verily believe from my soul, that if it had, daring as Ministers are and have been, they would not have presumed to have gone the lengths they have done in the open violation of the Constitution, though upheld, as they say they are, by Parliament, by the country gentlemen, and by their long tribe of obsequious addressers.

But to return more directly to the argument of Mr. Burke, and admitting that "all opposition where the name of America appears, is vain and frivolous," and therefore that Mr. Burke was right in not debating against the Bill; the same reason must hold good in every case of opposition where the same circumstances exist: for not to debate in this instance, and to debate in another, "where the name of America appears," must be wrong. Both cannot be right. And therefore Mr. Burke's repeated propositions so ably made, and so well supported, for peace, might have

have been dispensed with. Objections to taxes, in aid of this destructive war, were unnecessary. In short all debate was

“Time mispent, and language misapplied :” for “all opposition is vain and frivolous, where the name of America appears.”

Having thus stated the reasons, and examined the motives that occasioned a *difference in conduct* between Mr. Burke and me; I shall now, turning over those many leaves of his letter, of which, were I to take any notice, it must be in admiration and in praise, proceed to that part of it, wherein our *difference in opinion* prevails. And here, in page 46, Mr. Burke says, “But I do assure you, (and they who know me publickly and privately will bear witness to me) that if ever one man lived, more zealous than another, for the supremacy of Parliament, and the rights of this Imperial Crown, it was myself.” Now if I cannot join with Mr. Burke in this solemn declaration of his, I trust, it will not be therefore imputed to me, that I am less zealous than he is for the rights of the British Legislature; nor if I object to the terms of his proposition shall I be condemned as captious: for to cavil does not belong to me, and more especially about words. But when I see, and know, and am persuaded, that these very modes of speech, *supremacy of Parliament, rights of this imperial Crown*, with their kindred others, *unity of Empire, allegiance to the State*, and such like high-sounding *sesquipedalia verba*,

by becoming, in defiance of their impropriety, the deities of modern invocation, and by operating as incantations to mislead mankind, have done more mischief to the State even than the sword itself of Civil War; be their authority ever so great, I can never subscribe to their use. *Supremacy of Parliament* is a combination of terms unknown to the English polity; and as to *allegiance to the State*, though it be the sanctified phraseology of an Archbishop, it is, like the "Whiggism" he censures, allegiance "run mad." * *Supremacy* is an appendant of the Crown, and so is *allegiance*. The *former* is the right of the King, (as heretofore it was of the Pope) in his *ecclesiastical* capacity, the *latter* in his *temporal*; and there cannot be two rights, in one State, to the same thing. Who ever heard of the Oaths of *Supremacy* and of *Allegiance to the Parliament*? And why are they not taken to the Parliament? Because they are due to the King, and not to the Parliament; and it is not fit that the Parliament should invade "the rights of this Imperial Crown." Let each possess its own, and so the Constitution will be preserved. That the Parliament is *su-*

* Vide the Archbishop of York's Sermon, printed by T. Harrison and S. Brooke in Warwick-Lane, p. 22. It had been well if this, or any thing else that the Primate said, could have set aside the criminal charges to which his Sermon was exposed; but as it was indefensible, so is it matter of great national concern to find such doctrines propagated by the once Tutor of the Heir-apparent to the Crown; though it prove of some consolation, as the Earl of Shelburne remarked, that his Majesty, perceiving the evil tendency of such principles, had, in his wisdom, removed him from the tuition of the Prince.

preme,

preme, I admit. It is the *supreme court*, or *curia magna* of the Constitution; as the House of Lords is the *supreme court* of Justice, or *dernier resort* of the Law. Both are *supreme*, and yet *supremacy* was never attributed to the House of Lords, but ever, in the language of the Constitution, belonged to the King, as the *supreme Head* of the Church. In like manner I admit, that the people are bound in obedience to the laws of Parliament: but this does not therefore infer "allegiance to the State." Allegiance is one thing, obedience another. Allegiance is due to the King, so long as, in his *executive* capacity, he shall *protect* the rights of the People. Obedience is due to the Laws, when founded on the Constitution: but when they are *subversive* of the Constitution, then *disobedience* instead of obedience is due; and *resistance* becomes the law of the land*.

These were my reflections, consequent on Mr. Burke's declaration; but my hope was,

* Sir William Blackstone says, "If any *future Prince* should endeavour to subvert the Constitution by breaking the original Contract between King and People, should violate the *fundamental Laws*, and should withdraw himself out of the Kingdom; we are now authorised to declare, that this Conjunction of Circumstances would amount to an Abdication, and the Throne would be thereby vacant." But if any *future Parliament* should endeavour to subvert the Constitution, by breaking the original Compact, and should violate the *fundamental Laws* of the People, What then? The learned Judge has told us: "In these, and other Circumstances, which a fertile Imagination may furnish, since both Law and History are silent, it becomes us to be silent too; leaving to *future generations*, whenever necessity and the safety of the whole shall require it, the Exertion of those inherent (though latent) Powers of Society, which no climate, no time, no Constitution, no Contract, can ever destroy or diminish." Vid. Blackstone's Comm. vol. i. pag. 245.

that

that although we differed in *words*, in *things* we might yet be agreed. How great then was my disappointment, when instead of seeing this subject unrobed of its gorgeous apparel, and like truth made to appear naked and unadorned, when instead of discussion, which such a declaration seemed necessarily to call for, when instead of reasoning, and of argument; (as if afraid of their consequences,) I found assertions without the shadow of proof, and precedents importing no authority, but upholding error, substituted in their room! "Many others, indeed," says Mr. Burke, "might be more knowing in the extent, or in the foundation of these rights. I do not pretend to be an antiquary, or a lawyer, or qualified for the chair of professor in metaphysics. I never ventured to put your solid interests upon speculative grounds. My having constantly declined to do so has been attributed to my incapacity for such disquisitions; and I am inclined to believe it is partly the cause. I never shall be ashamed to confess, that where I am ignorant, I am diffident. I am indeed not very solicitous to clear myself of this imputed incapacity; because men, even less conversant than I am, in this kind of subtilties, and placed in stations, to which I ought not to aspire, have, by the mere force of civil discretion, often conducted the affairs of great nations with distinguished felicity and glory." This may be very true, but

but surely it is not very satisfactory. To be more zealous than any one man living "for the Supremacy of Parliament, and the Rights of this imperial Crown," and *less* knowing than others "in the extent and foundation of these rights," is to profess more of implicit faith and enthusiasm, than, I confess, I expected to have met with, at least now adays, in civil concerns. Of Fanatics in the Church I knew there were still many to be found, but a State Fanatic, I thought, was a *phænomenon* in politics not of modern appearance. If indeed our Parliaments were, as our Scottish race of Kings held themselves to be, God's vicegerents, and governed the State *de jure divino*; then such a degree of belief had been only correspondent to the occasion of it: but Parliaments have ever been the works of men's hands, as, thank God, we now know that our Kings are; or otherwise we had not had our present most gracious Majesty on this throne, nor yet that additional solemn contract between King and People, I mean the *Act of Settlement*, for the eternal security, as I trust, of those Rights of the Subject which are intrusted to the executive power.

Again, Why should a man be either antiquarian, lawyer, or metaphysician, or what need is there of speculation, to know "the extent and foundation of these rights?" The rights of Englishmen want no such professional authority for their support: neither are they mere abstract terms, the *entia rationis*, or creatures
of

of the understanding; but are, for but knowledge, written in our hearts, with the blood of our ancestors. But "the affairs of great nations are often conducted with distinguished felicity and glory by the mere force of civil discretion." What! are the rights of Englishmen to be held at the discretion of ministers? Is *civil discretion* the rule of our government? Wherein does *civil discretion* differ from *will*, the Law of Tyrants? And will any minister of this country say, "I am not conversant in this kind of subtilties, the extent and foundation of these rights," and therefore will govern by this unconditional power, the mere force of *civil discretion*? This can never be. But I have said that I found assertions without the shadow of proof, and precedents importing no authority, but upholding error; and this obliges me to be more particular. The subject is a deep one, and the consideration of it the most interesting of any that ever fell under political contemplation. It is no less than to know whether our *political* existence has any *real* foundation; or whether, as it is said of the sea, it be without a bottom. Perhaps I may be lost in the depths of research: but if I am, I carry this consolation with me, that I sink in the cause of truth. I have this hope, however, of preservation about me, that I shall not dive into mysteries, nor yet venture among the quicksands of metaphysical abstractions. The Constitution of my country is the ground

on

on which I wish to stand, and if I reach this shore, the safety I have gained will reward the dangers I have passed.

Mr. Burke having given us his *creed* in the Supremacy of Parliament, next applies its *unlimited* power to and over the American Colonies; and then tells us what the Supremacy of Parliament is in England. I shall consider the last first, namely, the Supremacy of Parliament in England, as a major proposition in which the minor is contained. He says (in order to shew "the compleatness of the legislative authority of Parliament *over this kingdom*") that "if any thing can be supposed out of the power of human legislature, it is religion: I admit however, that the established religion of this country has been three or four times altered by Act of Parliament; and therefore that a Statute binds *even in that case*." This is conclusive as to Mr. Burke's idea both with respect to the *unlimited right* as well as the *unlimited power* of Parliament: but whilst he is sharp even to a point for the *general unlimited right* of Parliament, he adduces some cases to blunt the edge of its *power over this kingdom*. He says, "But we may safely affirm, that notwithstanding this *apparent* omnipotence, it would be *now* found as impossible for King and Parliament to change the established religion of this country, as it was to King James alone, when he attempted to make such an alteration without a Parliament." Further, "I see

"see no abstract reason, which can be given,
 "why the same power that made and repealed
 "the High-Commission Court and the Star-
 "Chamber might not revive them again: but
 "the madness would be as unquestionable as
 "the competence of that Parliament which
 "should make such attempts." Furthermore:
 "The King's Negative to Bills is one of the
 "most indisputed of the royal prerogatives, and
 "it extends to all cases whatsoever*; but the
 "exercise is wisely forborne." Moreover: "We
 "know that the Convocation of the Clergy had
 "formerly been called, and sat with nearly as
 "much regularity to business as Parliament it-
 "self. It is now called for form only." These
 then are what I call precedents without autho-
 rity, but upholding error: for distinguishing,
 as must be done, between *right* and *power*, Par-
 liament cannot exercise a *power* without a *right*
 to that *power*; or if it does, it is an *usurpation*
 of *power*, which sooner or later never fails of re-
 dress. Precedents therefore of Acts of Parlia-
 ment, repugnant to the fundamental principles

* Has the King a right to reject a Bill that has passed the two
 Houses of Parliament, such Bill containing no infringement upon
 the Prerogative of the Crown? Is not the power of rejecting in
 the Crown given for the security of the Prerogative, and *limited*
 to this use only? And of which is not this the reason? That
 the King having no share in the Debates of either House cannot
 be supposed to be a judge of the fitness or unfitness of any Bill,
 any otherwise than as it relates to the Prerogative of the Crown.
 The power of *resolving*, it is plain, is not in the Crown.
 Montesquieu says, "If the Prince were to have a share in
 "the Legislature by the power of *resolving*, Liberty would
 "be lost. But as it is necessary he should have a share in the
 "Legislature *for the support of his own prerogative*, this share
 "must be in the power of *rejecting*." Vide Spirit of Laws,
 vol. i. pag. 227.

of

of the Constitution, are no proofs of the Supremacy or Omnipotency of Parliament, but instances only of the *abuse* of Parliament; "and as no government," says Machiavel, "can be of long duration, which, by the original formation of its constitution, is not frequently renewed or drawn back to its first principles," so whenever this happens to us, as it often has done, *and, I trust, is again not afar off from us*, these precedents, like so many clouds dispersed, only serve to shew, that although they may darken the face of the constitution, they can never extinguish its light.

But a word or two more particularly of these precedents. Much stress has been laid on the alterations that have been made in the established religion, in order to shew the right of Parliament to omnipotency. It is the doctrine of Sir William Blackstone*; but as the most able chymist cannot extract *that* from any given thing, *which* does not exist in its nature, so is this precedent, for this reason, by no means a case in point. In the first place, religion has nothing to do with the *civil* rights of the State. It is set apart from them, and belongs to the Church †. The *civil* rights of the State

* Vide his Commentaries, vol. i. p. 161.

† I am aware how much I here differ from the very able Prelate, who is for harnessing Church and State together, like coach and horses, that He as one of the drivers may enjoy the smack of the whip; a smack which he cannot forget, and which he gave me reason to remember when I was at Westminster school: but as I am now out of his clutches, so I hope I am out of his books too, at least such as are akin to his political sermons. Vide Archbishop of York's Sermon, p. 10.

x are of a *temporal* nature: they are *positive*, they are *general*, affecting every member of the community equally and alike. Religion is of a *spiritual* nature: it is a *negative* duty, and not a *positive* right: it is *not general*, but varies according to men's consciences: it is the subject of *toleration*, for no laws can have power over men's minds. What Act of Parliament can make me believe that *three* is *one*, or *one* is *three*, if I do not chuse to believe it? Or that my salvation in the next world is to be obtained by the belief of 39 Articles in this? The *established* religion, therefore, is no more than that *dress* which the *State taylor*s have provided for Religion to go to *court* in; and the same *taylor*s that made this *dress*, can *alter* it, as we have seen, and as the fashion of the times changes.

But if this was not the case with the *established* religion, how, in the next place, does its alteration shew the right of Parliament to omnipotency? What effect has it had on the constitution? Are we *less* free now, either in Church or State, than we were before the Reformation? I should imagine that we are *more* free in both, and if so, freedom being the first principle of the constitution, the *power* of Parliament to alter the *established* religion has been but correspondent to its *right*; and therefore, whilst it is no proof of the supremacy of Parliament, I should not be sorry to see a little more alteration of it. I think it may still be *amended*, without offence to the people, or in-
jury

x See Puffendorf's Law of Nature p: 662 line 12 of Note 2.

jury to the constitution; nay even with satisfaction to some of the clergy themselves.

The second precedent is that of the High Commission Court, and the Star Chamber; which is in direct proof of my argument: for they, being usurpations of *power*, and abuses of the *right* of Parliament, have been dissolved; and therefore I agree with Mr. Burke that it would be madness to revive them; and for the reason given, that, upon recurring to first Principles, Power in Exertion, without Right, cannot subsist.

The third precedent is, "the King's negative to Bills, which is wisely forborne." This is the forbearance of a *known right* to a *power* vested by the constitution in the Crown, and not the exercise of a power *unknown* to the constitution. As it therefore shews, that, even where there is a manifest *power*, that *power* is *limited*; so it proves, of course, that where there is no manifest *power*, there can be no *right* to *unlimited power*.

The last precedent is that concerning the Convocation of the Clergy; and to this, what I have said on the head of the *established* religion, inasmuch as *ecclesiastical* matters have nothing to do with *civil* concerns, may here be applied. But I do not recollect that, in bringing the Convocation of the Clergy to its present *formal* state only, there was any exertion of power of any kind to this end. If I remember aright it was a bargain. It was agreed that, on their Convocations becoming merely passive, the be-

nesiced Clergy should pay no further subsidies to the government, as they used to do in Convocation; and that they should be *represented* in Parliament, by being allowed to vote at the elections for Knights of the Shire: for before this they were not *represented* in Parliament, but in their own Convocations; and therefore Parliament had no *right* to tax them, nor were they taxed by Parliament, notwithstanding its *unlimited power*, and “the compleatness of its legislative authority over this kingdom.”

If this then be the result of these precedents, and the State of what has been offered by Mr. Burke *for this arbitrary right* in Parliament, extending even to Religion itself, and whose *power* is limited *only* by “the mere force of civil discretion;” is there nothing further that may be said *against this right*? I shall consider. There is nothing so much talked of, and yet nothing so little understood, as the *English Constitution*. Every man quotes it, and upon every occasion too: but few know where to find it. If one enquire after it, an Act of Parliament is produced. If you ask what it is, you are told it is the *Law*. Strange mistake! The *Constitution* and the *Law* are not the same. They differ, and in what manner I will endeavour to point out.

In the great *machine* of State there are found three *principal powers*, with a variety of others subordinate to them; particularly the Prerogative

gative of the Crown : which is a *power* there vested not to counteract the *higher powers*, but, if at any time there should be occasion, to supply their deficiencies. The first of these *principal Powers*, is the *Power of the People*; the second, the *Power of the Constitution*; the third, the *Power of the Law*. Now the *Power of the People* is first, because, without *People*, there could be neither *Constitution* nor *Law*. The *Power of the Constitution* is second, for it is the immediate effect of this first cause; and if the *People* and the *Constitution* make the first and the second *Power*, there is no need to prove that the *Law* is the third *Power* of the State. It follows in the order I have laid down. As from the *People* then is derived the *Constitution*, so from the *Constitution* is derived the *Law*; the *Constitution* and the *Law* being, in a due course of lineal consanguinity, the descendants of the *People*.

But now I shall be asked, what is this *Constitution*, and what is this *Law*? I answer, that by pointing out their relations, their differences too are marked. But this is not enough: definition is necessary, and therefore, as a definition of the name I would say, that *Constitution* signified *Compact*, and was the same with *public or political Law*; and that *Law*, as here meant, was the *municipal or civil Law* of the State: but as a definition of the thing, perhaps both may best appear as derived the one from the other.

I define *Constitution* then to be, those *Agreements* entered into, those *Rights* determined upon, and those *Forms* prescribed, by and between the Members of any Society in the first settlement of their union, and in the frame and mode of their Government; and is the *Genus* whereof the *municipal or civil Law* of such established Community is the *Species*: the *former*, ascertaining the reciprocal duties, or several relations subsisting betwixt the *governors and governed*; the *latter*, maintaining the rights and adjusting the differences arising betwixt individuals, as parts of the same whole. And this I take to be the true distinction, and real difference between the *Constitution* and the *Law* of England. But this is matter of *Theory* only. It is the *passive* state of Government, and Government must be *active*. *Practice* therefore is to be superadded to this *Theory*; and hence the origin of *Parliaments*.

What then are *Parliaments*? *Parliaments* make the *formal*, as *Rights* do the *substantial*, part of the Constitution; and are the Deputies, the Agents, or Appointees of the People, entrusted by them with the Powers of *Legislation*, for the purpose of preserving (and not of destroying) the established Rights of the Constitution. But what are the established Rights of the Constitution? In detail they are multifarious; and many: but reduced to their first principles, they are these, "*Security of*
Life,

" *Life, Liberty, and Property, and Freedom in Trade.*"

Such are the great Outlines of the *English Constitution*, the short history, or abstract of that *original Compact*, which is the bond or cement of our *political union*, and which forms, in particular, the relations that exist betwixt the *legislative Power* of the State, and the *People*. But there is still another relation to be considered. The *legislative Power* of the State must receive its force from an *executive Power*. This *executive Power* is lodged in the *Crown*, from whence a relation arises betwixt the *Crown* and *People*; and is called "the Contract between King and People." As *Compact* then is that *Agreement* of the *People* with the *legislative Power*, or among themselves, concerning their *same Rights*; so *Contract* is that *Bargain* of the *People* with the *executive Power* concerning their *different Rights* *. But here it will be

* Writers upon this subject have confounded the two terms, *Compact* and *Contract* together; making them to signify one and the same thing, though really different. *Compact* is an *Agreement* entered into without any other consideration, than that of the plighted faith of the parties to the articles agreed upon: for the articles being *general*, it is equally the interest of every *individual* to observe them without any additional obligation; and such is the *original Compact*, or *Constitution* of this country. But *Contract* is a *Bargain*, with a *condition* annexed thereto, that demands a *quid pro quo*; and such is the "Contract between King and People": for the *executive Power* being lodged in the *Crown*, the *King* may suffer the *Laws* to sleep, or pervert them "from their right use to their worst abuse," which, making the articles of this *Contract* *not general*, calls for different covenants; and therefore the *King*, at his coronation, takes an oath to protect the *Rights* of the *People*; and the *People*, in re-

said, How is this known, and where is this to be found? I reply, As well in the reason of the things themselves, and our own experience, as in the letter and spirit of our Charters: for instance, in *Magna Charta*, which is not only declaratory of the *original Compact*, or fundamental Rights of the People, but is *itself* that *solemn Contract*, which was had between King and People, for the protection of those Rights; and therefore, as such, proves *quod erat demonstrandum*.

But now I may be told, that although I have made a distinction between the *Constitution* and the *Law* of England, I have cited *Magna Charta*, which is an Act of Parliament, and consequently the Law of England, as for the *Constitution* of England. The objection is specious only, for it is groundless. In the first place, it is not true that *Magna Charta* is an Act of Parliament; and for this reason: that it was obtained in the field of battle, with sword in hand, in Runing-Mead, between Wind-turn, owe, and may be called upon to swear, Allegiance to the King. It may be further observed, that as it was not to be supposed that Parliaments, whose rights were precisely the same with those of the People, could possibly enact Laws subversive of those Rights, so the *original Compact* seeming to require no other sanction, no other agreement between the legislative Power and the People was ever thought of: but now Corruption, that self-devouring monster of the State, making fresh covenants necessary, it is to be hoped, that the same *explicit, unequivocal, express Contract*, which exists between the King and People, will soon, very soon, be made to subsist between the Parliament and People. It was the doctrine of *unlimited Power* in the Crown that obtained the former; it is the now new and more dangerous doctrine of *unlimited Power* in Parliament that must procure the latter.

for

for and Staines, where the *People* had pitched their tents, and where, as history further informs us, "King John and his adherents appeared to be an inconsiderable number, but the Lords and Commons filled the country."

It is therefore true, that *Magna Charta* was the Act of the People *at large*, and not of the Legislature *alone*. Besides: it is proved by Acts of Parliament, that it is not an Act of Parliament; and that Parliament (*unlimited* as its power is now said to be) has no power over it at all: for it is declared by the statute of the 25th of Edw. I. that *Magna Charta* was obtained by the *common Assent of all the Realm*, and that it was to be received as the *Folcright*, or common Law of the Land. And by the 42d of Edw. III. all statutes made against *Magna Charta* are declared to be void*: so that whilst *Magna Charta* proves the *Constitution* to be anterior to the Law, Acts of Parliament shew that it is not subject to the Law, nor under the power of Parliament. But, in the next place, admitting *Magna Charta* to be an Act of Parliament, still the objection remains without foundation. For *Magna Charta*, being not *enactive* of new Rights, but, as I have said before, *declaratory* only of those old Rights

* "En le Parlement nostre Seignur le Roi tenuz a Westm' le primer jour de May l'an de son regne quarantisme second est assentu et accorde que la Grande Chartre et la Chartre de la Foreste soient tenuz et gardez en tous Pointz et si nul Estatut soit fait a contraire soit tenuz pour nul." 42d Edward III. chap. i. ann. 1368.

of the People, some of which are of Saxon ancestry, others coeval with the first form of British Government, is a Law only in proof of the Constitution; and therefore supports my position, that the *Constitution* and the *Law* are not the same.

But there is still another objection, which I must anticipate in order to remove. It may be objected, that if (as I have shewn) *the People be made the source of all power in the State*, in what manner is such an idea to be reconciled with the doctrine, that "Government certainly is an Institution of divine Authority?"* for these (upon another occasion) are the words of Mr. Burke; though, he adds, "that its *Forms* and the *Persons* who administer it, all originate from the People." What a pity that an "Institution of divine Authority" should ever be found in the hands of *Devils*, as our Government sometimes unhappily is! But I do not mean to enter into the merits of this doctrine. Indeed I am bound not to do so: for I have said, that I will not dive into mysteries, lest I be drowned; and I will keep my word. But as this said mode of attributing to *natural* effects *supernatural* causes, or mixing Church and State together, has already done a great deal of mischief to the community; as I perceive that the *divine Right* of Parliaments, like the *divine Right* of Kings, to do what is *wrong*, with its

* Vid. *Thoughts on the Cause of the present Discontents*, fifth edit. p. 67.

concomitant train, *passive obedience* and *non-resistance*, is now from the

"Pulpit, drum ecclesiastic,

"That's beat with fist, instead of a stick,"

sounding forth in the ears of the † People; as I am content to judge of things *past* by the *present*, leaving to others all better rules of judging; and inasmuch as example goes before precept; so the present state of America affording not only much notable information on this head, but serving to illustrate the whole of what has been here said on the subject of Govern-

† See a Sermon preached before the University of Oxford, on Friday, December 13, 1776, being the day appointed by proclamation for a general Fast. By Myles Cooper, LL. D. President of King's College, New-York, and Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford. Published at the request of the Vice-Chancellor and Heads of Houses, and printed at the Clarendon press. This Doctor says, p. 12. "It is difficult indeed to assign any reasons that will justify the Rebellion of Subjects against the sovereign Authority." "Submission to the higher Powers" is enjoined at least upon Christians, under the severest penalty. "But were Christianity altogether out of the question, yet the insurrection of subjects against their rightful Governors, is condemned by those Laws which are fundamental to society." He says too, p. 22. "When men's principles are wrong, their practices will seldom be right. When they suppose those Powers to be derived solely from the People, which are ordained of God, and their heads are filled with ideas of original Compacts *which never existed*, and which are always explained so as to answer their present occasions; no wonder that they confound the duties of rulers and subjects, and are perpetually prompted to dictate where it is their business to obey. When once they conceive the governed to be superior to the governors, and that they may set up their pretended *natural Rights* in opposition to the *positive Laws* of the State; they will naturally proceed to "despise dominion and speak evil of dignities," and to open a door for anarchy, confusion, and every evil work, to enter." What *more* did Sacheverel say? And yet Sacheverel was impeached, whilst Doctor Cooper may expect preferment.

ment,

ment, I shall, with some advantage I trust, and in as few words as I can, make use of the instance.

America, having declared itself independent of Great-Britain, returned to that state of Nature, or state of Society, where Government was to be instituted; and being so circumstanced, whilst it proceeded to form itself into separate Commonwealths, or States, each Commonwealth or State provided a Constitution and Form of Government of its own; which, although differing in mode and manner, agreed in substance and effect. The Precedent therefore of one Constitution answering for every other, I shall here avail myself of such extracts from the Constitution of *the State of Massachusetts*, as are necessary to my purpose. This Constitution then, and Form of civil Government, consist of forty-three Articles, and are entitled, "An Act of the *General Convention* of the Commonwealth, or State of Massachusetts, declaring the same to be a free State, and independent of Great-Britain, and establishing a new Constitution and Form of civil Government; which *General Convention* was elected by *the whole People* for this sole purpose, &c." It next recites those (but too much to be lamented) *arbitrary* and *despotic* measures of this country, which occasioned the Declaration of Independency; and after this, proceeds to say, "The antient Government of this Colony being thus *totally dissolved*, and the People driven into a *State of Nature*,
" it

" it becomes their indispensable duty, and what
 " self-preservation requires, to declare them-
 " selves independent of Great-Britain, and to
 " establish such a Constitution and Form of
 " civil Government, as to them appears best
 " calculated to promote their greatest possible
 " happiness." " And whereas it is absolutely
 " necessary for the welfare and safety of the
 " inhabitants of this Commonwealth, that a
 " just and permanent Constitution and Form of
 " civil Government should be established as
 " soon as possible, *derived from and founded on*
 " *the authority of the People only, in whom is*
 " *the origin of all governmental Power, and*
 " *who have at all times a right, by common*
 " *consent* (whenever the great end of Govern-
 " ment, the general good is not obtained) to
 " alter and change their Constitution and Form
 " of Government, in such manner as may best
 " promote the safety and happiness of the
 " whole."

" We, therefore, the Representatives of the
 " Freemen of Massachusetts, in *general Con-*
 " *vention* met, for the *express purpose* of fram-
 " ing such a Constitution and Form of Go-
 " vernment; gratefully acknowledging the
 " goodness of the supreme Governor of all, in
 " permitting us peaceably, and *by common con-*
 " *sent*, deliberately to form such rules, as we
 " shall judge best adapted for governing this
 " Commonwealth in justice and righteousness;
 " and being fully convinced that it is our in-
 " dispensable

“ dispensible duty to establish, to the utmost
 “ of our power, such *original principles* of civil
 “ Government, as will best promote the gene-
 “ ral happiness of the People, do, by virtue of
 “ the authority vested in us by our Constituents,
 “ declare, enact, and establish the following
 “ Constitution, and Form of civil Government,
 “ for this Commonwealth, to be and remain
 “ in full force therein, from and after the se-
 “ cond Wednesday in ———, and *forever*
 “ *thereafter to remain unaltered*, except in such
 “ articles as shall hereafter, on new circum-
 “ stances arising, or on experience, be found
 “ to require alteration; and which shall, *by the*
 “ *like authority of the People, convened for that*
 “ *sole purpose*, be altered, for the more effectual
 “ obtaining and securing the great end and
 “ design of all good Government, *the Good of*
 “ *the People*.

“ Be it therefore declared and enacted by
 “ the *general Convention* of this Common-
 “ wealth, assembled *for the sole purpose* of de-
 “ claring and enacting Independency, and esta-
 “ blishing a new Constitution and Form of
 “ civil Government, and by the authority of
 “ the same, it is hereby declared and enacted,
 “ as in the following general articles, viz.

1. “ That this Colony is, and of right ought
 “ to be, and for ever hereafter shall, by the
 “ favour of all-gracious Heaven, be a free
 “ State, and absolutely independent of the
 “ Crown

“ Crown and Government of Great-Britain;
 “ and shall be stiled, THE COMMONWEALTH,
 “ OR STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.”

5. “ That this declaration of the general,
 “ fundamental, and essential Rights of the
 “ People of this Commonwealth, shall, for
 “ ever hereafter, be considered as the general
 “ fundamental of the said new Constitution
 “ and Form of Government; and every order,
 “ law, and statute, that shall hereafter be made
 “ by the general Court of this Commonwealth,
 “ shall conform to the spirit, and plain simple
 “ meaning and intention of these general funda-
 “ mentals; and all and every order, law, and
 “ statute, that may hereafter happen to be made,
 “ and shall be found contrary thereto, shall be
 “ null and void, and have no effect, and be im-
 “ mediately repealed: and no alteration in these
 “ general fundamentals shall hereafter be made,
 “ but only by the immediate consent of the good
 “ People of this Commonwealth at large, or their
 “ deputies, chosen for that special purpose.”

6. “ That all men are born equally free
 “ and independent, and their Maker has left
 “ them free liberty to set up such Governments as
 “ best please themselves.” “ That Magistrates
 “ were set up for the good of Nations, not
 “ Nations for the honour and glory of Magi-
 “ strates.” “ That the Right and Power of
 “ Magistrates in every country, was that which
 “ the Laws of that country made it to be.”

And,

And, " That usurpation gives no right to govern."

7. " That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the dictates of their own consciences, and to enjoy a full and free liberty therein; provided that they, under pretence of Religion, do not attempt to subvert the Constitution and Form of Government of this State, &c."

Here then is that in *esse*, what Dr. Cooper tells us " never existed," an *original Compact*. A Compact too, with *Powers* (which, according to him, " are ordained of God") *solely* derived from the People; and, the *governed* being superior to the *governors*, with natural Rights, " pretended," as he says they are, " set up in opposition to the positive Law of the State." Such is this Compact, and such, I presume, being all other *original Compacts* in their first institution, it is no wonder that their existence should be denied; inasmuch as they are the sovereign antidotes of those political poisons, *Priest-Craft*, and *State-Craft*, whose objects are dominion over " the Beasts of the People*."

* Such is Doctor Cooper's *humane* appellation of those persons in America, who plundered, as he says, the Members of the Church of England, Him, I suppose, among the rest, and others, of their property; adding, " without any means of present redress, though it is to be hoped, not without a prospect of future retribution." Methinks the Doctor, having received a slap on one cheek, in the true spirit of a Christian, should have turned the other, and not have looked forward to a prospect of plundering the Americans of their property, because

Here

Here too is an "institution of Government," but where "the divine authority" of it is, who can discover? Indeed, in a century more, for we are already giving up *things* for *words*, *sense* for *sound*, and from the *golden* falling back into the *iron* age again, such notions of Government may be well received. Tradition will inform posterity that the Governments of America were instituted *de Jure divino*, and not without some reason on their side; inasmuch as the more *natural* any Government is, in my opinion, the more *divine* it is: but now that we are witnesses to their *institution*, we know, we see, and we find that they are instituted *de Jure humano*.

The next observation to be made is the affinity of these Governments to that of our own country. They are founded on *original Compact*, and so is ours. The lines of distinction betwixt the People, the Constitution, and the Law, are marked there as they are drawn here. The Constitution is derived from the People, and the Law from the Constitution. The Law cannot alter the Constitution: for all and every Law and Statute that are, by the *general Courts*, (equal to our Parliaments) made contrary thereto, are null and void: neither is the Constitution *alterable*, but by general Conventions of the People *at large*, held *expressly* and *solely* for that purpose.

they had plundered him of his. However, whenever the Americans shall come to this country to deprive us of our *Liberty*, I will readily join the Doctor in his idea of Retribution.

If

If now then I should profess to believe that there is no more of *divine authority* in the Government of England, than in the Governments of America, a sample of which has been produced; and that the former is derived from the same powers, by the same means, and to the same end, namely; the *good of the whole*, as the latter: I hope I shall not be therefore accounted an *Infidel* by the *Church*, nor an *unworthy Member of Society* by the *State*. I must hope too, that if our *Parliaments*, who are the *Trustees* of the People, and the *Guardians* of their rights, (for they are no more, and I am one of its Members) should ever attempt to destroy those rights, that, as they will well deserve the fate, so may they feel all that vengeance which the offended *Majesty* of an injured People can bring down on their heads. Parliaments who will support the Constitution, will be supported by the People, and have nothing to fear; but those who will subvert the Constitution, let them tremble, as one man, even as Charles the First did, who lost his head in such an attempt; and which, as Lord Chesterfield tells us, "if he had not lost, we had certainly
 . "lost our Liberties."

Having thus gone over the constitutional ground of this country, and taken a comparative view of the foundation upon which its Government is superstructed, the inference to be drawn from thence is this; that if the Government be as I have stated it to be, and

as

as I shall hold it to be, till the contrary be proved, the *right to unlimited power* contended for in Parliament, cannot, in common apprehension, there exist. For although Mr. Burke asserts (and I mention this, because I wish to state, and not to mistake his meaning, and if I do, I trust he will impute it to the want of comprehension, and not to any intention in me) “that Legislators ought to do what Lawyers cannot; for they have *no other* rules to bind them but the great principles of reason and equity, and the general sense of mankind;” and although in arbitrary countries this be true, for there the People being *divested* of all power, and both the legislative and executive authority *vested solely* in the Prince, he may have no other rules than these to bind *him*; yet in free countries the case is different. In England, “the *legislative*,” says Lord Bolingbroke, “is a *supreme*, and may be called, in one sense, an *absolute*, but in none an *arbitrary* power.” “It is *limited*,” says Mr. Locke, “to the public good of the Society.” I say, it is *bound* by the rules of the Constitution, for the rules of the Constitution are to the Parliament, what the Law is to the Judges. The People make the Constitution, the Parliaments make the Law; and as the Judges are *bound* to determine according to the Law of the land*, so are Parlia-

* And yet determinations are made in the Court of King's-Bench, as if the imperial law (*fit law for an imperial crown*) (or the law of Scotland, was the law of England.

ments *bound* to enact Laws according to the rules of the Constitution ; and not according to *their own* principles of reason and equity, and *what they call* the general sense of mankind : for these *may* differ with the principles of the Constitution, as we know they *have* done ; and therefore arises the necessity of asserting the controul of the Constitution over the Law and the Parliament.

But of this power of the Constitution over the legislative authority Mr. Burke has himself given the most pointed case. He says, “ before this Act (that is before the Act for the partial suspension of the Habeas Corpus) every man putting his foot on English ground, every stranger owing only a local and temporary allegiance, even a Negro slave, who had been sold in the Colonies, *and under an Act of Parliament*, became as free as every other man who breathed the same air with him.” What is it then that, setting this Act of Parliament at defiance, manumits the Negro-slave so soon as he puts his foot on English ground ? Let it not be said that it is *the pure air* of this foggy island, that can work these wonderful wonders, for these are the half-witted sayings of lawyers that would be orators, and fit only for the *lullabies* of nurses, or the *sing songs* of children. Let it not be said that *the Act is local* ; for it is not local. The Act alluded to is the 5th of G. II. ch. 7. (but there are many other Acts to the same effect) and

and it vests a clear and unconditional property, confined no where, but absolute every where, in the owner to his purchased slave; and yet when this owner shall bring his slave to this country, he shall lose his ownership in him; though he hold him *under an Act of Parliament* *. No :

* This statute enacts that " the houses, lands, *Negroes*, and other hereditaments and real estates, situate or being within any of the said Plantations, belonging to any person indebted, shall be liable to, and chargeable with, all just debts, duties, and demands, of what nature or kind soever, owing by any such person to his Majesty, or any of his subjects, and shall and may be *afford* for the satisfaction thereof, in like manner as real estates are by the law of England liable to the satisfaction of debts due by bond, or other specialty, &c. &c." In case then any subject of his Majesty should accept a Negro in satisfaction of a just debt due to him in any one of the Plantations, and should bring that Negro with him to this Country, it would seem that, under the above Act of Parliament, he was entitled to hold such Negro as his property: But Lord Mansfield has, in the Teeth of this Act of Parliament, and of many others to the same effect, and in flat contradiction too to the opinions of the Lord Chancellors Talbot and Hardwick, determined otherwise; no doubt for the reason given in the Text, his Lordship being a great lover of the Constitution and a friend to Liberty; and for no other reason, seeing that this determination has proved very injurious to those owners of Negroes here who thought themselves possessed of them under this law and by these opinions, but who, by his Lordship's means, are now dispossessed of them. It is somewhat curious to remark too, that at the very time that Lord Mansfield was giving Liberty to *Negroes* in this Country, and of course was taking away, without the Verdict of a Jury, what was before held to be *property*; his Lordship gave his countenance and assent to an Act of Parliament for holding *Englishmen* in the most abject State of Slavery. The Act alluded to is the *Convict-Act*: Of the principles of which Sir William Blackstone speaks to the following effect: " Upon these principles," says he, " the Law of England abhors, and will not endure the existence of, Slavery within this Nation: So that when an attempt was made to introduce it, by statute i. Edward VI. c. 3. which ordained, that all idle vagabonds should be made slaves, and fed upon bread, water, or small drink, and refuse meat; should wear a ring of iron round their neck, arms, or legs; and should be compelled by beating, chaining, or otherwise to perform the work assigned them, were it never so vile; the Spirit of the Nation could not

it is neither the one, nor the other, that gives occasion to this manumission. It is the Constitution of England, which maintaining *liberty*, and annihilating *slavery*, renders this Act of Parliament a *tabula rasa*, a blank parchment, without operation, without force, without effect. *It is that Constitution, which is now resisting the rebellion of Acts of Parliament against it.*

In short, my idea of this Government, to speak as a lawyer would do, is, that *Parliaments*, as I have said before, are the trustees of the People, the *Constitution* the deed of trust, wherein they stand seized to *uses* only; and these *uses* being named, they cannot depart from them: but for their due performance are accountable to those by whose conveyance the trust was made*. The *right* is therefore *fiduciary*, the *power limited*, as the very Nature of a Trust implies. Or as a mathematician would say, more in the road of demonstration; the *Constitution* is as a *Circle*, the *Laws* the *Radii* of that *Circle*, drawn on its surface with the pen of

"brook this condition, even in the most abandoned rogues; and
"therefore this statute was repealed in two years afterwards." Blackstone's Comm. v. i. p. 424. And it must be observed that Sir William produces this case as the reason why Negroes become freemen in England. But yet whilst in this instance property licensed by Act of Parliament is taken away, what is forbidden by the Constitution is by the Convict-Act passed into a Law; and the *Spirit of the Nation* in the reign of George III. is made to brook the condition which in the reign of Edward VI. it could not endure.

* Serjeant Holt laid it down as a maxim, "that the Government and Magistracy was a *trust*, and that any acting contrary to that *trust* is renouncing of the *trust*, though it be not a renouncing by a formal deed." See Ech. Hist. of Eng. p. 1144.

Parliament,

Parliament, and it is the known quality of a circle, that its *radii* cannot exceed its *circumference*, whilst the People, like the *compasses*, are fixed in the center, and describe the *circle* *. These, I say, are my ideas of this Government, that is, of the whole political system of this country, for this is what I would mean by Government, and I hope that they are just and true; or otherwise, dreadful indeed is the prospect before us! For if Parliaments have the right to alter the "established religion of the land," and "if any thing can be supposed out of the power of human legislature, it is religion;" if they are bound by no other rules than "the great principles of reason and equity, and the general sense of mankind," and not by the more determined principles of the Constitution, nor subject to the controul of the People; if, by the influence of corruption they are become "the Masters, instead of the Servants," of their Constituents, looking *down* on the People, and *up* to the Court for honours and preferments, and granting money that they may receive it themselves; I say, if these things be so, and are they not said to be so? where is the difference be-

* "Fundamental Laws are, and should be, as concise as possible, and are expressive of the mutual compact between the Governors and Governed, for the benefit of both. They are as immoveable points in a circle, whence all other decrees, Acts of Dyet, *Parliament*, and Assembly flow. If they are preserved entire the respective societies will thrive and flourish; if not, they will tend towards a Dissolution. Vide Preface to Phillips's Fundamental Laws, p. 7.

twixt a *free* and an *arbitrary* country? where the difference between the despotism of the King of France, and the despotism of the Parliament of England? And what is this but to erect an *Aristocratic* tyranny in the State, a many-headed *Leviathan*, deplorable and to be deplored, dangerous and destructive, in proportion to the numbers of which it consists.

Hitherto I have considered the *Supremacy* of Parliament, or its *right to unlimited Power* in and over *this Kingdom*; and if I have shewn, that no such Power can exist in Parliament from the very nature of its institution, for it is a solecism in politics, and an absurdity in terms, to say, that in a *limited* Government, there can be *unlimited* Power, the application of this Power over the Colonies must consequently fall to the ground; and with it the occasion of any further reasoning upon the subject. But as Mr. Burke has made some assertions respecting this "unlimited legislative Power over the Colonies," that are not only new and different from every other Writer, but new and different from himself too, I hope, I shall be excused the trespass of a page or two more in the further consideration of this matter.

Mr. Burke says, "When I first came into a public trust, I found your Parliament in possession of an *unlimited legislative Power* over the Colonies. I could not open the *Statute-book* without seeing the actual exercise of it,

“ it, more or less, in all cases whatsoever.” These then are what I have called assertions without the shadow of proof, or more properly assertions with the most convincing proofs of their being without foundation; for the proofs are taken from Mr. Burke himself. Here Mr. Burke says, “ I could not open the *Statute-book* without seeing the actual exercise of “ this *unlimited Power* over the Colonies in all “ cases whatsoever:” but attend to what Mr. Burke says in his speech on American Taxation, April the 19th, 1774, p. 40, 3d edit. printed for J. Doddsley, in Pallmall. There he says, “ This is *certainly* true; that no Act avowed- “ ly for the purpose of revenue, and with the “ ordinary title and recital taken together, is “ found in the *Statute-book* until the year “ 1764. All before this period stood on *com- “ mercial* regulation and restraint;” and to prove this, that is, that “ a Parliamentary in- “ land Taxation” was not to be found in the *Statute-book* before the year 1764, is the business of this entire page: but as the extract would be too tedious for this place, so whilst I refer the Reader to the page itself, I will take the liberty of recommending to his perusal also the whole Speech, as a most excellent oration. If then America was not “ taxed *internally* for “ the purpose of revenue before the year 1764, “ but all before this period stood on *commer- “ cial* regulation,” here is a case of Mr. Burke’s own former shewing, that *contradicts*

the case he now puts, of an "actual exercise
 " of *unlimited legislative Power* over the Co-
 " lonies in all cases whatsoever:" for if Mr.
 Burke could not find the exercise of this Power,
 that is, of internal Taxation over the Colonies
 for the purpose of Revenue, in the *Statute-*
book, before the year 1764, no such Power
 having been ever exercised, he could not find the
 exercise of *unlimited legislative Power* over the
 Colonies in all cases whatsoever, before the year
 1764; and if he did not then find it, he could
 not find it after the year 1764: for the first
 instance of the exercise of this Power after
 the year 1764, was that of the Stamp-Act;
 and this Act, as soon as it passed, was resisted,
 and being resisted, it was repealed, and being
 repealed, it could afford no proof of the pos-
 session of the Power. And yet Mr. Burke
 adds, "this possession passed with me for a
 " title." But, if, as has been said, Parliament
 was not possessed of the Power of internal Tax-
 ation over the Colonies before the year 1764,
 no title to unlimited legislative Power in all
 cases whatsoever, before this time, could be
 founded on possession; for here is a manifest
 exception to this possession in the case of an
inland Taxation: and from the year 1764, no
 title can be derived from possession, for the title
 has been always disputed, and possession never
 obtained. So far then Mr. Burke is new and
 different from himself. In what follows, he is
 new and different from others.

No one has ever before contended, as I know of, for the right of Parliament to tax America, without the annexed idea of America being represented in Parliament. The idle phantom, the Cock-lane Ghost, of *virtual* Representation, has been ever conjured up, as the *ego sum illa*, of this vile deception*. But Mr. Burke has asserted, has maintained, and has proved, that America is not represented in Parliament, and yet insists for the unlimited Right in Parliament to bind America *in all cases whatsoever*. He says, " If any thing can be drawn from such examples by a parity of the case, it is to shew, how deep their crime, and how heavy their punishment will be, who shall at any time dare to resist a distant Power, actually disposing of their property, without their voice or consent to the disposition; and overturning their Franchises without charge or hearing†." Here then is his assertion, that America is not represented in Parliament; and his assertion that Parliament has an *unlimited* legislative Power over America *in all cases whatsoever*, has been already stated: which is a position as unaccountable to me, as it is new. But let me see if such a position is defensible, and whether a question or two may not serve as an answer thereto. The first ques-

* It is said that Doctor Johnson, the reputed Author of "Taxation no Tyranny," believes in Ghosts; and that he often went to see the Cock-Lane Ghost. It is no Wonder therefore, that such a Believer should believe in the *virtual* Representation of America.

† See also Mr. Burke's Conciliatory Propositions.

tion I shall propose is, Whether Representation in order to Taxation be not an *hereditary* indispensable privilege of the British Subject? The next question is, Whether the Americans are British Subjects or not? for if they are not British Subjects, Great Britain has nothing to do with them, no more than France, or Spain, or any other country has: And again, if they are British Subjects, and Representation in order to Taxation be the *hereditary* indispensable privilege of a British Subject, Representation in order to Taxation must be the *hereditary* indispensable privilege of the Americans, as British Subjects. From whence then can the Right to Parliament be derived of unlimited legislative Power over the Subjects of Great-Britain *in all cases whatsoever* without Representation in Parliament, which the Americans do not possess, as Mr. Burke has shewn; and which, in order to Taxation, is the *hereditary* indispensable privilege of British Subjects? I presume it cannot be derived from the Constitution; for no man will assert, that the Constitution gives a Right to Parliament to levy Taxes upon British Subjects without Representation; and if the Constitution does not give this Right, the claim of it in Parliament must be *unconstitutional*: which naturally brings me to the consideration of the *declaratory Act*, as falling under this point of view.

Mr. Burke has proved that America is not represented in Parliament: every wise man says the same: and it is only *folly the last*
 not that

that would assert the contrary. The declaratory Act declares, and Mr. Burke supports the declaration, that this country has a right to bind America *in all cases whatsoever*; and of course to tax America, *though not represented in Parliament*. Upon these principles is it possible to maintain this Act? It has no foundation. It rests not upon the Constitution. It is subversive of the Constitution. It has not the fundamental requisites of a declaratory Law. No Law declaratory of Rights was ever before made, or ought to have been made, whose recital did not express the sources from whence those Rights are derived; whether *direct* from the Constitution, or *indirect* from other Acts of Parliament founded on the Constitution, or from general Customs, or particular Customs, which make the Common Law of the Land. Look from *Magna Charta*, through every declaratory Law, down to the *Act of Settlement*, and it will be found that they are, every one of them, *in perpetuum rei testimonium*, or testimonials only of what had *before* existed: But this Law is declaratory not only of what *never* existed *before*, but of a Right, against which *common usage*, which is the *commune Law of the Land*, has been *ever* in direct opposition. I say *ever* in direct opposition: for America, from beyond the memory of man, nay, even from the very first date of its civil existence to the Era of this reign, has been uninterruptedly used to the *internal* Taxation of itself.

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This Law therefore must be repealed. As it was enacted for the dignity of this country, so for justice sake, which is the true dignity of this country, let it now be repealed. It is against Right, and usurped Power cannot uphold it. It is true the motives that brought it into being were intentionally upright, but with the patronage of the Author of those motives, the motives themselves ceased*; and of the Act since, the *double Cabinet*, as Mr. Burke calls them, has made an infamous use. They knew not where to look for the Right of Taxation. They found it in this Act, and have so tyrannized under it, that America has now stamped its foot upon it, and will never stir a step until "this tyranny be overpast." Every island in the West-Indies look upon it with terror. All Ireland see it with a jealous eye: For who is the Casuist that can discriminate between a British parliamentary Right to tax America, and a British parliamentary Right to tax Ireland? The case is the same. The Right has been avowed in Parliament, and add to the 6. Geo. I. ch. 5. or Irish declaratory Act, the words only, "*in all cases whatsoever*," and the matter is at issue: but *Inexpediency* prevents

* It is to be observed, to the honour of the noble Marquis, under whose ministry the declaratory Act passed, that, when the mischiefs that had arisen in America were imputed to this Act, (and what is most singular, by the very author himself of all the mischiefs) his Lordship, standing up in his place in Parliament, and clapping his hand on his heart, said; "If any mischiefs have been derived from this Act, I vow to God, they were never intended by Me."

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the exercise. *Inexpediency*! curse on the term! What is *inexpedient* to-day, may be *expedient* to-morrow. *Inexpediency* is as the tyrant's sword, that hangs over the head, suspended by a thread; and which *Discretion* only is to keep from falling. But are Englishmen to be thus *worded* out of their Rights? Forbid it, Common Sense! Or rather let the fixed Principles of the English Constitution, and the eternal Rights of Humanity, be the sister Fates to cut this Thread of Danger, by upholding in its room—*Themselves*.

One word more. It may be further asked, What! are the Americans to enjoy all the Rights appertaining to this Government, and not contribute to its support? I answer, by no means: it is not fitting that they should. The fundamental Rights of the English Constitution I have shewn to be, *the security of Life, Liberty, and Property, and Freedom in Trade*; and to these Rights all British Subjects *within the realm*, are without exception, entitled, and should enjoy: but it is not so with British Subjects *out of the realm*, for *of them* something more is required, and *of them* something more has been received. They, (I mean the Colonists) surrendered from the first, one of the fundamental Rights of the Constitution, to wit, *Freedom in Trade**. This they gave up, and this they

* Montesquieu says, "The *Magna Charta* of England forbids the seizing and confiscating, in case of war, the effects of foreign merchants; except by way of reprisals." It is, (he adds) "very remarkable, that the English have made this one of the ar-

put into the *monopolizing* hands of their brethren here, as the gift of Contribution, for the price of Protection. Excellent, and how valuable the exchange! when the very gift of contribution did itself enhance the price of protection! inestimable jewel! than which a nobler did not enrich the royal crown; and yet noble as it is, it was not enough to satisfy the appetite of despotism. More must be had. All was required. With *Freedom in Trade, Life, Liberty, and Property* were to be parted with; or, in the alternative, the revenge of *Herod* was to be taken in the blood of Innocents. Revenge has been pursued: but *Herod-like*, and I will use the language of the immortal Shakespear;

“When you shall these unhappy deeds relate,
“ then must you speak,

“ *Of one*, whose hand

“ Like the *base Judean* * threw a pearl away

“ Richer than all his Tribe.”

I have now done with the Thoughts, which the perusal of Mr. Burke's Letter had awakened in my mind; and find myself arrived at that period where I had designed to stop: but as I am upon the important subject of America, as there are one or two matters more that resting on my mind, I could wish to remove, and as I shall not again trouble the public with any further sentiments of mine upon this occasion (for

“ *titles of their liberty.*” Vid. Spir. of Laws, b. ii. c. 13; and see also *Magna Charta*, art. 49, where *freedom in trade* is established.

* This was Herod, who slew his Wife Mariamne.

truth

truth being my only object herein, I shall as readily look for it in others, as seek it in myself) so, if I should advance one or two paces beyond my journey's end, I hope I shall be excused.

Having attended my duty in the House of Lords upon every important debate respecting America, it was there that I derived much useful information to myself: but yet, however instructed, as I truly have been, by the wisdom of those who opposed the measure of a destructive civil war, I must confess, my mind has been more made up on this subject, by what has *not* been said by the advocates for it, than by what has been advanced against it. The *first*, the *chief*, and the *great champion* of all, for this calamity to a country, has been the *now* Earl of Mansfield: but his being so, was to me, at the very first sight, an argument against the war; for his Lordship is no *warrior*, and therefore I supposed that if he had been more competent to the events of such an undertaking, he had been less *sanguine* in his recommendations of it. Let us see, however, what his arguments were. The first point to be settled was, which of the two countries was the *aggressor*; and of course which was to blame: but this would not bear a dispute, for in the year 1764, when all was peace and harmony between both countries, this country, by its Stamp-Act, flung the first *stone* at America, and so (the year 1766 excepted) Great-Britain continued this *stoning* of America, like as Stephen was *stoned*, to the
year

year 1775; when, by Negroes and Indians*, the Americans were to be *scalped* and *slayed* alive, even as Bartholomew was; and, in both instances, perhaps for the same reason: for Stephen and Bartholomew were *Saints*, and the Americans are called Dissenters, and Dissenters are cursed, by some Church-of-England-Men, as *Saints*. To get rid then of this stumbling-block, of *aggressorship*, something was to be devised; and this something was, that America meant to become independent of this country†: But how was this to be supported? The learned Lord proved it by *inuendoes*, by *sayings* and *do-*

* See Lord Dunmore's Proclamation, dated Williamsburg, Virginia, Nov. 11, 1775, and declared to be, "in Virtue of the Power and Authority to him given by his Majesty." A Proclamation, which not only excites the *Negroes* to rebellion against their masters by way of quelling a rebellion, but, by declaring *Negroes* FREE, proceeds (so far as this goes) to a repeal of the African laws; since it is under these Acts of Trade, and by them alone, that the *Right* of every master to his *Negro* originated, and is held. Was this power given to his Majesty by Parliament? And if not, it is declared, by 1. W. and M. st. 2. c. 2. "that the pretended Power of suspending, or dispensing with Laws, or the Execution of Laws, by regal Authority without Consent of Parliament, is *illegal*." See too, the Speech to "Brother Captain White-Eyes" (an Indian Chief) signed "your sincere friend and elder brother, DUNMORE."

For both the above references, look into Almon's Remembrancer for 1776, vol. i. pag. 176, and pag. 221.

† Upon the late Inquiry of the House of Commons into the Conduct of Sir William Howe in America, the Ministers produced two witnesses (a General Robinson who had resided 24 years in America, and a Mr. Galway, a native of America, and who had been a Member of Congress there, and therefore both competent to the fact) who proved, in the course of their evidence, that Independency had never been the object of America, and that even now two thirds of the People were for a Dependency upon this Country, and against Independency. What then must be done to them who made the Independency of America the pretence for lighting up a bloody and a cruel Civil War in that Country, and which has ended in the disgrace and ruin of this?

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ings, à priori, out of the American Assemblies; from Montcalm's Letters, which have been found to be forgeries; and from Kalm's Travels, who made a voyage to America in the year 1749, and who says, that he was *there told*, that "the English Colonies in North America, in the space of thirty or fifty years, "would be able to form a state by themselves, "independent of Old England." But here I must beg leave to make an observation or two. Supposing Mr. Kalm, in his Way to North America in the year 1749, had come into England, and on his arrival had been *told*, that there were men in this country who *on their bare knees had drank the Pretender's health*; would not the inference have been just as fair to say, that this country meant to put the Pretender on the throne of this kingdom, in exclusion of the present family, as to say, what Mr. Kalm does say, that America meant independency? I think it would: for the question is not what individuals say, but what is the sense of the nation. And it is plain it was not the sense of this country to put the Pretender on the throne, and I hope it never will, notwithstanding his health has been so drank, &c. &c. &c.; and what the sense of America was, appeared by the unanimous declaration of the people themselves in the most solemn and authentic manner. They say, through their Congress, (and if ever the sense of any people were taken, it was here found, for so free and

general an election of Representatives was never before known in the annals of the world) "We
 " *cheerfully* consent to the operation of such
 " Acts of the British Parliament, as are, *bona*
 " *fide*, restrained to the regulation of our ex-
 " ternal Commerce, for the purpose of securing
 " the commercial advantages of the whole em-
 " pire to the Mother Country," &c. &c. * It
 may indeed be said, that America has declar-
 ed herself independent of this country, and
 therefore the prophecy of Mr. Kalm was true;
 but this does not follow: for this country, by
 putting America out of the protection of its
 laws, forced it, for self-preservation sake, into
 that state of Independency. Admitting, how-
 ever, that America did mean Independency, I
 will now ask, Were the measures pursued the
 means to prevent her becoming so? I apprehend
 not: For although the force of this country
 be sufficient for conquest, ten times its force
 would be insufficient to hold the country in sub-
 jection. Three millions of people, not only
 with their affections lost, but their inveterate
 hatred gained, at three thousand miles over the
 Atlantic, distant from the arm of power, are
 not so easily held prostrate at the feet of Parlia-
 ment, as Lord North was directed to say could be
 done. No: One hour of justice and moderation
 would have done more, than all the German
 Blood-hounds hired from all the German Traf-

* Vid. Votes of the Congress, reprinted for J. Almon, opposite Burlington-house, Piccadilly, and also the last Petition of the Congress to the King.

sickers in Blood, in all the petty Principalities of Germany, can atchieve in twenty years to come.

But to return to the learned Lord. Having set up Independency, and upon what grounds I have shewn, as the object of America; his Lordship argued, that the Rubicon was passed, that we should kill the Americans, or the Americans would kill us, and that we could not look back, but must go forward, though our destruction be certain and inevitable. In short he drove us on, until we are all now driven, like so many asses, into a *Pound*; and are so *impounded*, that Thirteen Shillings Land-Tax in the *Pound*, nay, all the *Pounds*, Shillings, and Pence in the Nation, will not *unpound* us*. Such is our disgraceful, and truly to be lamented, situation. The contempt of ourselves, and the mockery of all Europe besides. Bullied by Frenchmen, insulted by Spaniards, memorialized by Dutchmen; and yet, happy

* The diction of this sentence has, it seems, for want of other matter, proved an excellent bone for the Critics to pick: But in this they have rendered a service which they did not mean to perform: For the truth of the Fact not even their effrontery could venture to deny, and the importance of the fact is obvious to all. By their snarling and noise therefore, the inquiries of others have of course been awakened to know what was the matter; and thus whilst the *matter* was got at, the end has been obtained by the *manner*.

But in justification of the rhetoric itself of this sentence, it is the business of every Writer when he makes use of Tropes and Figures to employ such as will be best understood by those for whose use he writes. The idea therefore of being an Ass in a *Pound*, and of paying Thirteen Shillings Land-Tax in the *Pound* was perhaps the best Mirror of Reflection that could be held up to those Country-Gentlemen who have been brought into this situation, by abetting and supporting the American War; and is what the Logicians would call *Argumentum ad Hominem*.

would it be for us, if these were the only evils that we are to suffer.

Another argument for our entering into this savage War was, that the Americans were Cowards; an argument as full of indignity to this country, as it was of reproach to him that made it. Of Indignity, for are We to go to war with our enemies because they are cowards? Does English valour want such motives of inducement for its exertion? Shameful reflection! Of reproach, for it was the argument of the first Lord of the Admiralty, the Earl of Sandwich, that high Officer of the State, placed at the Head of the British Navy. And is this the language of the gallant Navy of England? No: the brave love the brave, and had rather meet bravery in the wounds of themselves, than cowardice in the disgrace of others. To fight with Cowards is the loss of Honour, and "Honour is the Sailor's, as the Soldier's care." But the Americans are not Cowards, and this I say for the honour of this country. If they were, such an Army and such a Navy doing no more than has been done in America, would well warrant the propriety of those incitements to action, which the Earl of Sandwich thought necessary to hold out in the cowardice of America. When the Americans, therefore, are called Cowards by us, let us remember that it is not them, but ourselves, that we accuse of Cowardice.

The last argument I shall take notice of, (for it is endless to recount the absurdities that have been

been urged in support of this iniquitous warfare) and which I mention for that it seems to contain a *secret* that should be known, is the argument of Lord Cardiff, son of the Earl of Bute. His Lordship said, as a reason for carrying on this War of Parliament, that the Americans had offered to lay kingdoms at the feet of the Crown, but which his Majesty disdained to accept*. This is an heavy charge, and, as I am as much an enemy to *arbitrary* power in the Crown, as I am to *arbitrary* power in Parliament, if true, I must confess, except so far as the justice of this nation is concerned in such a war, I should feel little concern else for America: but as it seems very unnatural that men should be surrendering their liberties, at the very time that they are fighting for them, so I have reason to believe that this argument has been formed upon grounds that will not support it. It is true, the Americans acknowledge the authority of the King, and will not acknowledge the authority of Parliament. It is from hence therefore, I presume, inferred, that the Americans are laying kingdoms at the feet of his Majesty; and if so, to explain this matter, is to remove the charge. The Americans were the subjects of the Crown of England, and of course owed allegiance to the King of England. They were never the *subjects* of their fellow-*subjects* the Parliament of England, and therefore neither owed nor professed allegiance to

* The Archbishop of York has adopted the same assertion. See his Sermon, p. 22, and 23.

Parliament. Besides, the King of England, by the Constitution of England, cannot levy taxes on his subjects; and therefore, for the Americans to acknowledge the authority of the King, is no surrender of their property to the King: whereas if they acknowledged the authority of Parliament, who do exercise the right of taxation over the People when represented, it would be, *without their being represented*, a surrender of their property to Parliament; and a forging of chains for themselves. Under the acknowledged authority then of the Crown, the Americans still preserve their constitutional Rights: under the *required* acknowledged authority of Parliament, they would lose them; and this is the reason that the Americans acknowledged the one, and will *never* acknowledge the other. But it is feared, that some future King, (not his present Majesty, for he has not a wish to govern but through his Parliaments,) may, upon requisition to his faithful American subjects, procure such large grants of money, as shall enable him to govern without Parliaments. Indeed, if we are to judge of what America may do, by what it has done, upon suchlike occasions, this argument is not without its force; and therefore, to prevent such generosity from being hereafter hurtful to this country, (and there cannot be a better time for it, as it is the object of his present Majesty to maintain the *supremacy* of Parliament,) let an Act be passed, (if it be not too late) declaring that

that all money obtained from the Colonies by requisition from the Crown, shall be carried into the Exchequer, and accounted for in Parliament. This will remove the danger apprehended, and prevent those *lowers of slavery*, the Americans, from making, at any future period, the Crown of England arbitrary.

Upon the whole, when I perceive a war, and such a war too, so weakly supported, and yet so violently pursued; when I find the most elevated of the Church, preaching and publishing to the world passive obedience and non-resistance to the supremacy of Law*, whether that Law be right or wrong, whether it be good or bad, whether it be to establish Popery

* The Archbishop of York says, "the foundation of legal freedom, is the *supremacy of law*." This I suppose is an apology for his Grace's *allegiance* to the Quebec-Act, and for his making this Act a pattern for cramming *Bishopricks* down the Throats of the Americans, by the help of the Civil Power, that is, on the points of Bayonets. See his Sermon, pag. 19, and pag. 24.

His Lordship says too, "As there are in the nature of things, but two sorts of Government; that of Law, and that of Force; it wants no argument to prove that under the last Freedom cannot subsist." This is a distinction without a difference; for when Law is contrary to the natural or political rights of mankind, it is Force, and the worst of all force: for it is as "a wolf in sheep's cloathing," and cometh unawares, "like a thief in the night." See p. 19.

Again, his Lordship says, "These indeed" (that is "Despotism and Anarchy) have usually *gone together*, for no Anarchy ever prevailed, which did not *end* in Despotism." This is a Bull, but an Irish one; and not a Popish Bull. If where Anarchy prevails Despotism *ends*, Anarchy and Despotism must follow one another, and not usually *go together*. See p. 20.

His Grace will excuse the Attention I have paid him in the course of my observations: but as I am unfortunately one of those Parties who have (according to him) "no Principle belonging to them," and are "in the last stage of political Depravity," I was willing to examine, a little, his Lordship's principles; that if I approved them, I might adopt them.

or Protestantism, whether it be to expel Bishops from the House of Lords, or continue their undue influence there, whether it be enacted by an honest, or by a corrupt and abandoned Parliament; when I see men that were pillored in the reign of good old George II. pensioned in this, and for the same reasons; when I hear of others hired to root out the very idea of *public virtue* from the minds, and tear *benevolence* from the hearts of Englishmen; when I reflect, but why add more to the black catalogue of public dangers? It is time to look at home: it is time, with more than *Stentorian* voice, to call for union among the Friends of the Constitution: it is time that private opinion should yield to public safety: it is time that we keep both "watch and ward:" for if the liberties of our fellow-subjects in America are to be taken from them, it is for the idiot only to suppose that we can preserve our own. The dagger uplifted against the breast of America, is meant for the heart of Old England. *Non agitur de vectigalibus, Libertas in dubio est* *.

In fine, these are my Sentiments, and these my Principles. They are the Principles of the Constitution; and under this persuasion whilst I have *signed* them with my Name, I will, if necessary, as readily, *seal* them with my Blood.

* Cato Orat. ap. Sall.



